CHAPTER Ten: “Property”
第十章：“财产权”(引言)
Jack Valenti has been the president of the Motion Picture Association of America since 1966. He first came to Washington, D.C., with Lyndon Johnson's administration—literally. The famous picture of Johnson's swearing-in on Air Force One after the assassination of President Kennedy has Valenti in the background. In his almost forty years of running the MPAA, Valenti has established himself as perhaps the most prominent and effective lobbyist in Washington.
杰克‧瓦伦提自19961966年开始担任美国电影协会（美影协， MPAA）的主席。不夸张地讲，他最先应当是和林顿‧约翰逊总统的这一届政府同时来到华盛顿特区的。肯尼迪总统遇刺之后，约翰逊在空军一号上宣誓继任，这 个著名的场面被拍摄下来，瓦伦提正在画面的背景之中。他主掌美国电影协会将近四十年，在此期间，他成了华盛顿最突出有效的游说者。

The MPAA is the American branch of the international Motion Picture Association. It was formed in 1922 as a trade association whose goal was to defend American movies against increasing domestic criticism. The organization now represents not only filmmakers but producers and distributors of entertainment for television, video, and cable. Its board is made up of the chairmen and presidents of the seven major producers and distributors of motion picture and television programs in the United States: Walt Disney, Sony Pictures Entertainment, MGM, Paramount Pictures, Twentieth Century Fox, Universal Studios, and Warner Brothers.
美影协是国际电影协会的一个分支。它成立于1922年，当时该协会（zHENG:是否体现trade association？）的 目标任务是应付来自国内日益增多的对美国电影的批评。现今，该组织不但是电影制作者的代言人，同时也涵盖了娱乐电视，音像制品和有线电视的制作者和发行 者。该组织的决策委员会由一个主席和美国七个最主要的电影电视制作发行公司的总裁组成；这七大公司分别是沃尔特‧迪斯尼、索尼影像娱乐、米高美、派拉蒙、 二十世纪福克斯、环球电影以及华纳兄弟。

Valenti is only the third president of the MPAA. No president before him has had as much influence over that organization, or over Washington. As a Texan, Valenti has mastered the single most important political skill of a Southerner—the ability to appear simple and slow while hiding a lightning-fast intellect. To this day, Valenti plays the simple, humble man. But this Harvard MBA, and author of four books, who finished high school at the age of fifteen and flew more than fifty combat missions in World War II, is no Mr. Smith. When Valenti went to Washington, he mastered the city in a quintessentially Washingtonian way.

瓦伦提只是美影协第三任主席。他的前任们，对这个组织或者华盛顿政府所产生的影响，没有一位及得过他比得上他。 作为一位德克萨斯州人，瓦伦提深谙南方佬的独门政治手腕—表面上粗简迟钝，实际上心思活跃，快如闪电。时至今日，瓦伦提依然保持着简扼低调的作风。这位哈 佛大学毕业的MBA，曾经出版过四本专著，十五岁就高中毕业，在二战中参加过不下五十次飞行作战任务，然而他绝非有如当年史密斯先生[1]的等闲之辈。当 瓦氏重归华盛顿之时，他已经摸透了华府政要的权谋。

译注[1] 史密斯先生的典故出自于1939年美国一部著名黑白电影《史密斯先生上美京》(Mr. Smith Goes to Washington)。 剧中的史密斯先生是一位抱有天真幻想的参议员。此处与瓦伦提的老练世故形成对照。

In defending artistic liberty and the freedom of speech that our culture depends upon, the MPAA has done important good. In crafting the MPAA rating system, it has probably avoided a great deal of speech-regulating harm. But there is an aspect to the organization's mission that is both the most radical and the most important. This is the organization's effort, epitomized in Valenti's every act, to redefine the meaning of “creative property.”

我们的文化依托于艺术创作自由以及言论自由，为了捍卫这种自由， 美影协曾经做出过重要的贡献。它构划了美影协电影分级制度，很大程度上避免了言论管制所带来的危害。然而该组织有一个最为根本和重要的任务，就是重新规定 “创造性财产”的涵义；这个使命贯穿于瓦氏所有努力的始末。
In 1982, Valenti's testimony to Congress captured the strategy perfectly:
No matter the lengthy arguments made, no matter the charges and the counter-charges, no matter the tumult and the shouting, reasonable men and women will keep returning to the fundamental issue, the central theme which animates this entire debate: Creative property owners must be accorded the same rights and protection resident in all other property owners in the nation. That is the issue. That is the question. And that is the rostrum on which this entire hearing and the debates to follow must rest.1

瓦伦提在1982年对国会作证时的发言充分体现了上述策略：
无论争论如何喋喋不休，无论正反两方得如何说理，无论喧嚣吵闹如何激烈，理性男女们最终会回归到引发整个辩论的一个最根本问题：创造性财产所有者（？）必须被授予本国其他财产所有者相同的权利并享有同等保护。这是事情的根本。这是问题的关键。并且这就是一个讲坛，我们接下去整个听证会和所有辩论都要摆到这个台面上来进行。(1)
The strategy of this rhetoric, like the strategy of most of Valenti's rhetoric, is brilliant and simple and brilliant because simple. The “central theme” to which “reasonable men and women” will return is this: “Creative property owners must be accorded the same rights and protections resident in all other property owners in the nation.” There are no second-class citizens, Valenti might have continued. There should be no second-class property owners.

　这个策略的阐述，就如同瓦氏的措辞，非常高明又不失简短。其高明之处正来自于它的简短有力。“理性男女”所趋向的“核心问题”正是如 此：“创造性财产所有者必须被授予本国其他财产所有者相同的权利并享有同等保护。”瓦氏想必会接着说，这里没有二等公民。 而且没有二等的财产所有者。

This claim has an obvious and powerful intuitive pull. It is stated with such clarity as to make the idea as obvious as the notion that we use elections to pick presidents. But in fact, there is no more extreme a claim made by anyone who is serious in this debate than this claim of Valenti's. Jack Valenti, however sweet and however brilliant, is perhaps the nation's foremost extremist when it comes to the nature and scope of “creative property.” His views have no reasonable connection to our actual legal tradition, even if the subtle pull of his Texan charm has slowly redefined that tradition, at least in Washington.
他的这个阐述浅显易见，直观有力。竞选总统时用词明晰的程度也不过如此。然而事实上，在认真参与这个辩论中的人们中， 没有人比瓦伦提的言论更为极端。无论杰克‧瓦伦提何等恭顺聪明，他仍然可能是整个国家对于“创造性财产”的性质和范围最为极端的分子。他的观点与我们的法 律传统没有必然合理的联系，即使他作为一个德州人所拥有的细微有致的魅力已经慢慢的改变这个传统，至少在华盛顿是如此。

While “creative property” is certainly “property” in a nerdy and precise sense that lawyers are trained to understand,2 it has never been the case, nor should it be, that “creative property owners” have been “ac- corded the same rights and protection resident in all other property owners.” Indeed, if creative property owners were given the same rights as all other property owners, that would effect a radical, and radically undesirable, change in our tradition.
　
“创造性财产”这个概念 理所当然地被受过训练的律师扣着字眼儿的理解成为一种“产权”(2)， 这是不对的，而且“创造性财产所有者”也不应该“被授予本国其他财产所有人相同的权利并享有同等保护。”的确，倘若创造性财产所有者受到与其他财产所有者 同等程度的保护的话，其结果将极端地和极端无益地导致我们传统的蜕变。

Valenti knows this. But he speaks for an industry that cares squat for our tradition and the values it represents. He speaks for an industry that is instead fighting to restore the tradition that the British overturned in 1710. In the world that Valenti's changes would create, a powerful few would exercise powerful control over how our creative culture would develop.
瓦伦提也明白这一点。但是他依然口口声声的回护维护这个挤占传统和传统价值的行业。他又口口声声地庇护的这个行业去斗志昂扬地复辟已经被英国人于1710年颠覆的传统。在瓦伦提改变的这个世界里，诞生了一小撮能量巨大的寡头，掌控着我们文化创新的发展方向。
I have two purposes in this chapter. The first is to convince you that, historically, Valenti's claim is absolutely wrong. The second is to convince you that it would be terribly wrong for us to reject our history. We have always treated rights in creative property differently from the rights resident in all other property owners. They have never been the same. And they should never be the same, because, however counterintuitive this may seem, to make them the same would be to fundamentally weaken the opportunity for new creators to create. Creativity depends upon the owners of creativity having less than perfect control.
　我在本章有两项意图。首先，要使你相信，从历史的角度来看，瓦伦提的言论是根本错误的根本就是错的。 其次，使你确信，倘若我们否认我们的历史，结果也会大错特错。我们一直以来对于创作产权和其他产权是区别对待的。他们从来就不是一回事；因为倘若没有区分 的话，这会从根本上弱化新手进行创新的机会，尽管这个理由不是很能够被直观地看出。创造性就在于创造的主人对于其创造掌握着不怎么严格的控制。

Organizations such as the MPAA, whose board includes the most powerful of the old guard, have little interest, their rhetoric notwithstanding, in assuring that the new can displace them. No organization does. No person does. (Ask me about tenure, for example.) But what's good for the MPAA is not necessarily good for America. A society that defends the ideals of free culture must preserve precisely the opportunity for new creativity to threaten the old.
　诸如美影协这类组织，它们的委员会囊括了最强势的旧派卫道者，缺乏 去旧迎新的兴趣，尽管他们嘴巴上会有另外一套措辞。　没有组织愿意如此，也没有个人如此。（比如说，问问关于我的终生教席的事就可明白。）然而对美影协有 利的事，未必对整个美国有好处。对于一个捍卫自由文化理想的社会而言，人们须分毫不差的保障新兴创造力胁迫旧事物就范的机会。
　

To get just a hint that there is something fundamentally wrong in Valenti's argument, we need look no further than the United States Constitution itself.
倘要对瓦伦提根本上错误言论有一星半点的了解的话，我们不妨看一下美利坚合纵国的宪法本身是如何说的。
The framers of our Constitution loved “property.” Indeed, so strongly did they love property that they built into the Constitution an important requirement. If the government takes your property—if it condemns your house, or acquires a slice of land from your farm—it is required, under the Fifth Amendment's “Takings Clause,” to pay you “just compensation” for that taking. The Constitution thus guarantees that property is, in a certain sense, sacred. It cannot ever be taken from the property owner unless the government pays for the privilege.
我们的立宪者对“财产”情有独钟。的确，他们对“财产”的喜好, 使其 被纳入宪法，成为一个重要组成部分。如果政府取走了你的财产--比如没收住宅，或征用你农庄的一小块地皮—他们必须根据宪法第五修正案的“褫夺条款”对你 进行“合理补偿”。宪法于是在一定的意义上规定了财产神圣不可侵犯。财产向来(ever) 不可被剥夺，除非政府对获得的利益支付了补偿。
Yet the very same Constitution speaks very differently about what Valenti calls “creative property.” In the clause granting Congress the power to create “creative property,” the Constitution requires that after a “limited time,” Congress take back the rights that it has granted and set the “creative property” free to the public domain. Yet when Congress does this, when the expiration of a copyright term “takes” your copyright and turns it over to the public domain, Congress does not have any obligation to pay “just compensation” for this “taking.” Instead, the same Constitution that requires compensation for your land requires that you lose your “creative property” right without any compensation at all.
而且，就是这部宪法中的所说的“创造性财产”也与瓦伦提所称的大相径庭。在授权国会设立“创 造性财产”的条款中，该宪法要求国会在“期限”过后，收回此种财产权，并把此“创造性财产”投诸可自由利用的公共领域。一旦国会这样做了，也就是你的在版 权过期之后，被返之于公共领域，国会无需为其“褫夺”行为进行“合理补偿”。相反的，正是这部要求补偿征用土地的宪法， 规定了在你失去“创造性财产”之后，不会有任何补偿。
The Constitution thus on its face states that these two forms of property are not to be accorded the same rights. They are plainly to be treated differently. Valenti is therefore not just asking for a change in our tradition when he argues that creative-property owners should be accorded the same rights as every other property-right owner. He is effectively arguing for a change in our Constitution itself.
由此，宪法从字面上就规定了两种财产权不是同样的权利。显而易见，他们二者要被区别对待。当瓦伦提说创造性财产权要获得同其他所有财产权一样的保护时，他要求的不只是翻改我们的传统，而且实际上意图篡改宪法。
Arguing for a change in our Constitution is not necessarily wrong. There was much in our original Constitution that was plainly wrong. The Constitution of 1789 entrenched slavery; it left senators to be appointed rather than elected; it made it possible for the electoral college to produce a tie between the president and his own vice president (as it did in 1800). The framers were no doubt extraordinary, but I would be the first to admit that they made big mistakes. We have since rejected some of those mistakes; no doubt there could be others that we should reject as well. So my argument is not simply that because Jefferson did it, we should, too.
当然，修改宪法的诉求并不一定都是错误的。我们原来的那部宪法就有很多明显的错误。1789年的那部宪法庇护蓄奴制度；它要求参议员不依选举产生， 而是委派任命；它使选举团与总统的权力势均力敌成为可能（1800年的情形就是这样的）。 立宪者们无疑是超凡卓绝的， 但是我愿意成为第一个指认他们犯下这些弥天大错的人。我们曾经拒绝过其中一些错误；毋庸置疑，那里依然存在着我们也应当拒绝的其他错误。由此，我的观点 是，不要仅仅是因为杰斐逊那样说了，我们就应该跟从。
Instead, my argument is that because Jefferson did it, we should at least try to understand why. Why did the framers, fanatical property types that they were, reject the claim that creative property be given the same rights as all other property? Why did they require that for creative property there must be a public domain?

相反，我的主张是，我们至少要明白杰斐逊为什么要那样说。为什么立宪者们狂热的支持财产权制度，却不肯给创造性财产与其他一般财产同样的权利？为什么他们一定要将创造性财产置于公共领域？
To answer this question, we need to get some perspective on the history of these “creative property” rights, and the control that they enabled. Once we see clearly how differently these rights have been defined, we will be in a better position to ask the question that should be at the core of this war: Not whether creative property should be protected, but how. Not whether we will enforce the rights the law gives to creative-property owners, but what the particular mix of rights ought to be. Not whether artists should be paid, but whether institutions designed to assure that artists get paid need also control how culture develops.

要回答这个问题，我们须得运用“创造性财产”的历史视角，看看他们如何使实现操控的。我 们一旦看清了这一些权利是如何被定义的， 就能够站到一个更佳的立场，以提出这场论战的核心问题：不是问应不应该要保护创造性财产，而是要问如何保护。不是问我们是否要执行法律赋予创造性财产所有 者的权利，而是问应当执行何种特定权力的组合。不是问艺术家是否要得到回报，而是问为保障艺术家得到回报而设计的制度，是否也应该去操控文化的发展。
To answer these questions, we need a more general way to talk about how property is protected. More precisely, we need a more general way than the narrow language of the law allows. In Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, I used a simple model to capture this more general perspective. For any particular right or regulation, this model asks how four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken the right or regulation. I represented it with this diagram:

为 了回答这些问题， 我们需要一个更具普遍性的立场来讨论产权是如何受到保护的。更准确一点儿说，我们需要一个超出狭窄的法律用语的论述，要求具有一般普适性。 在《代码，和其他数字空间的法律》一书中，我用了一个简易的模型来表述这个普遍立场。对于任何特定的权利和规制而言，此模型采用了四大模块来讨论权利和规 制是如何被支撑或弱化的。我将此模型重新归纳成如下图表：

图表1
At the center of this picture is a regulated dot: the individual or group that is the target of regulation, or the holder of a right. (In each case throughout, we can describe this either as regulation or as a right. For simplicity's sake, I will speak only of regulations.) The ovals represent four ways in which the individual or group might be regulated— either constrained or, alternatively, enabled. Law is the most obvious constraint (to lawyers, at least). It constrains by threatening punishments after the fact if the rules set in advance are violated. So if, for example, you willfully infringe Madonna's copyright by copying a song from her latest CD and posting it on the Web, you can be punished with a $150,000 fine. The fine is an ex post punishment for violating an ex ante rule. It is imposed by the state.
在图的中央是一个规制点：个人或团体要么是规制的目标，要么是权利持有者。（在所有情况中，我们把这个规制点看成既是规制又是一种权利。 为了行文简便起见，我们在下文中只说规制。）卵圆形的四个模块分别代表个人或团体如何被四种方式规制的—可能是受到约束，也可能是获得能动力。法律是最明 显的一种约束（至少对于从事法律工作的人员而言是如此）。它的约束力体现在，当事先规定的规则被破坏之后，违规者要被施以惩罚。比如， 如果你从麦当娜最新的唱片中复制一首歌，然后贴在网上，那么就是故意侵犯她的版权，将要被施以150,000美元的罚金。这个罚金是对违反对事先规定而后 施的惩戒。此种惩罚由国家执行。
Norms are a different kind of constraint. They, too, punish an individual for violating a rule. But the punishment of a norm is imposed by a community, not (or not only) by the state. There may be no law against spitting, but that doesn't mean you won't be punished if you spit on the ground while standing in line at a movie. The punishment might not be harsh, though depending upon the community, it could easily be more harsh than many of the punishments imposed by the state. The mark of the difference is not the severity of the rule, but the source of the enforcement.
规范是另外一种约束。它们同样的对违反规则的个人进行惩罚。此种惩罚由社群施 行，而不是（或不仅仅是）由国家执行。恐怕没有一部法律会规定禁止吐痰，但是这不等于，你在排队看电影时吐了一口痰，就没人来惩戒你。这时的惩罚可能不那 么严厉，当然这也要取决于各个社群的不同情况； 同时，这种惩罚也很容易比许多国家强制的惩罚更为严酷。区别点不在于规则的严厉性，而是执行惩罚手段的有效性。
The market is a third type of constraint. Its constraint is effected through conditions: You can do X if you pay Y; you'll be paid M if you do N. These constraints are obviously not independent of law or norms—it is property law that defines what must be bought if it is to be taken legally; it is norms that say what is appropriately sold. But given a set of norms, and a background of property and contract law, the market imposes a simultaneous constraint upon how an individual or group might behave.

市场机制是第三种约束。 此种约束是办有一定条件才能生效：如果你支付了报酬Y,那么才能去做事件X;如果你做了事件N，你也会得到报酬M。这些约束显然不是独立于法律或规范之外 的—正是财产法，规定了什么样的补偿才是合法转移财产的条件；正是规范，厘定了什么是正当的可出售物。然而，在给定一套规范和既定财产法和契约法的背景 下，市场对于个人行为和团体行为的约束是共时有效的。
Finally, and for the moment, perhaps, most mysteriously, “architecture”—the physical world as one finds it—is a constraint on behavior. A fallen bridge might constrain your ability to get across a river. Railroad tracks might constrain the ability of a community to integrate its social life. As with the market, architecture does not effect its constraint through ex post punishments. Instead, also as with the market, architecture effects its constraint through simultaneous conditions. These conditions are imposed not by courts enforcing contracts, or by police punishing theft, but by nature, by “architecture.” If a 500-pound boulder blocks your way, it is the law of gravity that enforces this constraint. If a $500 airplane ticket stands between you and a flight to New York, it is the market that enforces this constraint.

最后一种约束可能是目前为止最为密异的，叫做“基构”[2]，人们发现其乃是物 理层面上对于人们行为的约束。一座坍塌的大桥可能对你过河的能力产生约束。铁路轨道的铺设的多寡可能对于一个社群融入更大范围的社会生活，产生约束性的影 响。同市场机制一样，基构的约束力不是溯及既往的。相反，仍然和市场机制相同，基构的约束机制体现在其附加的共时性条件。这些条件不是由执行契约的法院或 惩罚偷窃的警力而强加的，而是自然而然地靠“基构”来维持。如果一块重达500磅的大石头挡住了你的去路，这时就由引力定律来决定你去向的约束。如果是有 一张价值500美元的机票，横隔在你和飞往纽约的飞机之间，那么此时就由市场机制决定对你去向的约束。
译注[2]：Architecture在Lessig的文章中具有特殊含义（参看下文），不是通常的“建筑”、“建构”之类的意思。此处，译作“基构”，意指“基本构建”。
So the first point about these four modalities of regulation is obvious: They interact. Restrictions imposed by one might be reinforced by another. Or restrictions imposed by one might be undermined by another.
由此，关于此四大规制模块需做的第一点说明就是：它们之间互相影响。一个模块产生了的限制，可能会被另一个模块强化此限制效应。或者也有可能，一个模块的限制会被另外一个模块的影响机制抵消。

The second point follows directly: If we want to understand the effective freedom that anyone has at a given moment to do any particular thing, we have to consider how these four modalities interact. Whether or not there are other constraints (there may well be; my claim is not about comprehensiveness), these four are among the most significant, and any regulator (whether controlling or freeing) must consider how these four in particular interact.

第二点说明紧跟而来：如果我们要弄明白人们在有效自由的条件下，在特定时刻是如何去 做特定事情的话，我们必须得考虑这四大模块如何相互作用。无论是否还存在别的约束（或许还存在有此四者之外的约束；我的论述没有概括到所有的情况），这四 者是最为重要的； 管制者（无论是操控还是解套）必须对于这四个模块的相互作用给予特别的考虑。
So, for example, consider the “freedom” to drive a car at a high speed. That freedom is in part restricted by laws: speed limits that say how fast you can drive in particular places at particular times. It is in part restricted by architecture: speed bumps, for example, slow most rational drivers; governors in buses, as another example, set the maximum rate at which the driver can drive. The freedom is in part restricted by the market: Fuel efficiency drops as speed increases, thus the price of gasoline indirectly constrains speed. And finally, the norms of a community may or may not constrain the freedom to speed. Drive at 50 mph by a school in your own neighborhood and you're likely to be punished by the neighbors. The same norm wouldn't be as effective in a different town, or at night.

由此，举个例子说，请考虑驾驶一辆高速行驶的汽车的“自由”。 关于这种“自由”，有一部分是由法律决定的：法律的限速要求，规定了在何时何地你的车子能开得多快。车速的限制，还有一部分是由基构决定的：比如限速的路 障能够使大多数理性的驾驶者缓行；另外一个例子是，公共汽车的控制挡（governor?）决定了开车者能够行驶的最大速度。这个自由还有一部分为市场机 制所限制：当车速加快，燃料功效下降，由此汽油的价格会间接地影响行驶速度。最后，社群规范也可能会约束到开车速度的自由，当然也可能不会产生影响。在学 校附近的社区开车速度快达50英里每小时，你就有可能被这个社区处罚。同样这条规范在另外一个村镇里或者在夜间行驶时就起不到那样的约束作用。

图表2
The final point about this simple model should also be fairly clear: While these four modalities are analytically independent, law has a special role in affecting the three.3 The law, in other words, sometimes operates to increase or decrease the constraint of a particular modality. Thus, the law might be used to increase taxes on gasoline, so as to increase the incentives to drive more slowly. The law might be used to mandate more speed bumps, so as to increase the difficulty of driving rapidly. The law might be used to fund ads that stigmatize reckless driving. Or the law might be used to require that other laws be more strict—a federal requirement that states decrease the speed limit, for example—so as to decrease the attractiveness of fast driving.

最后一点关于这个简易模型的说明也很清楚：这四大模块从分析的角度来看相互独立，然而法律这个模块在其 中，具有影响其他三个模块的特殊作用。换句话说，法律在运作时，有时会加强，有时也会消减其他模块的约束力。由此，法律可能会通过加重对汽油的税收，来抬 高人们对缓速驾驶的积极性。法律可能规定增加限速路障的数目，用以加大飚车的难度。法律可能被用来筹款去做公益广告，以警示那些不计后果的开车行为 。或者，法律也可能要求其它相关法律更为严厉—比如，联邦法律要求各州限制更低的车速—以此来消减开快车的诱惑力。
These constraints can thus change, and they can be changed. To understand the effective protection of liberty or protection of property at any particular moment, we must track these changes over time. A restriction imposed by one modality might be erased by another. A freedom enabled by one modality might be displaced by another.4

于是，这些约束各自变化，或者被其他因素改变。要理解在特定时期对自由的有效保护或者对产权的保护，我们必须对这些变化进行时间上的跟踪调查。一个模块所强加的限制可能会被另一个模块的影响所减轻。一个模块赋予的自由可能被另外一个模块的影响销于无形。（4）
好莱坞的正确性---(0)
CHAPTER Ten: “Property”
第十章：“财产权”（2）

The most obvious point that this model reveals is just why, or just how, Hollywood is right. The copyright warriors have rallied Congress and the courts to defend copyright. This model helps us see why that rallying makes sense.
Let's say this is the picture of copyright's regulation before the Internet:

显而易见，这个模型恰恰揭示了为什么以及在何等意义上好莱坞是正确的。版权斗士们纠集了国会和法院来保卫其版权。这个模型有助于我们弄明白他们的这种联合的意义。

让我们说说这张图表所表示的互联网时代之前对版权的规制：

图表3
There is balance between law, norms, market, and architecture. The law limits the ability to copy and share content, by imposing penalties on those who copy and share content. Those penalties are reinforced by technologies that make it hard to copy and share content (architecture) and expensive to copy and share content (market). Finally, those penalties are mitigated by norms we all recognize—kids, for example, taping other kids' records. These uses of copyrighted material may well be infringement, but the norms of our society (before the Internet, at least) had no problem with this form of infringement.

法 律、规范、市场机制和基构之间达到平衡。法律限制复制和内容共享，这是通过对违反者进行惩罚达到的。这些惩罚机制会经过技术手段得以强化，这里的技术能够 使复制和内容共享变得繁复困难（基构机制），或者昂贵得无法承受（市场机制）。 最终，这些惩罚都会被我们所认可的规范所减轻—比如，幼童复制其他幼童的录制品。这些对于受版权保护材料的使用很可能是侵权的，但是我们社会（至少是互联 网时代之前的社会）的对于这些侵权都不视作问题。

Enter the Internet, or, more precisely, technologies such as MP3s and p2p sharing. Now the constraint of architecture changes dramatically, as does the constraint of the market. And as both the market and architecture relax the regulation of copyright, norms pile on. The happy balance (for the warriors, at least) of life before the Internet becomes an effective state of anarchy after the Internet.

让 我们进入互联网，或者更精确的说，让我们开始使用诸如MP3和P2P文件共享技术。现在基构的约束发生了戏剧性的变化，市场机制的约束也发生了同样的变 化。当市场机制和基构机制都使版权的规制得到了松弛是，规范叠积出现。 前互联网时代的快乐平衡的生活（至少对于版权斗士而言是快乐的）被打破，然后剩下的只是一团互联网带来的混乱。

Thus the sense of, and justification for, the warriors' response. Technology has changed, the warriors say, and the effect of this change, when ramified through the market and norms, is that a balance of protection for the copyright owners' rights has been lost.

由此有必要要搞明白版权斗士的回应是怎么回事，他们合理性在哪里？斗士们说，技术变化，分别通过对市场机制和规范机制产生两股影响，于是原来版权所有者的保护的平衡被打破。
This is Iraq after the fall of Saddam, but this time no government is justifying the looting that results.

这就好比萨达姆倒台以后的伊拉克，但是在版权这个战场上，没有一个政府有合法理由去掳夺那些战利品。

Neither this analysis nor the conclusions that follow are new to the warriors. Indeed, in a “White Paper” prepared by the Commerce Department (one heavily influenced by the copyright warriors) in 1995, this mix of regulatory modalities had already been identified and the strategy to respond already mapped. In response to the changes the Internet had effected, the White Paper argued (1) Congress should strengthen intellectual property law, (2) businesses should adopt innovative marketing techniques, (3) technologists should push to develop code to protect copyrighted material, and (4) educators should educate kids to better protect copyright.

这 个分析和接下来的结论对版权斗士们而言都不是什么新玩艺儿。事实上，商务部1995年所准备的“白皮书”（这份文件很大程度上受到版权斗士的左右），指出 了各个模块的交替规制作用， 并提出了回应的策略。对于互联网所产生的影响，白皮书指出：（1）国会应当加强知识产权法律，（2）企业应当采纳创新性的市场营销技术，（3）技术人员应 当推进编码技术以保护版权，以及（4）教育者应当帮助孩童树立更强的保护版权的意识。

This mixed strategy is just what copyright needed—if it was to preserve the particular balance that existed before the change induced by the Internet. And it's just what we should expect the content industry to push for. It is as American as apple pie to consider the happy life you have as an entitlement, and to look to the law to protect it if something comes along to change that happy life. Homeowners living in a flood plain have no hesitation appealing to the government to rebuild (and rebuild again) when a flood (architecture) wipes away their property (law). Farmers have no hesitation appealing to the government to bail them out when a virus (architecture) devastates their crop. Unions have no hesitation appealing to the government to bail them out when imports (market) wipe out the U.S. steel industry.

这 个混合策略正是版权所需要的—倘若其欲维持被互联网带打破的那种特定的平衡。这也正是我们期望文化产业所要推进的。在美国，提起人们天生就应当享有幸福生 活的权利，便如同美国式“苹果派”[1]一样自然而然，如果此权利受到什么事物的侵害， 法律必须给予保护。居住在容易泛滥大水的平原家户，一旦被某次洪水（基构层面）冲走了其财产（法律层面），他们可以毫无顾虑地要求政府为其修缮家园（或多 次重修）。当农户们的庄稼被害虫糟蹋，他们可以毫无顾虑地要求政府为其担当损失。当美国钢铁工业受到钢铁进口（市场层面）冲击时，钢铁工业联合会可以毫无 顾虑地向政府提出救济要求。
译注[1]: Apple Pie（苹果派）是美国代表性食品。”as American as apple pie”就是指非常具有美国特色。

Thus, there's nothing wrong or surprising in the content industry's campaign to protect itself from the harmful consequences of a technological innovation. And I would be the last person to argue that the changing technology of the Internet has not had a profound effect on the content industry's way of doing business, or as John Seely Brown describes it, its “architecture of revenue.”

由 此，文化产业为了使自己免于技术革新带来的破坏性冲击，而采取的保护性运动，本无可厚非，也没有什么值得大惊小怪的。我最不愿意说的话就是，变革中的互联 网技术对于文化产业的商业运营不会产生深远的影响，或者说不会对如约翰·山列·布朗所言的产业“收入结构”产生影响。

But just because a particular interest asks for government support, it doesn't follow that support should be granted. And just because technology has weakened a particular way of doing business, it doesn't follow that the government should intervene to support that old way of doing business. Kodak, for example, has lost perhaps as much as 20 percent of their traditional film market to the emerging technologies of digital cameras.5 Does anyone believe the government should ban digital cameras just to support Kodak? Highways have weakened the freight business for railroads. Does anyone think we should ban trucks from roads for the purpose of protecting the railroads? Closer to the subject of this book, remote channel changers have weakened the “stickiness” of television advertising (if a boring commercial comes on the TV, the remote makes it easy to surf ), and it may well be that this change has weakened the television advertising market. But does anyone believe we should regulate remotes to reinforce commercial television? (Maybe by limiting them to function only once a second, or to switch to only ten channels within an hour?)

然 而，仅根据一个利益集团要求政府扶持的请求，并不能必然给予这种支持。仅仅因为技术变革弱化了某种特定的商业运行模式，并不能要求政府介入来保护这种旧方 法。比如，对柯达而言，面临数码相机技术的问世，其失去了多达20%原有胶卷的市场份额。（5）那么有人会相信政府应当通过禁止数码相机来支持柯达吗？高 速公路使铁路货运业务变得不那么重要。那么有人会不会认为应当禁开运货汽车，以达到保护铁路业务的目的。与本书主题相近，频道遥控选择器减低了电视广告的 “粘性”（如果令人乏味的电视广告出现在屏幕上，遥控器能够非常方便地调台转换），这个便利使得电视广告市场受到威胁。然而，会不会有人认为要管制遥控设 备来保护电视广告？（要使这种限制奏效，大概只要花一次时间仅一秒钟而已，然而却导致调十个频道，或许会用去一个小时？）

The obvious answer to these obviously rhetorical questions is no. In a free society, with a free market, supported by free enterprise and free trade, the government's role is not to support one way of doing business against others. Its role is not to pick winners and protect them against loss. If the government did this generally, then we would never have any progress. As Microsoft chairman Bill Gates wrote in 1991, in a memo criticizing software patents, “established companies have an interest in excluding future competitors.”6 And relative to a startup, established companies also have the means. (Think RCA and FM radio.) A world in which competitors with new ideas must fight not only the market but also the government is a world in which competitors with new ideas will not succeed. It is a world of stasis and increasingly concentrated stagnation. It is the Soviet Union under Brezhnev.

显 然，对于这些浅见的带有修辞色彩的提问的回答就是不。在一个自由社会中，有着自由的市场，以自由企业和自由贸易为依托，政府的职责不是支持一种商业模式而 去反对另一种。它不应当去扮演遴选优胜者并保护它们免遭失败的角色。如果政府使如上行为成为普遍做法的话，那么我们将毫无进展。 1991年微软主席比尔·盖茨在一份备忘录中谴责了对软件授予专利的做法，因为其“会树立公司排挤未来竞争者的兴致”。相对于一个刚刚启动的企业而言，站 稳脚跟的公司不但有兴致而且有手段这样做。（试想RCA[2]和调频收音的情况）。怀揣着新点子的竞争者不但要在市场上打拼，而且要与政府展开较量，在这 样的世界里这些竞争者是不会取得成功的。 这是一个死气沉沉的天地，而且正变得愈加呆滞。这个世界无异于勃列日涅夫时期的苏联。

译注[2]RCA, Radio Corporation of America, 美国收音公司。

Thus, while it is understandable for industries threatened with new technologies that change the way they do business to look to the government for protection, it is the special duty of policy makers to guarantee that that protection not become a deterrent to progress. It is the duty of policy makers, in other words, to assure that the changes they create, in response to the request of those hurt by changing technology, are changes that preserve the incentives and opportunities for innovation and change.

由 此，受到新技术威胁的行业， 他们被迫改变商业运营模式，于是去寻求政府保护，这是情有可原的，然而决策者的特别指责就在于确保此种保护不得阻吓进步。换句话说，决策者的职责在于，面 对受到新兴技术冲击的企业的要求，他们对此做出回应，其变革应当保证创新和变革的积极性和机会不可有损。

In the context of laws regulating speech—which include, obviously, copyright law—that duty is even stronger. When the industry complaining about changing technologies is asking Congress to respond in a way that burdens speech and creativity, policy makers should be especially wary of the request. It is always a bad deal for the government to get into the business of regulating speech markets. The risks and dangers of that game are precisely why our framers created the First Amendment to our Constitution: “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” So when Congress is being asked to pass laws that would “abridge” the freedom of speech, it should ask— carefully—whether such regulation is justified.
法 律是管制言论的，这些法律显然也包括版权法，在这个语境中，此种政府职责显得更为重要。当抱怨技术一直在变化的行业，要求国会对言论和创造力施加重压时， 决策者应当对这种请求有特别清新的认识。政府介入管制言论市场的活儿， 总是一件糟糕的事。这是一个危险的游戏，正因为其危险性，我们的立宪者为我们的宪法添加了第一修正案：“国会不得制定法律....以削减言论之自由。”由 此，当国会被要求通过“削减”言论自由的法律时，我们必须尤为仔细搞清楚这种管制的立法是否具有合理性。

My argument just now, however, has nothing to do with whether the changes that are being pushed by the copyright warriors are “justified.” My argument is about their effect. For before we get to the question of justification, a hard question that depends a great deal upon your values, we should first ask whether we understand the effect of the changes the content industry wants.

然而，我的如上言论尚未涉及正在被版权斗士推动的变革是否合理。我的观点只牵涉到他们行为的效果。因为当我们论及合理性问题时，难点在于其取决于你的价值观，我们首先应当检讨我们是否理解文化产业要求变革会产生的后果。

Here's the metaphor that will capture the argument to follow. In 1873, the chemical DDT was first synthesized. In 1948, Swiss chemist Paul Hermann Müller won the Nobel Prize for his work demonstrating the insecticidal properties of DDT. By the 1950s, the insecticide was widely used around the world to kill disease-carrying pests. It was also used to increase farm production.

这 里，我用一个暗喻来揭示我下面的观点。1873年，化学物质滴滴涕（DDT）首次合成。1948年，瑞士化学家保罗·赫尔曼·缪勒因为其发现滴滴涕的杀虫 效果而获得诺贝尔奖。到了二十世纪五十年代，这种杀虫剂已经被广泛的应用于世界各地，以对付携带病毒的害虫。其也被应用于增加农作物的产量。

No one doubts that killing disease-carrying pests or increasing crop production is a good thing. No one doubts that the work of Müller was important and valuable and probably saved lives, possibly millions.

消灭携带病毒的害虫或增加农产量是一件好事，这个没有人会怀疑。也没有人会质疑，缪勒的工作成果是价值重大的，而且可能救活百万生命。

But in 1962, Rachel Carson published Silent Spring, which argued that DDT, whatever its primary benefits, was also having unintended environmental consequences. Birds were losing the ability to reproduce. Whole chains of the ecology were being destroyed.

到了1962年，蕾切尔·卡逊的《静静的春天》出版，书中指出滴滴涕虽然有诸般好处，然而却有着的对环境不可预料的恶果。鸟类正在失去繁殖能力。整个生态系统链正在遭到破坏。

No one set out to destroy the environment. Paul Müller certainly did not aim to harm any birds. But the effort to solve one set of problems produced another set which, in the view of some, was far worse than the problems that were originally attacked. Or more accurately, the problems DDT caused were worse than the problems it solved, at least when considering the other, more environmentally friendly ways to solve the problems that DDT was meant to solve.

没 有人的出发点是要破坏环境。保罗·缪勒肯定不愿伤害任何鸟类。但是解决了一系列问题后，另一堆问题又会冒出来；在另外一些人的眼中，这些新问题可能比原来 要对付的问题更为棘手。更准确些一点儿说，滴滴涕带来的后果比起其要解决的问题更为恶劣；至少在考虑到其他的问题时，对环境更加友善的方法会具有针对性地 去解决这些问题。

It is to this image precisely that Duke University law professor James Boyle appeals when he argues that we need an “environmentalism" for culture.7 His point, and the point I want to develop in the balance of this chapter, is not that the aims of copyright are flawed. Or that authors should not be paid for their work. Or that music should be given away “for free.” The point is that some of the ways in which we might protect authors will have unintended consequences for the cultural environment, much like DDT had for the natural environment. And just as criticism of DDT is not an endorsement of malaria or an attack on farmers, so, too, is criticism of one particular set of regulations protecting copyright not an endorsement of anarchy or an attack on authors. It is an environment of creativity that we seek, and we should be aware of our actions' effects on the environment.

正 是对于此种图景，杜克大学法律教授詹姆士·博伊尔号召我们亟需一种文化“环保主义”。（7）他的观点同我要在本章中要持衡的观点相同，并不是说版权法的立 法意图错了。也不是说，著作者不应该为其作品获得报酬。更不是说，音乐作品应是应当被“免费”的取用的。我们的观点是，我们保护著作者的可能用到的一些方 法，会导致对文化环境的不可预料的影响，这就非常象滴滴涕对于自然环境所产生的后果那样。批评滴滴涕就不等同于支持疟疾或攻击农户，同样的，批判某套特别 的保护版权的法规不等同于支持无政府主义或攻击著作者。我们寻求的是一种创新环境，我们必须意识到我们的行为对于此种环境的影响。

My argument, in the balance of this chapter, tries to map exactly this effect. No doubt the technology of the Internet has had a dramatic effect on the ability of copyright owners to protect their content. But there should also be little doubt that when you add together the changes in copyright law over time, plus the change in technology that the Internet is undergoing just now, the net effect of these changes will not be only that copyrighted work is effectively protected. Also, and generally missed, the net effect of this massive increase in protection will be devastating to the environment for creativity.

为 了保持本章的平衡，我的论述正是为了点出这个可能带来的效果。毋庸置疑，互联网技术对于版权所有者保护自己作品具有戏剧性的影响。然而，你把历史上所有版 权沿革中的变化加在一起，包括现下互联网给技术带来的变化，这些变化的净效果不仅仅是版权作品得到了有效的保护。而且，通常被忽视的一点是，这个不断累积 加强保护的净效果会对创新环境产生毁灭性的影响。

In a line: To kill a gnat, we are spraying DDT with consequences for free culture that will be far more devastating than that this gnat will be lost.

简括成一句话：为了杀死一个害虫，于是我们喷洒滴滴涕，然而对于自由文化而言，其所遭受的损害远远不是死了这只小虫可以销抵的。

原初---(2)
America copied English copyright law. Actually, we copied and improved English copyright law. Our Constitution makes the purpose of “creative property” rights clear; its express limitations reinforce the English aim to avoid overly powerful publishers.
美国人拷贝了英格兰的版权法。事实上我们不但拷贝了而且改进了英格兰版权法。我们的宪法对于“创造性财产”权利之目的的规定毫不含糊。它明确地限制了此权利以避免过于出现强势的出版者。
The power to establish “creative property” rights is granted to Congress in a way that, for our Constitution, at least, is very odd. Article I, section 8, clause 8 of our Constitution states that:
Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
创设“创造性财产”权利的权力由国会赋予，至少从我们的宪法角度来看，这个权力的授予颇有些唐突。宪法第一条第八款有言：

国会有权力推进科学及有益艺术之进步，此权力的实现可以通过对著 作者和发明者针对各自的写作和发现，授予有限期的独占权利。
We can call this the “Progress Clause,” for notice what this clause does not say. It does not say Congress has the power to grant “creative property rights.” It says that Congress has the power to promote progress. The grant of power is its purpose, and its purpose is a public one, not the purpose of enriching publishers, nor even primarily the purpose of rewarding authors.
我们称此条款为“进步条款”，其目的是为了提醒注意其不曾提起的内容。该条款并没有说国会有权授予“创造性财产之权利”。 而是说国会有权力推动进步。授予权力是其目的，而且这个目的是一个公共目的，不是为了养富出版商，甚至也不主要是为了回馈著作者。
The Progress Clause expressly limits the term of copyrights. As we saw in chapter 6, the English limited the term of copyright so as to assure that a few would not exercise disproportionate control over culture by exercising disproportionate control over publishing. We can assume the framers followed the English for a similar purpose. Indeed, unlike the English, the framers reinforced that objective, by requiring that copyrights extend “to Authors” only.
这个进步条款明确限制了版权的期限。我们在第6章已经看到，英格兰人对版权进行限期，为了防止一部分人地通过控制 出版的过当手段，对文化进行失衡的操控。 我们可以设想我国的立宪者与与那些英格兰人也出于类似目的。事实上，我们的立宪者不像英格兰人那样，而是强化了这个目标，要求版权只能授“之于著作者”。
The design of the Progress Clause reflects something about the Constitution's design in general. To avoid a problem, the framers built structure. To prevent the concentrated power of publishers, they built a structure that kept copyrights away from publishers and kept them short. To prevent the concentrated power of a church, they banned the federal government from establishing a church. To prevent concentrating power in the federal government, they built structures to reinforce the power of the states—including the Senate, whose members were at the time selected by the states, and an electoral college, also selected by the states, to select the president. In each case, a structure built checks and balances into the constitutional frame, structured to prevent otherwise inevitable concentrations of power.
进步条款的设计反映了整个宪法的一般设计意图。为了避免问题，立宪者们匡建构架。为了防止出版商过于集权，立宪者们匡建了使版权远 离出版商的构架，并使版权短暂存在。为了防止教会过于集权，立宪者们禁止联邦政府自立为教。为了防止联邦政府权过于集权，立宪者匡建了强化各州权力的构 架，这个构架包括了由当时各州选举产生的参议院，以及一个也是由各州选举产生的选举团，来选举总统。在上面每个情况中，一个权力制衡的构架被纳入宪法体系 中，整合以后，便可以防止否则无可避免的权力集中。
I doubt the framers would recognize the regulation we call “copy-right” today. The scope of that regulation is far beyond anything they ever considered. To begin to understand what they did, we need to put our “copyright” in context: We need to see how it has changed in the 210 years since they first struck its design.
我很怀疑，立宪 者们会不会认今天我所称得“拷贝-权利”[1] 。 这个立法规制的宽泛程度远远超过了原来他们所考虑到的。为了能够开始理解立宪者的所为，我们须得把我们的“版权”放在历史语境中来考虑：我们需要看清自从 其首次被设计定型以后的 210年里，是如何变化的。
译注[1]：此处莱斯格的原词是“copy-right”,词中有横线相隔，以示与“copyright”之区别。
Some of these changes come from the law: some in light of changes in technology, and some in light of changes in technology given a particular concentration of market power. In terms of our model, we started here:
有些变化是通过法律途径发生的；有些变化是通过技术沿革发生的，还有一些是通过特定市场权力集中条件下的技术变革发生的。我们的模型是这样阐述的，始于此处：

图表1
We will end here:

终于彼处：
图表2

Let me explain how.
让我来解释一下这是怎么回事。

法律：期限---(6)
第十章：财产权 (4)
Law: Duration 法律：期限
When the first Congress enacted laws to protect creative property, it faced the same uncertainty about the status of creative property that the English had confronted in 1774. Many states had passed laws protecting creative property, and some believed that these laws simply supplemented common law rights that already protected creative authorship.[8] This meant that there was no guaranteed public domain in the United States in 1790. If copyrights were protected by the common law, then there was no simple way to know whether a work published in the United States was controlled or free. Just as in England, this lingering uncertainty would make it hard for publishers to rely upon a public domain to reprint and distribute works.
当第一次议会是保护创造性财产的法律生效时，(???)其面临着与英格兰人在1774年遇到问题，就是关于创造性财产地位的不确定性。许多州都通过 了保护创造性财产的法律，还有一些人为只不过是对普通法保护创造性著作权的补充。这意味着在1790年，没有在美国的公有领域是受保障的。如果版权受到普 通法的保护，那么就没有简单途径可以要了解到一部美国出版物是否受到控制还是自由的。 就好比在英格兰，这个残留的不确定性使得出版商难以凭籍公有领域去重刊传播作品。

That uncertainty ended after Congress passed legislation granting copyrights. Because federal law overrides any contrary state law, federal protections for copyrighted works displaced any state law protections. Just as in England the Statute of Anne eventually meant that the copyrights for all English works expired, a federal statute meant that any state copyrights expired as well.
国会通过了关于版权的立法后，这个不确定性被消除了。因为联邦法律凌驾于任何相抵触的州法律， 并取代了各州法律对于版权作品的保护。就好比英格兰的安妮女王法令最终导致了所有英格兰作品的版权到期，一部联邦法令同样的使各州版权到期。

In 1790, Congress enacted the first copyright law. It created a federal copyright and secured that copyright for fourteen years. If the author was alive at the end of that fourteen years, then he could opt to renew the copyright for another fourteen years. If he did not renew the copyright, his work passed into the public domain.
在1790年，国会启动了第一部版权法。其创制了联邦版权，并保证了十四年的版权期限。如果著作者活到在十四年版权到期之时，他可以选择延续十四年的更新版权。如果他不更新版权，那么其作品就流入了公有领域。

While there were many works created in the United States in the first ten years of the Republic, only 5 percent of the works were actually registered under the federal copyright regime. Of all the work created in the United States both before 1790 and from 1790 through 1800, 95 percent immediately passed into the public domain; the balance would pass into the pubic domain within twenty-eight years at most, and more likely within fourteen years.9
许多在合纵(???)众国（译作美国？）创作的作品是在共和国立国的 前十年里面创作出来的，其中只有百分之五的作品在联邦版权制度下受到登记。在1790年之前以及1790年到1800年期间在美国创作的所有作品中，其有 百分之九十五进入了“公有领域”；这个平衡会使作品至多在二十八年内进入公有领域，而大多数在十四年之内就达到了。

This system of renewal was a crucial part of the American system of copyright. It assured that the maximum terms of copyright would be granted only for works where they were wanted. After the initial term of fourteen years, if it wasn't worth it to an author to renew his copyright, then it wasn't worth it to society to insist on the copyright, either.
这个期限延展的规定是美国版权制度至关重要的一个部分。其保证了最长期限版权只被授予最需要此保护的作品。在起初的十四年当中，如果作者认为其作品没有延长版权期限的价值，那么对社会而言也没有固执版权的价值。

Fourteen years may not seem long to us, but for the vast majority of copyright owners at that time, it was long enough: Only a small minority of them renewed their copyright after fourteen years; the balance allowed their work to pass into the public domain.10
十四年对于我们看似不长，然而对于当时大多说版权拥有者而言，这是足够长的一段时间了：他们中的很少一部分会在十四年之后延展版权；这个平衡使得他们的作品得以流入公有领域（公众领域?）。

Even today, this structure would make sense. Most creative work has an actual commercial life of just a couple of years. Most books fall out of print after one year.11 When that happens, the used books are traded free of copyright regulation. Thus the books are no longer effectively controlled by copyright. The only practical commercial use of the books at that time is to sell the books as used books; that use—because it does not involve publication—is effectively free.
甚至在 今天，这个结构也是有意义的。许多创作性作品实际上存在的商业寿命的一段时间(???)，只二三年而已。大多数在一年之后就印刷告罄了。告罄之后，旧版书 就在无版权规制的情况下交易流通。由此，这些书籍再也无法被有效地受控于版权之下。彼时对于书籍唯一实际的商业利用就是以旧版书出售；此种利用——因为不 涉及出版——有效地导致了书籍的自由流通。

In the first hundred years of the Republic, the term of copyright was changed once. In 1831, the term was increased from a maximum of 28 years to a maximum of 42 by increasing the initial term of copyright from 14 years to 28 years. In the next fifty years of the Republic, the term increased once again. In 1909, Congress extended the renewal term of 14 years to 28 years, setting a maximum term of 56 years.
在共和国的前一百年内，版权的时限只被更改过一次。
在1831年，前段版权期限由14年增加到28年，于是整个版权期限的上限从28年扩展到了42年。共和国在在接下来的五十年里，版权期限又被增加了一次。在1909年，国会把续展版权时限由14年增加到28年，于是版权最高时限被扩展到了56年。

Then, beginning in 1962, Congress started a practice that has defined copyright law since. Eleven times in the last forty years, Congress has extended the terms of existing copyrights; twice in those forty years, Congress extended the term of future copyrights. Initially, the extensions of existing copyrights were short, a mere one to two years. In 1976, Congress extended all existing copyrights by nineteen years. And in 1998, in the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Congress extended the term of existing and future copyrights by twenty years.
后来， 在1962年，国会起始了重新打造的版权法。国会在过去的四十年内，曾十一次扩展既定版权的时限。国会在过去的四十年内，有两次扩展了未来版权的时限。起 初，对既定版权的延展非常短，只有一到两年。在1976年，国会把所有既定版权扩展了十九年。1998年，国会通过《Sonny Bono版权条款延长法案》把既定的和未来的版权时限延长了二十年。

The effect of these extensions is simply to toll, or delay, the passing of works into the public domain. This latest extension means that the public domain will have been tolled for thirty-nine out of fifty-five years, or 70 percent of the time since 1962. Thus, in the twenty years after the Sonny Bono Act, while one million patents will pass into the public domain, zero copyrights will pass into the public domain by virtue of the expiration of a copyright term.
这些期限的扩展只会导致延 缓或延滞作品流入公有领域。这最近一次扩展意味着公有领域会从五十五年中延后三十九年，或者说1962年以后百分之七十的时间被延后了。于是，在 《Sonny Bono法案》通过的二十年后，当一百万个专利将进入公有领域时，而没有一样版权保护下的作品将进入公有领域，只因为版权失效期限的变化。

The effect of these extensions has been exacerbated by another, little-noticed change in the copyright law. Remember I said that the framers established a two-part copyright regime, requiring a copyright owner to renew his copyright after an initial term. The requirement of renewal meant that works that no longer needed copyright protection would pass more quickly into the public domain. The works remaining under protection would be those that had some continuing commercial value.
另有一项不为人关的注版权法律的变化恶化了上述版权期限延长导致的后果。还记得我说过的立宪者建立的两段版权制度，要求版权所有者 在第一段版权失效后对其版权进行更新【renew】才可延期。这项更新要求意味着无需进一步保护的作品将会更快速地进入公有领域。那些需要继续保护的作品 将会是那些拥有持续商业价值的作品。

The United States abandoned this sensible system in 1976. For all works created after 1978, there was only one copyright term—the maximum term. For “natural” authors, that term was life plus fifty years. For corporations, the term was seventy-five years. Then, in 1992, Congress abandoned the renewal requirement for all works created before 1978. All works still under copyright would be accorded the maximum term then available. After the Sonny Bono Act, that term was ninety-five years.
在1976年，美国舍弃了这个明智的制度。所有创作于1978年以后的作品，只有一个版权期限——最长期 限。 对于“自然人”作者而言，此期限到其过世后的五十年。对于公司而言，此时限为七十五年。然后，在1992年，议会对于所有创作于1978年之前的作品抛弃 了更新【renew】版权的要求。所有依旧受版权保护的作品即被授予了当时最长的保护期限。在通过《Sonny Bono法案》后，这个骑限是九十五年。

This change meant that American law no longer had an automatic way to assure that works that were no longer exploited passed into the public domain. And indeed, after these changes, it is unclear whether it is even possible to put works into the public domain. The public domain is orphaned by these changes in copyright law. Despite the requirement that terms be “limited,” we have no evidence that anything will limit them.
这个变化意味着美国法律再也没有了这样一个【automatic？】途径，能够保障没有利用价值【no longer exploited】的作品【自动？】进入公有领域。 事实上，在历经这些变化后，我们甚至不清楚是否有可能使作品进入公有领域。公有领域成了版权法律变化后的遗孤。虽然要求版权期限是“有限的”，然而我们并 无任何证据表明有什么东西可以限制它们。

The effect of these changes on the average duration of copyright is dramatic. In 1973, more than 85 percent of copyright owners failed to renew their copyright. That meant that the average term of copyright in 1973 was just 32.2 years. Because of the elimination of the renewal requirement, the average term of copyright is now the maximum term. In thirty years, then, the average term has tripled, from 32.2 years to 95 years.12
这些变化对于版权的平均期限的影响是戏剧性的。在1973年，超过百分之八十五的版权拥有者未能更新他们的版权。这意味着在 1973年平均版权的长度为32.2年。因为取消了更新版权的要求，平均版权期限就是最大版权期限。于是，在后来的三十年里，平均版权期限增至3倍，从 32.2年上升到了95年。

[7] See, for example, James Boyle, "A Politics of Intellectual Property: Environmentalism for the Net?" Duke Law Journal 47 (1997): 87.
[7] 参阅，如 James Boyle， 《知识版权的政治：网络的原教环境论？》 Duke
法律期刊 47 （1997）：87页。

[8] William W. Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution in the History of the United States (London: Cambridge University Press, 1953), vol. 1, 485?6: "extinguish[ing], by plain implication of `the supreme Law of the Land,' the perpetual rights which authors had, or were supposed by some to have, under the Common Law" (emphasis added).
[8]William W. Crosskey，《美国历史中的政治和宪法》（Politics and the
Constitution in the History of the United States） （伦敦： 剑桥大学出
版社， 1953），卷 1, 485?6: "，依靠清楚的‘国家最高法律’，消除了作者在
普通法下曾经拥有的，或被认为应该有的，永久的权利“。the perpetual
rights which authors had, or were supposed by some to have, under the
Common Law" (emphasis added).

[9] Although 13,000 titles were published in the United States from 1790 to 1799, only 556 copyright registrations were filed; John Tebbel, A History of Book Publishing in the United States, vol. 1, The Creation of an Industry, 1630?865 (New York: Bowker, 1972), 141. Of the 21,000 imprints recorded before 1790, only twelve were copyrighted under the 1790 act; William J. Maher, Copyright Term, Retrospective Extension and the Copyright Law of 1790 in Historical Context, 7?0 (2002), available at link #25. Thus, the overwhelming majority of works fell immediately into the public domain. Even those works that were copyrighted fell into the public domain quickly, because the term of copyright was short. The initial term of copyright was fourteen years, with the option of renewal for an additional fourteen years. Copyright Act of May 31, 1790, ?, 1 stat. 124.

[9] 尽管1790年至1799年间在美国出版了13000本书，只有556个申请了版权保护；
John Tebbel，《美国出版史》（A History of Book Publishing in the
United States），卷 1，行业的诞生（The Creation of an Industry），
1630?865 （纽约：: Bowker， 1972）， 141。依据1790年前记录在案的210000
条出版者信息上页上，只有12个受1790年版权法的保护；William J. Maher，
《版权期限，回溯延长和历史背景中的1790年版权法》（Copyright Term,
Retrospective Extension and the Copyright Law of 1790 in Historical
Context）， 7?0 (2002), 可从链接 #25 处获得。所以，绝大部分作品直接进入
共有领域。即使那些受版权保护的也会很快地计入共有领域，因为版权期限很短。
起初（第一部分initial）的版权期限是14年，可以选择更新再得到14年。《5月
31日的版权法案》(Copyright Act of May 31), 1790, ?, 1 stat. 124.

[10] Few copyright holders ever chose to renew their copyrights. For instance, of the 25,006 copyrights registered in 1883, only 894 were renewed in 1910. For a year-by-year analysis of copyright renewal rates, see Barbara A. Ringer, "Study No. 31: Renewal of Copyright," Studies on Copyright, vol. 1 (New York: Practicing Law Institute, 1963), 618. For a more recent and comprehensive analysis, see William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright," University of Chicago Law Review 70 (2003): 471, 498?01, and accompanying figures.
[10] 极少的版权拥有者选择更新他们的版权。例如，1883年注册的25006个版权
中，只有894个在1910年更新了。如果您需要一年一年分析的版权更新率，参阅
Barbara A. Ringer，“研究第31号：版权的更新，”（"Study No. 31:
Renewal of Copyright"） 《版权研究》（Studies on Copyright），卷 1 （纽
约： Practicing Law Institute, 1963）， 618。更新的全面研究，参阅
William M. Landes 和 Richard A. Posner，“不确定的可更新的版权，”
（"definitely Renewable Copyright"）芝加哥大学法律评论（University of
Chicago Law Review） 70 (2003): 471, 498?01, 和配图。

[11] See Ringer, ch. 9, n. 2.
[11] 参阅 Ringer，ch. 9, n. 2.

[12] These statistics are understated. Between the years 1910 and 1962 (the first year the renewal term was extended), the average term was never more than thirty-two years, and averaged thirty years. See Landes and Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright," loc. cit.
[12]这些数据被少报了。1910年到1962年（更新期限被延长的第一年）间，平均
期限从美超过32年，平均为32年。参阅 Landes 和 Posner，“不确定的可更新版
权，” "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright," loc. cit【同上？】。
法律：范围---(0)
Chapter 10 Property

第十章：财产权 (5)
Law: Duration 法律：范围
The “scope” of a copyright is the range of rights granted by the law. The scope of American copyright has changed dramatically. Those changes are not necessarily bad. But we should understand the extent of the changes if we're to keep this debate in context.

版权的“范围”就是法律给其规定的涉及面。美国版权的范围发生过巨大的变化。那些变化不一定是糟糕的。然而倘若我们要把这个辩论置于情境之中，我们必须明白这个变化的程度。

In 1790, that scope was very narrow. Copyright covered only “maps, charts, and books.” That means it didn't cover, for example, music or architecture. More significantly, the right granted by a copyright gave the author the exclusive right to “publish” copyrighted works. That means someone else violated the copyright only if he republished the work without the copyright owner's permission. Finally, the right granted by a copyright was an exclusive right to that particular book. The right did not extend to what lawyers call “derivative works.” It would not, therefore, interfere with the right of someone other than the author to translate a copyrighted book, or to adapt the story to a different form (such as a drama based on a published book).

在1790 年，版权的那个范围非常之窄。版权只覆盖了“地图、图表以及书本。” 这意味着，其并不包括比如像音乐或建筑这类东西。更重要的是，版权给予了著作者独家“出版”版权作品的权利。这表示，只有在未经版权所有者允许的情况下再 次出版作品，才算侵权。最后，版权所授予的权利仅仅是对此特定书的独占权利。这个权利并没有延展到律师所称得“衍生性作品”。因此，这项权利不会干涉到非 著作者以外的其他人去翻译一部版权作品或者将故事改编成另外一种形式（比如某戏剧改编自某出版书籍）。

This, too, has changed dramatically. While the contours of copyright today are extremely hard to describe simply, in general terms, the right covers practically any creative work that is reduced to a tangible form. It covers music as well as architecture, drama as well as computer programs. It gives the copyright owner of that creative work not only the exclusive right to “publish” the work, but also the exclusive right of control over any “copies” of that work. And most significant for our purposes here, the right gives the copyright owner control over not only his or her particular work, but also any “derivative work” that might grow out of the original work. In this way, the right covers more creative work, protects the creative work more broadly, and protects works that are based in a significant way on the initial creative work.

此 项内容也发生了巨大的变化。从总体上大致勾勒今日版权法之轮廓极其困难，其权利在实践上涵盖了任何能够被归结为实体物的创造性作品。它涵盖建筑的同时也包 括了音乐作品，包括戏剧也包括了电脑软件。它不但给予了版权所有者对于创作性作品独家“出版”的权利，而且使其能够排他地对此作品的任何一份“拷贝”进行 控制。对于我们，此处最为紧要的目的而言，此权利使版权所有者不但能够控制他或她的作品，并且此权利及于发展自原作品上的“衍生作品”。通过这种方式，此 权利涉及了更广的创造性作品，并显著保护了构建于原创作品之上的作品。

At the same time that the scope of copyright has expanded, procedural limitations on the right have been relaxed. I've already described the complete removal of the renewal requirement in 1992. In addition to the renewal requirement, for most of the history of American copyright law, there was a requirement that a work be registered before it could receive the protection of a copyright. There was also a requirement that any copyrighted work be marked either with that famous (c) or the word copyright. And for most of the history of American copyright law, there was a requirement that works be deposited with the government before a copyright could be secured.

与 此同时，版权的范围开始扩张，而程序性限制得以松弛。我已经讲到过1992年全面废止版权延展之要件。除了此延展要件外，在美国版权法历史的大部分时间 里，都有一个登记之后才给予保护的要件。还有一项要件是，任何版权作品必须标记有那个著名的符号(c)或者有“版权”字样。并且, 在美国版权历史的大部分时间里，作品在受到版权保护前，规定须得被托管于政府处。

The reason for the registration requirement was the sensible understanding that for most works, no copyright was required. Again, in the first ten years of the Republic, 95 percent of works eligible for copyright were never copyrighted. Thus, the rule reflected the norm: Most works apparently didn't need copyright, so registration narrowed the regulation of the law to the few that did. The same reasoning justified the requirement that a work be marked as copyrighted—that way it was easy to know whether a copyright was being claimed. The requirement that works be deposited was to assure that after the copyright expired, there would be a copy of the work somewhere so that it could be copied by others without locating the original author.

需 要登记要件的理由是基于对这样一种明智的理解：大多数作品并不需要版权。我们又一次看到在共和国的前10年里，百分之九十五的够格作品并未申请版权。由 是，这项规则反映了这么一个规律：大多数作品明显不需要版权，于是登记制度缩小了使少数人受制法律的范围。 同样这个理由也能证明标记版权的作品的合理性——这个方法使得某部作品是否有版权保护得以一望而知。作品须得被存档的要件是为了保证，当版权过期后，此作 品的复印件能够在某处有保存，这样其他人要复制此作品就无需找到原作者了。

All of these “formalities” were abolished in the American system when we decided to follow European copyright law. There is no requirement that you register a work to get a copyright; the copyright now is automatic; the copyright exists whether or not you mark your work with a ?; and the copyright exists whether or not you actually make a copy available for others to copy.

当我们决定追随欧洲的版权法律时，美国制度就把所有这些“正规要求”都废除了。当你获得版权时，你无须去将作品登记；现今，取得版权是自动的；版权得以存在，无论你是否在作品上标记了符号(c)；还有，版权的存在并不依赖于你是否实际上准备有一份复件供人拷贝。

Consider a practical example to understand the scope of these differences.

让我们考虑一个实际的例子，来理解这些差异的范围。

If, in 1790, you wrote a book and you were one of the 5 percent who actually copyrighted that book, then the copyright law protected you against another publisher's taking your book and republishing it without your permission. The aim of the act was to regulate publishers so as to prevent that kind of unfair competition. In 1790, there were 174 publishers in the United States.13 The Copyright Act was thus a tiny regulation of a tiny proportion of a tiny part of the creative market in the United States—publishers.

如 果在1790年，你写了一本书而且是属于百分之五的那部分人，并的确为那本书申请了版权，那么版权法会保护你不使其他出版商在没有获得你许可的情况下重印 此书。此法律的目的在于规制出版者以防止不正当竞争。在1790年，美国有174家出版社。[13] 版权法只是一项无足轻重的法规，规制很小一部分美国的创作市场——即出版者。

The act left other creators totally unregulated. If I copied your poem by hand, over and over again, as a way to learn it by heart, my act was totally unregulated by the 1790 act. If I took your novel and made a play based upon it, or if I translated it or abridged it, none of those activities were regulated by the original copyright act. These creative activities remained free, while the activities of publishers were restrained.

此 法律对于其他创作者是毫无约束的。如果我一起又一次的手抄了你的诗歌，这好比用心记住这首诗，1790年的法律对这种行为完全不管。如果我把你的小说改编 成一部戏剧，或者翻译或者削减之，这些行为没有一项是受制于原来的版权法的。这些创作性行为得以自由，而只有出版商的行为是受到约束的。

Today the story is very different: If you write a book, your book is automatically protected. Indeed, not just your book. Every e-mail, every note to your spouse, every doodle, every creative act that's reduced to a tangible form—all of this is automatically copyrighted. There is no need to register or mark your work. The protection follows the creation, not the steps you take to protect it.

时 至今日，情况大异：如果你写了一本书，你的书就会自动地获得保护。事实上，这里不仅仅是你写的书。每一封电子邮件，每一封给你配偶的信笺，每一笔涂鸦，每 一种能够落实到实体的创作性行为——所有这些都自动地获得版权。你无需登记或标记你的作品。保护紧跟创作，而非来自于你采取步骤去申请保护。

That protection gives you the right (subject to a narrow range of fair use exceptions) to control how others copy the work, whether they copy it to republish it or to share an excerpt.

此种保护给予你权利去控制别人如何拷贝你的作品（此权利受制于窄范围的合理使用的例外规定），而无论他们拷贝是为了重新出版还是分享一个摘要。

That much is the obvious part. Any system of copyright would control competing publishing. But there's a second part to the copyright of today that is not at all obvious. This is the protection of “derivative rights.” If you write a book, no one can make a movie out of your book without permission. No one can translate it without permission. CliffsNotes can't make an abridgment unless permission is granted. All of these derivative uses of your original work are controlled by the copyright holder. The copyright, in other words, is now not just an exclusive right to your writings, but an exclusive right to your writings and a large proportion of the writings inspired by them.

那 些就是显而易见的版权法的组成部分。任何版权体系都是为了控制有竞争性的出版。然而还有第二个属于今天版权法的部分就不那么明显。这就是对“衍生权利”的 保护。如果你写了一本书，没有人能够在未获得你允许的条件下改编其为电影。没有许可，没有人可以翻译它。CliffsNotes[译注1]不能做任何缩 写，除非获得了许可。所有这些对于原始作品的衍生使用都受到了版权所有者的控制。换句话说，现在的版权制度不只是赋予你对书写作品的独占权利，而且是对于 一大部分受你作品启发的而写的作品的独占权利。
[译注1] ClffsNotes是世界名著简写本的一个出版物系列。

It is this derivative right that would seem most bizarre to our framers, though it has become second nature to us. Initially, this expansion was created to deal with obvious evasions of a narrower copyright. If I write a book, can you change one word and then claim a copyright in a new and different book? Obviously that would make a joke of the copyright, so the law was properly expanded to include those slight modifications as well as the verbatim original work.

如 果这种衍生权利被我们的立宪者是视作最为离奇的话，虽然对于我们而言这还只是其次的性质。 本来，创设此种扩张是为了应付对于窄范围版权显见的侵犯。如果我写了一本书，你改动其中一个字，你能不能就此认定为一本新书或者不同的书而主张版权。显而 易见，这将是对版权开的一个玩笑，于是法律适当地扩张，将为微小修改纳入，使其与原封不动地拷贝原作品一样进行保护。

In preventing that joke, the law created an astonishing power within a free culture—at least, it's astonishing when you understand that the law applies not just to the commercial publisher but to anyone with a computer. I understand the wrong in duplicating and selling someone else's work. But whatever that wrong is, transforming someone else's work is a different wrong. Some view transformation as no wrong at all—they believe that our law, as the framers penned it, should not protect derivative rights at all.14 Whether or not you go that far, it seems plain that whatever wrong is involved is fundamentally different from the wrong of direct piracy.

为 了阻止那种玩笑，法律在自由文化的范围内创设了一种出乎意料的权力——至少，当你理解到此法律除了适用于那些商业出版者之外，而且适用到每个电脑拥有者， 你会感到惊讶。我理解复制和贩卖别人作品是有错误之处的。然而，无论这种错误行为是什么，改编别人作品是另一种不同的错误行为。有些人视改编为无错之有 ——他们相信，立宪者在写下我们法律的时候，就完全没有要求保护到衍生权利。无论你是否想得那么远，显而易见， 无论这涉及到何种错误行为，其根本上是有别于直接盗版的错误行为的。

Yet copyright law treats these two different wrongs in the same way. I can go to court and get an injunction against your pirating my book. I can go to court and get an injunction against your transformative use of my book.15 These two different uses of my creative work are treated the same.

然而，版权法律对此二种错误行为并不区别对待。我能够上法庭请求一道阻止你盗版我书的禁令。我能够上法庭请求一道你对我书付诸于转换用途的禁令。这两项不同的对我的创作性作品的使用被无区别的对待。

This again may seem right to you. If I wrote a book, then why should you be able to write a movie that takes my story and makes money from it without paying me or crediting me? Or if Disney creates a creature called “Mickey Mouse,” why should you be able to make Mickey Mouse toys and be the one to trade on the value that Disney originally created?

这对你而言可能还是正确的。如果我写了一本书，你根据其情节改写的赚钱的电影，凭什么不给我报酬或不提及我的名号。又如，迪斯尼创造了一个生灵叫做“米老鼠”，凭什么你就能够制造米老鼠玩具，以此交易获得迪斯尼原创的价值呢？

These are good arguments, and, in general, my point is not that the derivative right is unjustified. My aim just now is much narrower: simply to make clear that this expansion is a significant change from the rights originally granted.

这些是很好的论点，大体上来讲我的观点是衍生性权利并非不合理。我的现在目的要狭隘得多：仅仅是要澄清此扩张一种原来被授予权利意义重大的改变。

法律与设计结构：影响---(1)
LAW AND ARCHITECTURE: REACH
法律和设计结构：影响
...........................
Whereas originally the law regulated only publishers, the change in
copyright's scope means that the law today regulates publishers,
users, and authors. It regulates them because all three are capable of
making copies, and the core of the regulation of copyright law is
copies.~[133]
开始时该法律只管理出版商，版权法范围的改变意味着它今天管理出版商、用户和
作者。版权法管理他们是因为他们有能力制作副本，版权法管理的核心就是副本。
[133]

[133]: This is a simplification of the law, but not much of one. The
law certainly regulates more than "copies" - a public performance
of a copyrighted song, for example, is regulated even though
performance per se doesn't make a copy; 17 /United States Code,/
section 106(4). And it certainly sometimes doesn't regulate a
"copy"; 17 /United States Code,/ section 112(a). But the
presumption under the existing law (which regulates "copies;" 17
/United States Code,/ section 102) is that if there is a copy,
there is a right.
[133]：这里简单化了该法律，但也没简化太多。该法律管理的当然比“副本”
多（受该法调整的当然不仅仅只是“副本”）——例如，有版权作品的公开表演也受到管理即使演出本身并没有制作副本；
17 美国法律， 第106条第4款。当然有时它也不管理“副本”；17 美国法律(美国法典)，
第112条（a）。但现有法律（是管理“副本”的；” 17 美国法律(美国法典) 第102条）的假设
是如果有副本，就有权利。

"Copies." That certainly sounds like the obvious thing for /copy/right
law to regulate. But as with Jack Valenti's argument at the start of
this chapter, that "creative property" deserves the "same rights" as
all other property, it is the /obvious/ that we need to be most
careful about. For while it may be obvious that in the world before
the Internet, copies were the obvious trigger for copyright law, upon
reflection, it should be obvious that in the world with the Internet,
copies should /not/ be the trigger for copyright law. More precisely,
they should not /always/ be the trigger for copyright law.
“副本。”听起来肯定该是版权法管理的。[注：英文copyright中的copy 是复制、
副本的意思。]但如Jack Valenti在本章开始的论点，“创造性财产”应有和其它
财产“一样”的权力（权利），我们_显然_需要极为小心。因为可能显而易见的是在
Internet出现在世界上之前，副本显然是版权法的触发器，经过思考，同样也应
该显然的是世界有了Internet之后，副本_不_应该是版权法的触发器。更准确地
说，不应该_总是_版权法的触发器。

This is perhaps the central claim of this book, so let me take this
very slowly so that the point is not easily missed. My claim is that
the Internet should at least force us to rethink the conditions under
which the law of copyright automatically applies,~[134] because it is
clear that the current reach of copyright was never contemplated, much
less chosen, by the legislators who enacted copyright law.
这也许是本书的中心主张，所以我会很慢的地来，以便您不会轻易地没抓住我的
观点。（the point is not easily missed）我的主张是Internet应该至少迫使
我们重新想一想版权法自动试用的条件，～[134] 因为明显当前版权法的范围从
没有经过颁布它的立法者的沉思，更谈不上是他们的选择了。

[134]: Thus, my argument is not that in each place that copyright law
extends, we should repeal it. It is instead that we should have a
good argument for its extending where it does, and should not
determine its reach on the basis of arbitrary and automatic
changes caused by technology.
[134]：因此，我的观点不是版权法延伸到的每一个方面我们都应该废除它。我
们应该就其延伸到哪里有个良好的辩论，而不应该依靠任意为基础（on the
basis of arbitrary）和因技术引起的自动的变化（automatic changes）来决
定它的范围。

We can see this point abstractly by beginning with this largely empty
circle.
[image: "uses"]
我们可以通过基本上是空的圆圈来抽象的表达这个观点。
[图： "使用（方法）"]

Think about a book in real space, and imagine this circle to represent
all its potential /uses/. Most of these uses are unregulated by
copyright law, because the uses don't create a copy. If you read a
book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you give someone
the book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you resell a
book, that act is not regulated (copyright law expressly states that
after the first sale of a book, the copyright owner can impose no
further conditions on the disposition of the book). If you sleep on
the book or use it to hold up a lamp or let your puppy chew it up,
those acts are not regulated by copyright law, because those acts do
not make a copy.
想一下现实空间中的书，将这个圈想象成它潜在的_使用（方法）_。大部分这些
使用（价值）是不受版权法管理的，因为这些用法没有生成副本。如果您读书，
这一行为是不熟版权法管理的。如果您将书给其他人，这一行为也不受管理。如
果您将书再次出售，该行为也不受管理（版权法明确规定在书第一次售出
（first sale）之后，版权所有者不能再对该书的处置提出更多的条件）。如果
您睡在树上或用它垫台灯或让您的小狗嚼它，这些行为不熟版权法管理，因为它
们都没有生成副本。

[image: "unregulated"]
[图像：“不受管理的”]

Obviously, however, some uses of a copyrighted book are regulated by
copyright law. Republishing the book, for example, makes a copy. It is
therefore regulated by copyright law. Indeed, this particular use
stands at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted
work. It is the paradigmatic use properly regulated by copyright
regulation (see first diagram on next page).
但是，有些使用书的方法显然受到版权法的管理。例如，重新出版一本制作了副
本。因此受版权法管理。确实，这个使用[译者：出版]的特例是版权作品可能使
用方法的核心。这个的典型使用方法适当地受到版权法的管理（见下页的第一副图
标）。
[image: ""]
[图： ""]

Finally, there is a tiny sliver of otherwise regulated copying uses
that remain unregulated because the law considers these "fair uses."
These are uses that themselves involve copying, but which the law
treats as unregulated because public policy demands that they remain
unregulated. You are free to quote from this book, even in a review
that is quite negative, without my permission, even though that
quoting makes a copy. That copy would ordinarily give the copyright
owner the exclusive right to say whether the copy is allowed or not,
but the law denies the owner any exclusive right over such "fair uses"
for public policy (and possibly First Amendment) reasons.
最后，还有一缕（a tiny sliver）该受管理的复制使用方法不受管理。因为法律
认可它们是“fair use”。这些使用法本身牵扯到了复制，但法律认为它们不受
管理因为公众政策要求它们保持不受管制。您可以自由的引用本书的内容，即使
在一篇对本书的负面书评中，不需要我的许可，即使引用制造了副本。该副本通
常给予版权所有者排它的（exclusive）权力决定是否允许该副本，但法律给予公
共政策（还有可能是宪法第一修正案）的原因，拒绝给版权所有者在此类“fair
use”上排他的权力。

[image: ""]

[image: ""]

In real space, then, the possible uses of a book are divided into
three sorts: (1) unregulated uses, (2) regulated uses, and (3)
regulated uses that are nonetheless deemed "fair" regardless of the
copyright owner's views.
显示空间中，可能使用一本书的方法可以被分成3类：（1）不受管理的使用，
（2）受管理的使用，和（3）受管理的使用但仍被认为是“合理”的，不用管版
权所有者的看法。

Enter the Internet - a distributed, digital network where every use of
a copyrighted work produces a copy.~[135] And because of this single,
arbitrary feature of the design of a digital network, the scope of
category 1 changes dramatically. Uses that before were presumptively
unregulated are now presumptively regulated. No longer is there a set
of presumptively unregulated uses that define a freedom associated
with a copyrighted work. Instead, each use is now subject to the
copyright, because each use also makes a copy - category 1 gets sucked
into category 2. And those who would defend the unregulated uses of
copyrighted work must look exclusively to category 3, fair uses, to
bear the burden of this shift.
进入Interent——在这个分布式的数字网路，每一次受版权保护作品的使用都生
成一个副本。~[135]因为数字网络设计上这个单独的，arbitrary的特征，种类
（1）发生了巨大的变化。从前被认为不受管理的现在被认为是受到管理的了。
No longer is there.... 每一个使用方法都要服从版权[法]，因为每一种使用方
法都制作了副本——种类（1）被吸入到了种类（2）。那些为不受管理的使用辩
护的人必需专注于种类（3），fair use，来承担这个变化。【】

[135]: I don't mean "nature" in the sense that it couldn't be
different, but rather that its present instantiation entails a
copy. Optical networks need not make copies of content they
transmit, and a digital network could be designed to delete
anything it copies so that the same number of copies remain.
[135]：我说“天生”（nature ？）不是它不能有所不同，而是它现今的例证
了伴随着副本。光学网络（optical network）不需要制造它们传输内容的副本，
也可以设计一个数字网络删除所有它复制的内容使保留的仍是同样的数目的副
本。

So let's be very specific to make this general point clear. Before the
Internet, if you purchased a book and read it ten times, there would
be no plausible /copyright/-related argument that the copyright owner
could make to control that use of her book. Copyright law would have
nothing to say about whether you read the book once, ten times, or
every night before you went to bed. None of those instances of use -
reading - could be regulated by copyright law because none of those
uses produced a copy.
让我们将这个泛泛的观点变得非常具体化。在Interenet之前，如果您买了本书然
后读10遍，版权拥有者没有什么让人信服（plausible）的、和 _版权法_相关的
论点（argument）来控制您对他的书的使用。书您是读了1遍、10遍或每晚睡觉前
都读根版权法没有任何关系。说有这些使用的例子——阅读——都不受版权法管
理因为它们都没有生成副本。

But the same book as an e-book is effectively governed by a different
set of rules. Now if the copyright owner says you may read the book
only once or only once a month, then /copyright law/ would aid the
copyright owner in exercising this degree of control, because of the
accidental feature of copyright law that triggers its application upon
there being a copy. Now if you read the book ten times and the license
says you may read it only five times, then whenever you read the book
(or any portion of it) beyond the fifth time, you are making a copy of
the book contrary to the copyright owner's wish.
但同样的一本书如果是电子书，实际上（effectively）就受一套不同的规则统治。
如果版权所有者说这书您只能读一遍或一个月一遍，那么_版权法_会帮助版权所
有者形式这种程度的控制，因为版权法附带的（accidental）的特征是有副本就
可以触发它的使用。现在，如果您已经将书读了10遍而许可协议说您只能再读5遍，
那么5遍后无论何时您读该书（或该书的一部分），您都要制作该书的副本，而这
与版权所有者的希望是相反的。

There are some people who think this makes perfect sense. My aim just
now is not to argue about whether it makes sense or not. My aim is
only to make clear the change. Once you see this point, a few other
points also become clear:
有些人认为这完全有道理。我现在的目的不是要争论它有没有道理。我的目只是
让大家清楚这一变化。您一旦看清了这点，其它几点也变得清楚了：

First, making category 1 disappear is not anything any policy maker
ever intended. Congress did not think through the collapse of the
presumptively unregulated uses of copyrighted works. There is no
evidence at all that policy makers had this idea in mind when they
allowed our policy here to shift. Unregulated uses were an important
part of free culture before the Internet.
第一，任何政策制定者都无意使种类1消失。国会没有预料（think through）被
认为是有版权作品不受管理的使用方法会崩溃。没有任何证据表明当政策制订者
允许对这个政策变化的时候脑子了有这个概念。在Internet之前，不受管理的使
用方法是自由文化重要的一部分。

Second, this shift is especially troubling in the context of
transformative uses of creative content. Again, we can all understand
the wrong in commercial piracy. But the law now purports to regulate
/any/ transformation you make of creative work using a machine. "Copy
and paste" and "cut and paste" become crimes. Tinkering with a story
and releasing it to others exposes the tinkerer to at least a
requirement of justification. However troubling the expansion with
respect to copying a particular work, it is extraordinarily troubling
with respect to transformative uses of creative work.
第二、这一变化尤其使变革性使用（transformative uses）创造性内容变得令人
担心。再次重申，我们都明白商业盗版是错误的。但现在的法律意味着管理您通
过机器对创造性作品做的_任何_变革（transform）。“复制粘贴”和“剪切粘贴”
变成了犯罪。您修改一个故事使它变得更好（tinkering a story）并将故事发布
给其它人，这么做要求您起码有个这么理由说明这么做是正当的。不管[法律
的？]这一扩充对某一作品的复制产生什么令人担忧的影响 ，对于变革地使
用创造性作品，这一变化及其的令人担心。

Third, this shift from category 1 to category 2 puts an extraordinary
burden on category 3 ("fair use") that fair use never before had to
bear. If a copyright owner now tried to control how many times I could
read a book on-line, the natural response would be to argue that this
is a violation of my fair use rights. But there has never been any
litigation about whether I have a fair use right to read, because
before the Internet, reading did not trigger the application of
copyright law and hence the need for a fair use defense. The right to
read was effectively protected before because reading was not
regulated.
第三，从种类1移位（shift）到种类2使种类3（“fair use”）承受了其从来没
有承受过的负担。如果版权所有者企图控制我阅读在线图书的次数，我自然会争
论说这一做法违背了我fair use的权力。但是以前从没有过我有阅读这一fair
use的诉讼，因为在Internet之前，阅读不引起版权法的应用（不牵扯到版权法），
所以没有使用fair use辩护的需要。阅读的权力以前有效地受到保护，因为阅读
是不受管理的。

This point about fair use is totally ignored, even by advocates for
free culture. We have been cornered into arguing that our rights
depend upon fair use--never even addressing the earlier question about
the expansion in effective regulation. A thin protection grounded in
fair use makes sense when the vast majority of uses are /unregulated/.
But when everything becomes presumptively regulated, then the
protections of fair use are not enough.
这个关于fair use的观点被完全忽略了，甚至被那些提倡自由文化的人忽略。我
们把精力花在（concerned into）权力依赖fair use——根本不谈之前的管制有
效扩张了的问题。当大多数的使用方法_不受管理_的时候，小部分给予fair use
的保护是合理的。但当所有的事情都被认为是受管理的，那么fair use的保护是
不够的。
The case of Video Pipeline is a good example. Video Pipeline was in
the business of making "trailer" advertisements for movies available
to video stores. The video stores displayed the trailers as a way to
sell videos. Video Pipeline got the trailers from the film
distributors, put the trailers on tape, and sold the tapes to the
retail stores.
Video Pipeline一例就是个例子。Video Pipeline从事“电影预告片”广告的生
意，那些电影您在录像店有售。录像店用播放电影预告片作为销售录像的一种手
段。Video Pipeline从电影发行上处活动预告片，将预告片放到录像带上，然后
卖给零售商店。

The company did this for about fifteen years. Then, in 1997, it began
to think about the Internet as another way to distribute these
previews. The idea was to expand their "selling by sampling" technique
by giving on-line stores the same ability to enable "browsing." Just
as in a bookstore you can read a few pages of a book before you buy
the book, so, too, you would be able to sample a bit from the movie
on-line before you bought it.
该公司如此经营了15年。之后，在1997年，它开始考虑通过Internet作为分发这
些预告片的另一种手段。这一概念是扩展他们的“先尝后买（selling by
sampling）”的手段，给予在线商店同样的“浏览”的能力。就像您在书店买书
会读上一两页再[决定]买[不买]，同样，您希望在买之前能在先尝试（sample）
[“尝”，搂一眼；瞅一眼] 一下该电影。

In 1998, Video Pipeline informed Disney and other film distributors
that it intended to distribute the trailers through the Internet
(rather than sending the tapes) to distributors of their videos. Two
years later, Disney told Video Pipeline to stop. The owner of Video
Pipeline asked Disney to talk about the matter - he had built a
business on distributing this content as a way to help sell Disney
films; he had customers who depended upon his delivering this content.
Disney would agree to talk only if Video Pipeline stopped the
distribution immediately. Video Pipeline thought it was within their
"fair use" rights to distribute the clips as they had. So they filed a
lawsuit to ask the court to declare that these rights were in fact
their rights.
在1998年，Video Pipeline统治Disney和其它电影发行商它要通过Internet向影
片分销商分发电影预告片（而不是寄出录像带）。2年后，Disney让Video
Pipeline停止这么做。Video Pipeline的所有人要和Disney谈谈此事——它的企
业就建立在分发这些内容[产品]作为帮助销售Disney影片的手段；他的顾客依赖
他将内容交付给他们。Disney同意谈一谈前提是Video Pipeline立即停止分发。
Video Pipeline认为分发这些[影片]片断（clips）是他们的“fair use”，因此
它们起诉要求法庭宣布这些权力[分发片断]确实是它们的权利。

Disney countersued - for $100 million in damages. Those damages were
predicated upon a claim that Video Pipeline had "willfully infringed"
on Disney's copyright. When a court makes a finding of willful
infringement, it can award damages not on the basis of the actual harm
to the copyright owner, but on the basis of an amount set in the
statute. Because Video Pipeline had distributed seven hundred clips of
Disney movies to enable video stores to sell copies of those movies,
Disney was now suing Video Pipeline for $100 million.
Diseny也反告（countersued）——要求1亿美元的赔偿。Diseny称Video
Pipeline是“故意侵犯”Disney的版权，该赔偿是基于此估计出来的。如果法庭
发现是故意侵犯版权，那么赔偿的判定就不是基于对版权所有者实际的损伤，而
是法律（statute）设定的数额。因为Video Pipeline分发了700段Disney电影的
片断——为了让录像店卖那些电影——现在Disney起诉Video Pipeline，要求1亿
美元的赔偿。

Disney has the right to control its property, of course. But the video
stores that were selling Disney's films also had some sort of right to
be able to sell the films that they had bought from Disney. Disney's
claim in court was that the stores were allowed to sell the films and
they were permitted to list the titles of the films they were selling,
but they were not allowed to show clips of the films as a way of
selling them without Disney's permission.
当然，迪斯尼有权控制它的财产。但那些卖迪斯尼电影的录像店录像店也该有些
权力以便它们能出售从迪斯尼那里买来的电影。迪斯尼在法庭称商店有权出售电
影，也允许它们将它们出售的影片名称罗列出来，但不允许它们为了销售，未经
迪斯尼许可而展示影片的片断。
Now, you might think this is a close case, and I think the courts
would consider it a close case. My point here is to map the change
that gives Disney this power. Before the Internet, Disney couldn't
really control how people got access to their content. Once a video
was in the marketplace, the "first-sale doctrine" would free the
seller to use the video as he wished, including showing portions of it
in order to engender sales of the entire movie video. But with the
Internet, it becomes possible for Disney to centralize control over
access to this content. Because each use of the Internet produces a
copy, use on the Internet becomes subject to the copyright owner's
control. The technology expands the scope of effective control,
because the technology builds a copy into every transaction.
那么，您可能认为这个案子是一半儿一半儿[双方都有道理]（a close case），
我认为法庭也会这样认为。我的目的是绘制这一出给了迪斯尼这种权力的变化。
在Internet之前，迪斯尼其实不能控制人们如何获得他提供的内容（content）。
录像你进入到市场，“first-sale doctrine”使经销商有按自己愿望使用录像的
自由，包括展示部分内容来带动整盘电影录像的销售。但有了Interent，使迪斯
尼有可能集中化控制如何获得它们提供的内容。因为Internet上每一次使用都产
生了副本，Internet上的使用售控于版权所有者。技术有效地扩展了控制的范围，
因为该技术的每一次执行（transacton）都建立了一个副本。

No doubt, a potential is not yet an abuse, and so the potential for
control is not yet the abuse of control. Barnes & Noble has the right
to say you can't touch a book in their store; property law gives them
that right. But the market effectively protects against that abuse. If
Barnes & Noble banned browsing, then consumers would choose other
bookstores. Competition protects against the extremes. And it may
well be (my argument so far does not even question this) that
competition would prevent any similar danger when it comes to
copyright. Sure, publishers exercising the rights that authors have
assigned to them might try to regulate how many times you read a book,
or try to stop you from sharing the book with anyone. But in a
competitive market such as the book market, the dangers of this
happening are quite slight.
毫无疑问，有可能[被滥用]还并不是滥用。Barnes & Noble有权说您不能触摸它
们店里的图书；财产法（property law）给予了它们这个权力。但市场给您的有
效地保障使它们不能滥用这个权力。如果Barnes & Noble禁止浏览（browsing，
翻阅？），那么消费者会选择其它的书店。竞争保障了不[出现]极端[的情况]。
也很有可能（我的论点到目前为止还没有对此提出疑意）竞争会防止类似的危险
在版权领域出现。当然，出版商行使作者赋予它们的权力时可能会试着控制您一
本书可以读几遍，或试着阻止您将书与任何人分享。但在一个竞争的市场下，如
图书市场，这些发生的危险是很小的。
Again, my aim so far is simply to map the changes that this changed
architecture enables. Enabling technology to enforce the control of
copyright means that the control of copyright is no longer defined by
balanced policy. The control of copyright is simply what private
owners choose. In some contexts, at least, that fact is harmless. But
in some contexts it is a recipe for disaster.
再次说明，到目前为止，我的目的时描绘出变化，这一设计结构（architecture）
变化带来的可能性（enables）。让技术执行版权控制的可能意味着版权的控制不
再由平衡的政策来定义。版权的控制不过是私人所有者做出的选择。至少在某些
情况下，这是无害的。但在某些情况下，这将带来灾难。

基构与法律：效力---(1)
ARCHITECTURE AND LAW: FORCE
结构和法律：力
...........................
The disappearance of unregulated uses would be change enough, but a
second important change brought about by the Internet magnifies its
significance. This second change does not affect the reach of
copyright regulation; it affects how such regulation is enforced.
不受管理使用的消失，本身已经是足够大的变化了，但Internet带来的第二个重
要的变化使这种变化更加显著。第二个变化不涉及版权管理的范围；它影响的是
这些管理是如何被执行的。
In the world before digital technology, it was generally the law that
controlled whether and how someone was regulated by copyright law. The
law, meaning a court, meaning a judge: In the end, it was a human,
trained in the tradition of the law and cognizant of the balances that
tradition embraced, who said whether and how the law would restrict
your freedom.
数字技术之前的世界，一般是由法律来控制人们否或如何受版权法的管理。法律，
意味着法庭，意味着法官：最终，是人，受过法律传统训练的，知道传统中包含
的平衡的人，来决定法律是否和如何限制您的自由。
There's a famous story about a battle between the Marx Brothers and
Warner Brothers. The Marxes intended to make a parody of /Casablanca/.
Warner Brothers objected. They wrote a nasty letter to the Marxes,
warning them that there would be serious legal consequences if they
went forward with their plan.~[136]
[136]: See David Lange, "Recognizing the Public Domain," /Law and
Contemporary Problems/ 44 (1981): 172-73.
有一个关于马克思兄弟[公司]（Marx Brothers）和华纳兄弟[公司] （Warner
Brothers）[注：两家都是电影公司 ？]的著名故事。马克思兄弟想拍一个嘲弄/
卡撒布兰卡（Casablanca）/的电影。华纳兄弟反对。他们给马克思兄弟写了封威
胁的信件，警告他们如果继续该计划会带来严重的法律后果。~[136]
[136]：参阅 David Lange， "Recognizing the Public Domain （