Introduction for Chinese Edition

The aim of this book is to introduce a meme, and offer an argument in its defense. The meme is the idea of “free culture.” My defense of this idea is that it has been the tradition of many free societies, and that it would promote the most important values of speech and creativity if it were embraced again.

In English, the term “free culture” is often confusing. As Richard Stallman says about “free software,” too many hear “free beer” when they hear “free software,” rather than as it is meant, as in “free speech.” I would extend the point: Think about free markets, free trade, free enterprise, free society, and free speech, and you will then have the frame necessary to understand “free culture.” A free culture is not a culture in which there is no property — as a free market is not a market where there is no property, or as a society that protects the right of free speech doesn’t require that newspapers give anyone who wants access to their presses. A free culture instead is a culture that balances the important and essential incentives of copyright against the equally important and essential opportunity of society — to build upon, and transform, culture. And most relevantly to the current debate, free culture keeps that balance up to date, as technologies change and alter the balance that copyright strikes.

This ideal has been a central aspect of American culture. It is an important part of many other cultures as well. Yet oddly, among policy makers at least, there is a conflicting idea that prosperity only happens when intellectual property rights are maximized. That more rights are always better. That stronger protection is always efficiency maximizing.

That contrary view, however prevalent in our societies, is profoundly misguided. In this book, I try to sketch why — and more importantly, I try to show why reforming this misguided view is crucial if the economic growth and creative potential of digital technologies are to be achieved.

This book was written primarily for American audience. But much of the inspiration for the ideas I describe came from my time in foreign nations as well. For in an odd, yet important sense, this tradition that I argue has been a part of America for most of its history lives most vibrantly in cultures outside America. They I hope, will teach us something. And given the importance of what’s at stake, that teaching must happen soon.

The existence of this translation itself is testament to the power of free culture. I am extraordinarily grateful to the team that has volunteered and self-organized to produce this translation, more quickly than any commercial publisher acting alone could have. I am humbled that others would devote themselves to help carry these ideas into other cultures. I am honored that they will be accessible to China.

汉语版序

本书旨在介绍一种媒母[1]，并发表辩护这一媒母的主张。这一媒母即是“自由文化”的理念。我的辩护是：长期以来，自由文化是很多自由社会的传统，如果我们再次拥抱它，它将提升言论与创造力最重要的价值。

在英语中，“自由文化”（free[2] culture） 这一说法常令人迷惑。当理查德·斯托尔曼说着“自由软件”时，太多的人听成了“免费啤酒”,而非其本意。我愿意扩展这一观点：请想一下自由市场、自由贸 易、自由企业、自由社会和自由言论，然后您就有了理解“自由文化”所需的框架。自由文化不是一种没有财产权的文化——正如自由市场不是一个没有财产权的市 场，或者这么说，一个保护言论自由的社会并不要求把报纸免费分发给想看它们的人。相反的，自由文化是一种平衡版权概念与社会机会的文化——版权概念重要 的、基本的鼓励机制，和同等重要的、基本的社会机会——保障文化得以立身与转化。与当前的论辩最相关的是，当技术发展变化打破了既定版权的制衡,自由文化 使此平衡与日俱进。

自由文化的理想是美国文化的一个核心方面。它也是其它很多文化的重要部分。而奇怪的是，至少决策者们中有个自相矛盾的想法：只有最大化保护知识产权，才会有繁荣昌盛；产权总是越多越好；加强保护即是最大化效率。

相反的观点是，决策者的想法纵然流行于我们的社会，却是一种极度的误导。在本书中，我试图勾勒一二理由——更重要的是，我试图展现，要取得数字技术的经济增长，开发其创造潜能，革新这一被误导的观念是如此紧要。

这 本书原先是为美国受众而写。但是，我在不同国家的时光，同样很大地启发了我所描述的诸多想法。离奇却不失为重要的是，我所讨论的“美国传统”，存在于美国 的大部分历史中，亦活跃无比地栖居于美国以外的种种文化中。我希望，它们可以给我们上一课。考虑到误导所及，危如累卵，这一课必须尽快上。

汉译版的存在，本身即是自由文化力量的明证。汉译团队，他们自行组织，志愿工作，其速度之迅捷远远超乎任一商业出版机构所能为，我敬致谢忱。他人如此投入，以协助将这些理念带入其它种种文化中，我自叹弗如。中国将由此接近这些理念，我深感荣幸。

[1] 媒母：承载文化和知识信息的基本单位，是复制信息和传播信息的一种假想结构，与生物学中的基因类似。在理查德·道金斯（Richard Dawkins）1976年出版的《自私的基因》（Selfish Gene）一书中，英文meme这一单词首次出现。这一概念的出现则先于造词，譬如，在1970年出版的《电子革命》（Electronic Revolution）一书中，敲打派作家威廉· 巴罗斯（William S. Burroughs）曾写道：“语言是一种来自太空的病毒”（Language is a virus from outer space）。关于meme的汉译，有“觅母”（卢允中、张岱云，1998）、“拟子”（ ）、“迷米”（ ）、“文化基因”（ ）、“媒母” （毛向辉，2004）等数种。
[2] 英语free作形容词时，有“自由”与“免费”两个义项。

Introduction for Chinese edition: (汉语版序(简体) Translator: Tian, Proofreader: Chenwei, bxy)

PREFACE
前言
At the end of his review of my first book, Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace, David Pogue, a brilliant writer and author of countless technical and computer-related texts, wrote this:
David Pogue是个杰出的作家，他写了许许多多科技和电脑方面的文章，在给我的第一本书《Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace》的评论的结尾，他写到：
David Pogue是个杰出的作家，写了不计其数的科技和电脑方面的文章。
他在对我第一本书《Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace（代码：和其它电脑
空间的法律）》的书评结尾写到：

Unlike actual law, Internet software has no capacity to punish. It doesn't affect people who aren't online (and only a tiny minority of the world population is). And if you don't like the Internet 's system, you can always flip off the modem.1
与实际的法律不同，Internet软件没有惩罚的能力，它【删除_根本_】不能影响到那些不在线的人（而那些在线的仅仅是人口中【极；非常】少的一部分）。而且，如果【您】不喜欢Internet【的体制】，总是可以关掉调制解调器 （译者：指下线）。

与实际的法律不同，Internet软件没有惩罚的能力，它不能影响到那些不在线的
人（而那些在线的仅仅是人口中极少的一部分）。而且，如果您不喜欢Internet
的体制，总是可以关掉调制解调器。
Pogue was skeptical of the core argument of the book--that soft- ware, or "code," functioned as a kind of law--and his review suggested the happy thought that if life in cyberspace got bad, we could always "drizzle, drazzle, druzzle, drome"-like simply flip a switch and be back home. Turn off the modem, unplug the computer, and any troubles that exist in that space wouldn't "affect " us anymore.
Progue (Pogue)对那本书的核心主题【论点】 -- 软件，或者“代码”起着一种法律的功能【有法律的作用】，存有疑念【表示怀疑】。在评论里，他乐观地认为一旦在【删除“在”】网络空间的情况变糟，我们总 是可以【drizzle,drzzle,druzzle,rome】【简单地把开关一关】关掉一个开关，如同念个咒语后就能离开。关掉调制解调器，拔下网 线【关掉电脑；unplug=turn off】，甚至关掉电脑【没有这个吧】，“哗～～，世界清静了。”【搞笑一下？这里？：）】，那些在那个空间里的伤脑筋的东西就再也不会困扰我们了【那个 空间里存在的任何问题就不会“影响”到我们了】。
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Pogue对那本书的核心论点 -- 软件，或者“代码”有法律的作用表示怀疑。在评
论里，他乐观地认为一旦网络空间的情况变糟，我们总是可以（念个咒语）
drizzle, drzzle, druzzle, drome--简单地把开关一关，就可以回家了。关掉调
制解调器，关掉电脑，那个空间里存在的任何问题就不会“影响”到我们了。
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[下面这段谁加的，还不错]
"drizzle, drazzle, druzzle, drome"
Matrix爱好者
When Neo is calling to get extracted from the Matrix, he says, "Mr. Wizard get me out of here." - a reference to the 1960s cartoon Tooter Turtle. Each episode, Tooter would yearn to be something he wasn't and have his friend Mr. Wizard (a lizard) wave his magic wand and make him an astronaut or a scientist or whatever. Inevitably, Tooter would quickly get himself into trouble and call out, "Help Mr Wizard," and the lizard would say, "Drizzle, drazzle, druzzle, drome, time for this one to come home." Tooter would be transported back to his old self and be chided by Mr Wizard to "be happy with what you are".
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当Neo呼叫要求（将自己）从Marix（矩阵）中提取（extracted）出时，他说，"
精灵先生（Mr. Wizard），把我弄出去。"－－这话的出自1960年代的卡通
Tooter Turtle（小龟嘟嘟）。在每一集里，Tooter都渴望成为他不是的东西，而
他的朋友精灵先生（一只蜥蜴）举起魔杖就可将他变为宇航员或科学家或任何东
西。不可避免地，Tooter很快就麻烦缠身并叫道，“救命，精灵先生，”。然后
蜥蜴会说：“Drizzle, drazzle, druzzel, drome,【嘛喱嘛喱哄，不把你捉
弄？？】。”Tooter会被传回到他原来的自己然后被精灵先生斥责到“好好做你
自己。【与be happy with what you are有一些出入】”
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Pogue might have been right in 1999--I'm skeptical, but maybe. But even if he was right then, the point is not right now: Free Culture is about the troubles the Internet causes even after the modem is turned off. It is an argument about how the battles that now rage regarding life on-line have fundamentally affected "people who aren't online." There is no switch that will insulate us from the Internet 's effect.
Pogue的看法在1999年也许【是对的；可以成立】 －－ 我【虽然】怀疑，但还是可能的。【但关键是】即使那个时候他【删除：的看法】是对的，如今就不再正确了【现在他是错的】：自由文化【《自由文化》】涉及到 那些即使在调制解调器关掉之后Internet所造成的麻烦【自由文化说的是关掉modem后仍存在的Internet造成的问题】。问题是，那些关于网 络生存【？】的斗争，已经在根本上影响了那些“不上网的人们”。【它的论点是对在线生活（life on-line）发动的战争已经在根本上影响了“不在线的人”。】 已经没有什么开关能够将我们隔绝于Internet的影响之外了。
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Pogue的看法在1999年也许是对的－－我虽然怀疑，但还是可能的。但关键是即使
那个时候他是对的，现在他是错的：《自由文化》说的是关掉modem后仍存在的
Internet所造成的问题。它的论点是对在线生活（life on-line）发动的战争已
经在根本上影响了“不在线的人”。已经没有什么开关能够将我们隔绝于
Internet的影响之外了。
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But unlike Code, the argument here is not much about the Internet itself. It is instead about the consequence of the Internet to a part of our tradition that is much more fundamental, and, as hard as this is for a geek-wanna-be to admit, much more important.
本书的讨论不像《Code》那么多地围绕于Internet本身，而是关于在Internet成为我们的世俗生活一部分之后所造成的后果，这些后果 相对于Internet本身，是更根本的。（as hard as this is for a geek-wanna-be to admit 怎么译？）更重要的。
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与《代码（Code）》不同，本书的论点不怎么是关于Internet本身的，而是关于
Internet对我们一部分传统带来的更为根本地－－做为一个“想要成为高手”的
人很难承认这点－－更为重要的后果。
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That tradition is the way our culture gets made. As I explain in the pages that follow, we come from a tradition of "free culture"--not "free" as in "free beer" (to borrow a phrase from the founder of the free- software movement 2), but "free" as in "free speech," "free markets," "free trade," "free enterprise," "free will," and "free elections." A free culture supports and protects creators and innovators. It does this directly by granting intellectual property rights. But it does so indirectly by limit- ing the reach of those rights, to guarantee that follow-on creators and innovators remain as free as possible from the control of the past. A free culture is not a culture without property, just as a free market is not a market in which every thing is free. The opposite of a free culture is a "permission culture"--a culture in which creators get to create only with the permission of the powerful, or of creators from the past.

我们的文化由世俗传统所产生。【tradition 惯例，这部分的传统就是文化是是如何创造的传统/惯例。】如在本书接下来所解释的，我们来自一个自由(Free，“自由”的英文，也作免费解)文化的世俗 传统，这自由不是免费啤酒的免费，是指自由言论，自由市场，自由贸易，自由经营，自由愿望，自由选举意义上的自由。 通过承认知识产权，自由文化直接支持并保护创造者和改革者。但它也间接地限制这些知识产权所能触及的范围，从而保证后继的创造者和改革者们最大的自由，不 被过去所控制。 就像自由市场中不是所有东西都是免费一样，自由文化不是不存在财产的文化。自由文化的对立面是一个“许可文化”（需要一个更好的"Permission Culture"的翻译【bxy注：我觉得你这个就不错。批准文化？政治性更强一点到是，
但有点儿过，其实不过：）现在就是这样。许可证文化】），在那里，创作者只有在过去的创作者或者强大势力的许可下才能创作。
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这部分传统就是文化是如何被创造的。我在下面的篇幅会解释，我们来自于“自
由文化”（free culture；译者注：free，“自由”的英文，也有免费的意思）
的传统，－－不是“免费啤酒”（free beer）的“free”（借用自由软件运动创
始人的措辞），而是“言论自由（free speech）”的free，“自由市场（free
markets）”的free，“自由贸易（free trade）”的free，“自由企业经济
（free enterprise）”的free，“自由意志（free will）”的free和“自由选
举（free elections）”的free。自由文化支持和保护创作者和创新者。直接地，
它通过授予知识产权的权利来做到这点，但间接地，它通过限制这些权利的范围，
以保证后继的创造者和创新者保有尽可能大的不被过去所控制的自由来做到这点。
自由社会不是没有财产的文化，正如自由市场不是所有东西都是免费的一样。自
由文化的对立面是“许可文化”。在“许可文化”下，创作者只有在得到过去的
创作者或强大势力的许可后才能创作。
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If we understood this change, I believe we would resist it. Not "we" on the Left or "you" on the Right, but we who have no stake in the particular industries of culture that defined the twentieth century. Whether you are on the Left or the Right, if you are in this sense disinterested, then the story I tell here will trouble you. For the changes I describe affect values that both sides of our political culture deem fun- damental.
倘若我们当时能够理解这个变化，我想信【相信】我们那时就会抵制它。【删除：这里的我们，】不是左翼【左派；开明的；自由主意的 （liberal）】的“我们或者右翼【右派；保守的（conservative）】的“你们”，（Not "we" on the Left or "you" on the Right,？？？）而是那些在标志了二十一【二十 twentieth】世纪的那些产业没有所有利益的“我们”。【？？？】不论你是左翼还是右翼，如果你在这点上不偏不倚【漠不关心】，那么我在这里所说的 事情将让你感到忧虑【苦恼】，因为我描述的变化影响到了政治文化【两边派别】都视为根本的价值【观】。
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倘若我们当时能够理解这个变化，我相信我们那时就会抵制它。不是左派的“我
们”或右派的“你们”，而是我们－－这些在与定义二十世纪的文化产业没有任
何利益瓜葛的我们。不论你是左派还是右派，如果你在这点上是事不关己，那么
我在这里所说的事情将让你感到苦恼，因为我描述的变化影响到了政治文化两边
派别都视为根本的价值观。
【注：右派在西方不是一个贬义词，更多是保守的意思 用左翼 left wing 和 右翼 right wing 好像也可以】
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We saw a glimpse of this bipartisan outrage in the early summer of 2003. As the FCC considered changes in media ownership rules that would relax limits on media concentration, an extraordinary coalition generated more than 700,000 letters to the FCC opposing the change. As William Safire described marching "uncomfortably alongside CodePink Women for Peace and the National Rifle Association, between liberal Olympia Snowe and conservative Ted Stevens," he formulated perhaps most simply just what was at stake: the concentration of power. And as he asked,
在2003年夏天【初夏】，我们曾短暂地看到获得两党支持的激烈抗议【瞥见了这种两党（跨党派的）都表现出的愤慨】。美国联邦通信委员会(FCC) 考虑修改媒体所有权条例(规章？Rules【规则】)以宽松【放宽】对媒体【业】集中（Concentration）的限制，一次非比寻常的【删除：两 党】同盟产生【引发】了超过七十万封发给FCC的抗议信。 根据【如】William Safire描述那是【与代号妇女和平运动和美国步枪协会一起并肩，处于自由派的Olympia Snowe和保守派的Ted Stevens之间的【令人不舒服的】游行”，他一针见血地阐明了问题的关键【简洁地阐明了争端所在】：力量的集中。 如他所问：
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2003年的初夏，我们瞥见了这种两党（美国的共和党和民主党）共有的愤怒。美
国联邦通信委员会(FCC)考虑修改媒体所有权规则来放宽对媒体业集中（media
concentration）的限制，一个非比寻常的同盟引发了超过七十万封发给FCC的抗
议信。如William Safire所描述的,（他）“不太舒服地与粉色代号——妇女为和
平”（CodePink Women for Peace）和美国步枪协会(National Rifle
Association) 并肩，在自由派的Olympia Snowe和保守派的Ted Stevens之间”游
行着。他简洁地阐明了争端所在：力量的集中。 如他所问：
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Does that sound unconservative? Not to me. The concentration of power--political, corporate, media, cultural--should be anathema to conservatives. The diffusion of power through local control, thereby encouraging individual participation, is the essence of federalism and the greatest expression of democracy.3
这听起来是非保守(反保守? unconservative【不保守？】)的吗？对我来说不是【我不觉得】。这种力量【权力】的集中，政治的，组织的【企业的】，媒体的，文化的，应该 是为保守派所深恶痛绝【格格不入的sth that is comnpletely the opposite of what you believe in】。通过局部的控制达到力量的传播【地方掌权达到权力扩散】，由此鼓励个人的参与，是联邦主义【联邦制度】的本质和民主的最大的表述【最好的表现】。
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这听起来不像保守派是吗？我不觉得。这种权力的集中，政治上的，企业上的，
媒体上的，文化上的，应该是与保守派格格不入的。通过地方掌权达到权力扩散，
由此鼓励个人的参与，是联邦制度的本质和民主的最好的表现。
【这里我注一下：does that sound conservative可以这样理解，因为
conservative要求政府尽可能少地干预私人企业，所以，conservative不应该反
对media concentration。我的理解。所以他才自问这个问题。】
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This idea is an element of the argument of Free Culture, though my focus is not just on the concentration of power produced by concentra- tions in ownership, but more importantly, if because less visibly, on the concentration of power produced by a radical change in the effective scope of the law. The law is changing; that change is altering the way our culture gets made; that change should worry you--whether or not you care about the Internet, and whether you're on Safire's left or on his right.
这个看法是自由文化论点的一个要素，虽然我关注的不仅仅是由所有权集中而产生的力量【权力】的集中，但【而】更重要的是，【如果没那么明显的话，】 在法律影响范围发生的巨大变化而产生的力量的集中【法律的影响范围彻底的改变产生的权力的几种】。法律正在发生改变，这改变正更改【改变】着我们【删除： 的】文化产生的方式；这改变会让你担忧，不论你是否在意【关心】Internet，也不论你是【删除：否】站在Safire的左边还是右边。
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这个看法是自由文化论点的一个要素，虽然我关注的不仅仅是由所有权集中而产
生的权力的集中，而是更为重要的--如果因为它没那么明显的话--法律影响范围
的彻底改变所产生的权力集中。法律正在发生改变，这改变也正改变着我们文化
产生的方式；这改变会让您担忧，不论您是否关心Internet，也不论您是站在
Safire的左边还是右边。
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The inspiration for the title and for much of the argument of this book comes from the work of Richard Stallman and the Free Soft- ware Foundation. Indeed, as I reread Stallman's own work, especially the essays in Free Software, Free Society, I realize that all of the theoret- ical insights I develop here are insights Stallman described decades ago. One could thus well argue that this work is "merely" derivative.
本书【删除：的】标题和大部分论点的灵感来自Richard Stallman和自由软件基金的工作【成果】。的确，当我重新阅读Stallman的著作，尤其是那些在《自由软件，自由社会》里的文章，我发现【意识 到】我在这里得到的的所有的理论上的发现和领悟【我意识到我这里揭示的所有理论上的insights】，在几十年前就已经被Stallman描述过了。因 此可以说这本书仅仅【“不过是”】是一个衍生的作品。
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本书标题和大部分论点的灵感来自Richard Stallman和自由软件基金的成果。的
确，当我重新阅读Stallman的著作，尤其是那些在《自由软件，自由社会》里的
文章，我意识到我这里揭示的所有理论上的真知灼见Stallman在几十年前就已经
记述过了。因此可以说这本书“不过是”是一个衍生的作品。
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I accept that criticism, if indeed it is a criticism. The work of a lawyer is always derivative, and I mean to do nothing more in this book than to remind a culture about a tradition that has always been its own. Like Stallman, I defend that tradition on the basis of values. Like Stallman, I believe those are the values of freedom. And like Stallman, I believe those are values of our past that will need to be defended in our future. A free culture has been our past, but it will only be our fu- ture if we change the path we are on right now.
我接受这个评价【批评】，如果那真的是个评价【批评】。一个律师的工作永远是衍生的，而且【删除：我】在这本书里，【我】的确只想提醒一个文化关于 一个一直属于自己的传统【我的确只想提醒大家关于这个自成一体的传统的文化】。 和Stallman一样，我是基于价值观上【来】捍卫那个传统。和Stallman一样，我想信那些是价值观也是属于自由的价值观。和Stallman一 样，我想信那些价值观曾是我们昔日的价值观【我们昔日的价值观】，【删除：它们】需要被捍卫。自由文化曾经在我们的过去【我们的过去在自由文化中】，但只 有我们改变现在所走的道路，它才能出现在我们的将来【我们的将来才能在自由文化中】。
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我接受这个批评，如果它真的是批评的话。一个律师的工作永远是衍生的，而且
在这本书里，我的确只想提醒大家关于这个自成一体的传统的文化【a
tradition that has always been its own】。 和Stallman一样，我是基于价值
观来捍卫那个传统。和Stallman一样，我想信那些价值观是自由的价值观。和
Stallman一样，我想信我们昔日的价值观在未来需要被捍卫。我们过去生活在自
由文化中，但只有我们改变现在所走的道路，我们将来才能生活在自由文化中。
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Like Stallman's arguments for free software, an argument for free culture stumbles on a confusion that is hard to avoid, and even harder to understand. A free culture is not a culture without property; it is not a culture in which artists don't get paid. A culture without property, or in which creators can't get paid, is anarchy, not freedom. Anarchy is not what I advance here.
就像Stallman【删除：为】自由软件【删除：提出】的论点，自由文化的论点触绊【的绊脚石是】到了一个难以避免、更难以理解的困惑【混淆】。 自由文化不是一个不存在财产的文化；它不是一个艺术家不能得到【得不到】报酬的文化。【删除：一个】没有财产的文化，或者艺术家不能得到【得不到】报酬的 文化是无政府【删除；状态的】，【删除：那】不是自由。我在此不促进【不是提出 advance an idea: to sugest a plan ttc s that others can consider it】无政府状态。
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就像Stallman的自由软件论点，自由文化论点的绊脚石是一个难以避免、更难以
理解的容易混淆的概念。自由文化不是一个不存在财产的文化；它不是一个艺术
家得不到报酬的文化。没有财产的文化，或者艺术家得不到报酬的文化是无政府
状态，不是自由。无政府状态不是我的提议。
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Instead, the free culture that I defend in this book is a balance be- tween anarchy and control. A free culture, like a free market, is filled with property. It is filled with rules of property and contract that get enforced by the state. But just as a free market is perverted if its prop- erty becomes feudal, so too can a free culture be queered by extremism in the property rights that define it. That is what I fear about our cul- ture today. It is against that extremism that this book is written.
相反，我在此书里要捍卫的【自由文化】是一个在无序【无政府】和控制之间的平衡。自由文化，有【由】如自由市场，充满了财产。它充满了被国家所维护 实行【强制实行】的关于财产和合约【合同】的规章制度【规则】。但就如自由市场一旦被封建制度化就会没落【变了质】，自由文化同样会被产权所定义的极端主 义所糟蹋【弄糟】。这正是我对我们今天的文化的担心。本书就是为了对抗那些极端主义而写。
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我在此书里要捍卫的自由文化是一个在无政府和控制之间的平衡。自由文化，由
如自由市场，充满了财产。它充满了国家强制实行的关于财产和合同的规则。但
就如自由市场的财产一旦被封建制度化就会变了质，定义自由文化的财产权如果
被极端化同样会糟蹋了它。这正是我们今天的文化让我担心的。本书是为了对抗
那些极端主义而写。
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NOTES
1. David Pogue, "Don't Just Chat, Do Something," New York Times, 30 Januar y 2000.
2. Richard M. Stallman, Free Software, Free Societies 57 ( Joshua Gay, ed.2002).
3. William Safire, " The Great Media Gulp," New York Times, 22 May 2003.
注释
【中英文书名放在一块儿风格的统一请大家拿个意见。我也查一下相关的出版规
则。】
1、 David Pogue, 《别光聊了，做点儿事儿》（"Don't Just Chat, Do
Something,"） New York Times, 30 Januar y 2000.

2、 Richard M. Stallman, 《自由软件，自由社会》（Free Software, Free
Societies） 57 ( Joshua Gay, ed.2002).
3、 William Safire, 《媒体大口》【？翻的俗了：）】" The Great Media
Gulp," New York Times, 22 May 2003.

Preface: (前言(简体)，Translator: Yining, Proofreader: bxy)

Introducation
简介
On December 17 1903, on a windy North Carolina beach for just , shy of one hundred seconds, the Wright brothers demonstrated that a heavier-than-air, self-propelled vehicle could fly. The moment was electric and its importance widely understood. Almost immediately, there was an explosion of interest in this new found technology of manned flight, and a gaggle of innovators began to build upon it.
1903年12月17日，在北卡罗来纳州一个刮着风的海滩上，在少于一百秒的时间里，莱特(Wright)兄弟俩证明了一个比空气重、自行推动的交通工具 是能够飞起来的。这一刻不仅激动人心而且具有众所周知的重大意义。人们几乎立刻爆发出对这项载人飞行的新技术的兴趣，一大批发明家开始吵吵嚷嚷 [gaggle]的在这个基础上开始新的发明和创造。
At the time the Wright brothers invented the airplane, American law held that a property owner presumptively owned not just the sur- face of his land, but all the land below, down to the center of the earth, and all the space above, to "an indefinite extent, upwards."1 For many years, scholars had puzzled about how best to interpret the idea that rights in land ran to the heavens. Did that mean that you owned the stars? Could you prosecute geese for their willful and regular trespass?
莱特兄弟发明飞机的时候，美国的法律认为[held]土地拥有者应该 [presumptively]不仅仅拥有土地的表面，也拥有地面以下，低至地核，地面以上， “高至无限高”的空间。对此，学者们为了如何最好地诠释这个权力从尘土延伸 到天堂的观点绞尽脑汁，抓耳挠腮了许多年。难道这意味着你能拥有天上的星辰 么？您能起诉那些定期故意非法从空中侵入您土地的鹅吗？
Then came airplanes, and for the first time, this principle of American law -- deep within the foundations of our tradition, and acknowledged by the most important legal thinkers of our past -- mattered. If my land reaches to the heavens, what happens when United flies over my field? Do I have the right to banish it from my property? Am I allowed to enter into an exclusive license with Delta Airlines? Could we set up an auction to decide how much these rights are worth?
飞机的到来使这条美国法律的原则，这深入我们传统，被以往最重要的法 律思想家们所公认的原则，第一次变得重要了。如果我的土地所有权能 够上升至天堂，那么该怎么对待飞过我土地上空的联合航空？我是否有权把它驱 逐出我的土地？我能不能跟Delta Airline签一份全权授权书？我可否把我的土地 所有权拍卖来判定它的价值？
In 1945, these questions became a federal case. When North Carolina farmers Thomas Lee and Tinie Causby started losing chickens because of low-flying military aircraft (the terrified chickens apparently flew into the barn walls and died), the Causbys filed a lawsuit saying that the government was trespassing on their land. The airplanes, of course, never touched the surface of the Causbys' land. But if, as Blackstone, Kent, and Coke had said, their land reached to "an indefinite extent, upwards,"[1] then the government was trespassing on their property, and the Causbys wanted it to stop.
到了1945年，这些问题被提上了联邦法院。北卡罗来纳的农场主托马斯·李 （Thomas Lee）和蒂尼·考斯比[?]（Tinie Causby） 因为空军战机低飞而导致 农场鸡只减少（显然，那些受了惊吓的鸡是惊慌失措撞飞向禽舍的墙上而致死） 对政府提出了非法侵入他们土地的控诉。那些飞机当然没有触及他们的土地。但 如果按照Blackstone, Kent和Coke[？]所说，他们的土地所有权“高至无限高” 的话，那么政府的确是非法侵入了他们的土地，因此，考斯比两人要求政府停止 这么做。
The Supreme Court agreed to hear the Causbys' case. Congress had declared the air ways public, but if one's property really extended to the heavens, then Congress's declaration could well have been an unconstitutional "taking" of property without compensation. The Court acknowledged that "it is ancient doctrine that common law ownership of the land extended to the periphery of the universe." But Justice Douglas had no patience for ancient doctrine. In a single paragraph, hundreds of years of property law were erased. As he wrote for the Court,
高等法院同意受理Causbys一案。国会已经宣布空中航线是公有的，但如果个人的 土地财产真的能够延伸至天堂的话，那么国会的声明足够算得上因不做补偿“占 有”财产而违宪了。法院承认习惯法(common law)“把土地所有权延伸无限到宇 宙是一个古老的学说（doctrine）”。但是道格拉斯（Douglas）法官对古老的学说没有耐心。 他在判决中只用了一段话，就把几百年来的财产法给删除了，
[The] doctrine has no place in the modern world. The air is a public highway, as Congress has declared. Were that not true, every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea. To recognize such private claims to the airspace would clog these highways, seriously interfere with their control and development in the public interest, and transfer into private ownership that to which only the public has a just claim.2
在现代世界里，不应存在这样的学说。正如国会所宣称的，空中是公共的交 通航线。如果这不成立，每个跨洲航线的飞行员将面对无数的非法侵入的诉 讼。这个观点是违反常理。承认这种对空间的私人占有将阻止这些交通航线， 严重影响到符合大众利益的对空中交通的管理和发展，而且将只有公众才合 法享有得所有权改变为私人所有。[2]
"Common sense revolts at the idea."
“这个观点是违反常理的。”
This is how the law usually works. Not often this abruptly or impa- tiently, but eventually, this is how it works. It was Douglas's style not to dither. Other justices would have blathered on for pages to reach the conclusion that Douglas holds in a single line: "Common sense revolts at the idea." But whether it takes pages or a few words, it is the special genius of a common law system, as ours is, that the law adjusts to the technologies of the time. And as it adjusts, it changes. Ideas that were as solid as rock in one age crumble in another.
法律通常就是这么运作的。虽然通常不是这么突然或者没有耐心，但最终就是这 么运作的。道格拉斯的作风是不优柔寡断。其他法官也许会在喋喋不休、长篇累 椟之后得出与他仅仅用一句话就表达了的一样的结论：“这个观点是违反常理 的。”但不管是花上几页纸还是几个字，习惯法（common law）——就是我们 （美国）采用的——的特殊本质在于法律能够根据当时的科技调整自身。法律在 调整的同时也变化着。一个时期曾经坚如磐石的观念在另一个时期就化为齑粉。
Or at least, this is how things happen when there's no one powerful on the other side of the change. The Causbys were just farmers. And though there were no doubt many like them who were upset by the growing traffic in the air (though one hopes not many chickens flew themselves into walls), the Causbys of the world would find it ver y hard to unite and stop the idea, and the technology, that the Wright brothers had birthed. The Wright brothers spat airplanes into the technological meme pool; the idea then spread like a virus in a chicken coop; farmers like the Causbys found themselves surrounded by "what seemed reasonable" given the technology that the Wrights had produced. They could stand on their farms, dead chickens in hand, and shake their fists at these newfangled technologies all they wanted. They could call their representatives or even file a lawsuit. But in the end, the force of what seems "obvious" to everyone else--the power of "common sense"--would prevail. Their "private interest " would not be allowed to defeat an obvious public gain.
或者至少，这是当变化的对立面没有强大力量的时候，事情是如何发展的。考斯 比不过是农场主。虽然毫无疑问很多像他们一样得人对越来越多的空中交通对他 们造成的损失感到心烦（虽然大家希望没有太多的鸡飞向了墙壁），世界上的考 斯比们很难团结起来阻止莱特兄弟带来的观念和科技的变化。莱特兄弟让飞机变 为人们口耳相传的科技词汇(technological meme pool)；这个观念如同鸡舍里四 处散播的病毒；农场主们发现自己被莱特兄弟的技术所带来的“看起来合情合理 的东西”所包围[?]，手里抓着死去的鸡，对着那些新潮的技术挥舞拳头。他们可 以找当地的议员，甚至上诉法院。但到了最后，在其他人看起来是“显然的”力 量——“常理”（common sense）的力量——终将胜利。不允许他们的“私人利 益”战胜一个显而易见的公众获益（public gain）。
Edwin Howard Armstrong is one of America's forgotten inventor geniuses. He came to the great American inventor scene just after the titans Thomas Edison and Alexander Graham Bell. But his work in the area of radio technology was perhaps the most important of any single inventor in the first fifty years of radio. He was better educated than Michael Faraday, who as a bookbinder's apprentice had discov- ered electric induction in 1831. But he had the same intuition about how the world of radio worked, and on at least three occasions, Arm- strong invented profoundly important technologies that advanced our understanding of radio.
埃德温·霍华德·阿姆斯壮（Edwin Howard Armstrong）是美国被遗忘的发明天 才之一。他在发明界巨头托马斯·爱迪生（Thomas Edison）和亚历山大· 格雷 厄姆·贝尔（Alexander Graham Bell）之后登场。但是在无线电发明后的头五十 年里，他在这个领域的发明比任何发明家都来的重要。他比曾经是书本装订商学 徒而后在1831年发现电流感应的迈克尔·法拉第（Michael Faraday）受过更好的 教育。但是他对无线电世界是如何运转的有着同样的直觉，而且阿姆斯壮至少三 次发明了非常重要的技术，大大增进了我们对无线电的了解。
On the day after Christmas, 1933, four patents were issued to Arm- strong for his most significant invention--FM radio. Until then, con- sumer radio had been amplitude-modulated (AM) radio. The theorists of the day had said that frequency-modulated (FM) radio could never work. They were right about FM radio in a narrow band of spectrum. But Armstrong discovered that frequency-modulated radio in a wide band of spectrum would deliver an astonishing fidelity of sound, with much less transmitter power and static.
在1933年圣诞节的第二天，阿姆斯壮最具重大意义的发明——无线调频广播—— 获得了四项专利。直到那时，消费者的收音机（consumer radio）都是调幅（AM） 的。当时的理论家曾说无线调频广播（FM）是不可能的。对于窄频的无线调频广 播，他们是对的。但是阿姆斯壮发现在宽频上的无线调频广播能够提供惊人的声 音清晰度，而且传输的功率更小，静电干扰更少。
On November 5, 1935, he demonstrated the technology at a meeting of the Institute of Radio Engineers at the Empire State Building in New York City. He tuned his radio dial across a range of AM stations, until the radio locked on a broadcast that he had arranged from seven- teen miles away. The radio fell totally silent, as if dead, and then with a clarity no one else in that room had ever heard from an electrical device, it produced the sound of an announcer's voice: " This is amateur station W2AG at Yonkers, New York, operating on frequency modulation at two and a half meters."
1935年11月5日，他在纽约帝国大厦举行的无线电工程师学院（Institute of Radio Engineers）大会上演示了这一技术。他调整着收音机的转盘，转过一系列 调幅广播站点，然后锁定在他事先安排的一个十七英里之外的广播站上。收音机 先是完全没有了声音，仿佛被关掉了一样，然后以一种在场所有人在电器设备上 都没有听到过的清晰度，发出了广播员的声音：“这里是纽约Yonkers的业余广播 电台W2AG在二点五米调频上的广播。”
The audience was hearing something no one had thought possible:
在场的观众听到了从没人认为可能的声音：
A glass of water was poured before the microphone in Yonkers; it sounded like a glass of water being poured. ...A paper was crumpled and torn; it sounded like paper and not like a crackling forest fire. ...Sousa marches were played from records and a pi- ano solo and guitar number were performed. ... The music was projected with a liveness rarely if ever heard before from a radio "music box."3
水倒入麦克风前的杯子，听起来就像水被倒入杯子...... 一张纸被揉起来后 撕掉，听起来就像纸而不像着火的树林在噼啪作响...... 播放了Sousa进行 曲（Sousa marches）的唱片，演奏了一段钢琴独奏和吉他作品。......音乐 以一种收音“音乐盒”从未有过的生命力呈现出来。[3]
As our own common sense tells us, Armstrong had discovered a vastly superior radio technology. But at the time of his invention, Arm- strong was working for RCA. RCA was the dominant player in the then dominant AM radio market. By 1935, there were a thousand radio stations across the United States, but the stations in large cities were all owned by a handful of networks.
常识告诉我们，Armstrong发现了先进得多的无线电传播技术。但在Armstrong发 明它的时候，他在RCA（美国无线电公司）工作。当时调幅广播统治广播市场，而 RCA是这一市场的统治企业。截至到1935年，美国有上千家广播公司，但大城市里 的电台却被少数几家广播网所拥有。
RCA's president, David Sarnoff, a friend of Armstrong's, was eager that Armstrong discover a way to remove static from AM radio. So Sarnoff was quite excited when Armstrong told him he had a device that removed static from "radio." But when Armstrong demonstrated his invention, Sarnoff was not pleased.
RCA的主席David Sarnoff是阿姆斯壮的朋友。他渴望阿姆斯壮能发现消除调幅广 播上的静电干扰的办法。所以当阿姆斯壮告诉他自己有了个能消除“广播”静电 干扰的设备，Sarnoff非常兴奋。但当Armstrong演示他的发明的时，Sarnoff并不 高兴。
I thought Armstrong would invent some kind of a filter to remove static from our AM radio. I didn't think he'd start a revolution-- start up a whole damn new industr y to compete with RCA.4 我以为阿姆斯壮的发明能够过滤掉我们调幅广播的静电干扰。我没想到他会 开始个革命——开始了个他妈的全新的产业与RCA竞争。[4]
Armstrong's invention threatened RCA's AM empire, so the company launched a campaign to smother FM radio. W hile FM may have been a superior technology, Sarnoff was a superior tactician. As one au- thor described,
阿姆斯壮的发明威胁到了RCA的调幅广播帝国，所以该公司发动了扼杀调频广播的 运动。调频广播或许是个更出众的技术，但Sarnoff是更出众的战术家。正如一位 作者所说，
The forces for FM, largely engineering, could not overcome the weight of strategy devised by the sales, patent, and legal offices to subdue this threat to corporate position. For FM, if allowed to develop unrestrained, posed ...a complete reordering of radio power . . . and the eventual overthrow of the carefully restricted AM system on which RCA had grown to power.5 调频广播的强项大部分是工程技术上，不能与为了压制它对企业地位的威胁 而动用了销售，专利，和法律部门的战略对抗。对调频广播来说，如果被允 许不受限制地发展......将能够颠覆广播业的势力格局.....而且最终推翻 RCA小心约束（carefully restricted）的其赖以发展壮大的调幅广播。[5]
RCA at first kept the technology in house, insisting that further tests were needed. When, after two years of testing, Armstrong grew impatient, RCA began to use its power with the government to stall FM radio's deployment generally. In 1936, RCA hired the former head of the FCC and assigned him the task of assuring that the FCC assign spectrum in a way that would castrate FM--principally by moving FM radio to a different band of spectrum. At first, these efforts failed. But when Armstrong and the nation were distracted by World War II, RCA's work began to be more successful. Soon after the war ended, the FCC announced a set of policies that would have one clear effect: FM radio would be crippled. As Lawrence Lessing described it,
RCA起初把这项技术束之高阁，坚称需要更多的测试。测试两年后，阿姆斯壮开始 不耐烦了，RCA开始利用在政府的力量拖延调频广播的广泛部署。 1936年，RCA雇 佣了美国通讯委员会(FCC)的前头目，并委派他一个任务，确保FCC用一个能阉割 调频广播的电磁频谱分配办法——主要就是将调频广播移到另一个频段。刚开始， 这些努力都失败了。但当阿姆斯壮和整个国家为二战所分心时，RCA的手段开始奏 效。战争结束后不多久，FCC宣布一系列的政策，这些政策都有一个明显的作用： 调频广播将被削弱。如Lawrence Lessing所描述的，
The series of body blows that FM radio received right after the war, in a series of rulings manipulated through the FCC by the big radio interests, were almost incredible in their force and deviousness.6
大广播公司利益集团操纵FCC所做的一系列裁定，给了调频广播一系列的重击， 其力量和狡猾（deviousness）几乎是令人难以置信的。[6]
To make room in the spectrum for RCA's latest gamble, television, FM radio users were to be moved to a totally new spectrum band. The power of FM radio stations was also cut, meaning FM could no longer be used to beam programs from one part of the country to another. (This change was strongly supported by AT&T, because the loss of FM relaying stations would mean radio stations would have to buy wired links from AT&T.) The spread of FM radio was thus choked, at least temporarily.
为了在频段分配上给RCA的最新冒险——电视——腾地儿，调频广播的用户被移到 了全新的波段。调频广播站的电力（power ?）也被切断，意味着调频广播将不能 再将节目从国家的一处播送到另一处（这个改变受到了美国电话电报公司（AT&T） 的大力支持，因为调频广播中继站的消失意味着广播站将不得不购买AT&T的有线 连接。）调频广播的传播因此受到抑制，至少是暂时性的。
Armstrong resisted RCA's efforts. In response, RCA resisted Armstrong's patents. After incorporating FM technology into the emerging standard for television, RCA declared the patents invalid --baselessly, and almost fifteen years after they were issued. It thus refused to pay him royalties. For six years, Armstrong fought an expensive war of litigation to defend the patents. Finally, just as the patents expired, RCA offered a settlement so low that it would not even cover Armstrong's lawyers' fees. Defeated, broken, and now broke, in 1954 Armstrong wrote a short note to his wife and then stepped out of a thirteenth-story window to his death.
阿姆斯壮对RCA的行为进行了抵制。对应地，RCA对阿姆斯壮的专利进行抵制。在 将调频技术纳入到新兴的电视技术标准后，RCA——毫无根据地，在专利颁发了几 乎十五年后——宣布那些专利无效。以此，RCA拒绝支付阿姆斯壮专利费。为了捍 卫他的专利，阿姆斯壮打了六年费用高昂的法律官司。终于，就在专利过期之际， RCA提出了一个赔偿极低的和解方案，根本不够支付阿姆斯壮的律师费。一败涂地， 精疲力尽，如今又身无分文，阿姆斯壮在1945年写了一张给妻子的便条后，从十 三层楼的窗口跳下，结束了生命。
This is how the law sometimes works. Not often this tragically, and rarely with heroic drama, but sometimes, this is how it works. From the beginning, government and government agencies have been subject to capture. They are more likely captured when a powerful interest is threatened by either a legal or technical change. That powerful interest too often exerts its influence within the government to get the govern- ment to protect it. The rhetoric of this protection is of course always public spirited; the reality is something different. Ideas that were as solid as rock in one age, but that, left to themselves, would crumble in another, are sustained through this subtle corruption of our political process. RCA had what the Causbys did not: the power to stifle the effect of technological change.
法律有时候就是这么运作的。虽然不是常常这么悲剧性的，更鲜有这样英雄般的 戏剧性的，但有时候，就是这么运作的。一开始，政府和政府部门就会遭到俘获 （subject to capturing ？）。在当强大的利益集团因为法律或者技术上的变化 而受到威胁的时候，他们就更可能被俘获。强大的利益集团大多时候通过其在政 府的影响力使政府保护它。这种保护当然被冠以为公众牟利的花言巧语，实际上 并非如此。一个时期坚如磐石的观念，如果仅靠自己，在另一个时期就会化为齑 粉，却因这个微小的政治程序上的腐败而赖以生存（sustained through this subtle corruption of our political process）。RCA有考斯比们没有的：能够 抑止科技转变带来影响的力量。
There's no single inventor of the Internet. Nor is there any good date upon which to mark its birth. Yet in a very short time, the Internet has become part of ordinary American life. According to the Pew Internet and American Life Project, 58 percent of Americans had access to the Internet in 2002, up from 49 percent two years before.7 That number could well exceed two thirds of the nation by the end of 2004.
Internet不是某一个人发明的。也没有明确的日期记录它的起源。但在一个很短 的时间里，Internet成为了普通美国人生活的一部分。根据《Pew的因特网和美国 生活项目》（Pew Internet and American Life），百分之五十八的美国人在 2002年连接上了Internet，两年前为百分之四十九。[7] 到2004年底这个数字将大大 超过全美国人口的三分之二。
As the Internet has been integrated into ordinary life, it has changed things. Some of these changes are technical--the Internet has made communication faster, it has lowered the cost of gathering data, and so on. These technical changes are not the focus of this book. They are important. They are not well understood. But they are the sort of thing that would simply go away if we all just switched the Internet off. They don't affect people who don't use the Internet, or at least they don't affect them directly. They are the proper subject of a book about the Internet. But this is not a book about the Internet.
Internet已经融入了日常生活，它改变了一些事情。有些改变是技术上的——使 得通讯更快捷，降低了收集数据的成本，等等。这些技术上的变化不是本书的重 点。它们是重要的。我们还没很好地理解它们。但当我们关掉internet后它们就 消失了。它们不影响那些不使用Internet的人，或者至少不直接影响到他们。它 们适合作关于internet的书的话题。但这本书不是关于Internet的。
Instead, this book is about an effect of the Internet beyond the Internet itself: an effect upon how culture is made. My claim is that the Internet has induced an important and unrecognized change in that process. That change will radically transform a tradition that is as old as the Republic itself. Most, if they recognized this change, would reject it. Yet most don't even see the change that the Internet has introduced.
这本书是关于Internet带来的超越了Internet本身影响：是对关于文化如何产生 的影响。我断言Internet导致这一过程（文化如何生成）发生了重要且未被意识 到的变化。这个变化将根本地改变这与共和国（美国）一样古老的传统。大多数 人，如果他们意识到这个变化，将拒绝接受它。但大多数人甚至还没看到 Internet引入的变化。
We can glimpse a sense of this change by distinguishing between commercial and noncommercial culture, and by mapping the law 's regulation of each. By "commercial culture" I mean that part of our culture that is produced and sold or produced to be sold. By "noncommercial culture" I mean all the rest. When old men sat around parks or on street corners telling stories that kids and others consumed, that was noncommercial culture. W hen Noah Webster published his "Reader," or Joel Barlow his poetry, that was commercial culture.
我们可以通过对比商业和非商业文化，对照法律对二者的“管制”来粗略感觉一 下这个变化。我指的“商业文化”是那些生产后销售了的，或为了销售而生产的 文化。“非商业文化”是指其它所有的。当老人们在公园或街角闲坐，为孩子和 其他人讲述故事，那是非商业文化。当Noah Webster发表他的《读者》或者 Joel Barlow发表他的诗歌，那是商业文化。
At the beginning of our history, and for just about the whole of our tradition, noncommercial culture was essentially unregulated. Of course, if your stories were lewd, or if your song disturbed the peace, then the law might intervene. But the law was never directly concerned with the creation or spread of this form of culture, and it left this culture "free." The ordinary ways in which ordinary individuals shared and transformed their culture--telling stories, reenacting scenes from plays or TV, participating in fan clubs, sharing music, making tapes--were left alone by the law.
在我们历史的初期，和近乎我们传统的全部，非商业文化基本上是不受管制的。 当然，如果你所说的故事是猥琐的，或者你的歌曲影响到了周围的安宁，那么法 律也许会介入。但法律从来没有直接牵扯到这种形式的文化创造和传播，它使得 这种文化是“自由”的。普通人分享和转变他们的文化的普通方式——讲述故事， 再现剧本或者电视上的节目，参加爱好者俱乐部，交流音乐，录制磁带——都不 受法律管辖。
The focus of the law was on commercial creativity. At first slightly, then quite extensively, the law protected the incentives of creators by granting them exclusive rights to their creative work, so that they could sell those exclusive rights in a commercial marketplace.8 This is also, of course, an important part of creativity and culture, and it has become an increasingly important part in America. But in no sense was it dominant within our tradition. It was instead just one part, a controlled part, balanced with the free.
法律专注于商业性的创作。法律开始很有限地，然后就相当大范围地，通过授予 创作者对作品的专有权来保护创作者的积极性，这样他们能够在商业市场上卖掉 专有权。[8] 这当然也是创造力和文化的一个重要部分，并在美国成为越来越重 要的一部分。但在我们的传统中它绝不占统治地位。它仅仅是一部分，一个受到 控制的，与自由相平衡的部分。
This rough divide between the free and the controlled has now been erased.9 The Internet has set the stage for this erasure and, pushed by big media, the law has now affected it. For the first time in our tradition, the ordinary ways in which individuals create and share culture fall within the reach of the regulation of the law, which has expanded to draw within its control a vast amount of culture and creativity that it never reached before. The technology that preserved the balance of our history--between uses of our culture that were free and uses of our culture that were only upon permission--has been undone. The consequence is that we are less and less a free culture, more and more a permission culture.
自由和受控间大体的区分已经被消除。[9] Internet为它的消除提供了舞台，在大媒 体集团推动下，通过法律使它起了作用。在我们传统里，个人创造和分享文化的 方式第一次划入了法律管制的范围，这个范围已经扩张到法律从未涵盖过的极大 量的文化和创造力。使我们历史保持平衡的技术——位于自由使用文化与只 有经得许可才能使用文化之间的平衡——已经被废除。结果是我们越来越不 是自由文化，越来越是个许可文化。
This change gets justified as necessary to protect commercial creativity. And indeed, protectionism is precisely its motivation. But the protectionism that justifies the changes that I will describe below is not the limited and balanced sort that has defined the law in the past. This is not a protectionism to protect artists. It is instead a protectionism to protect certain forms of business. Corporations threatened by the potential of the Internet to change the way both commercial and noncommercial culture are made and shared have united to induce lawmakers to use the law to protect them. It is the story of RCA and Armstrong; it is the dream of the Causbys.
这个变化必要性的辩护理由是它保护商业创造力。的确，保护主义正是它的动机。 但如我在下面要描述的，为这个变化辩护的保护主义并不是以往法律限定的有限 的和平衡的那种保护主义。这不是保护艺术家的法律。这是保护某些商业形式的 保护主义。Internet带来了改变商业和非商业文化生成和交流方式的潜力，这使 受到威胁的企业联合起来诱导立法者用法律去保护他们。这是RCA和阿姆斯壮的故 事；这是考斯比们梦想的事情。
For the Internet has unleashed an extraordinary possibility for many to participate in the process of building and cultivating a culture that reaches far beyond local boundaries. That power has changed the marketplace for making and cultivating culture generally, and that change in turn threatens established content industries. The Internet is thus to the industries that built and distributed content in the twentieth century what FM radio was to AM radio, or what the truck was to the railroad industry of the nineteenth century: the beginning of the end, or at least a substantial transformation. Digital technologies, tied to the Internet, could produce a vastly more competitive and vibrant market for building and cultivating culture; that market could include a much wider and more diverse range of creators; those creators could produce and distribute a much more vibrant range of creativity; and depending upon a few important factors, those creators could earn more on average from this system than creators do today--all so long as the RCAs of our day don't use the law to protect themselves against this competition.
因为Internet已经释放出非比寻常的可能性，它让许多人参与一个极大的超越地 域限制的建设和抚育文化的过程。 这个力量已经广泛地改变了制造和抚育文化市 场，而且这个改变反过来威胁到了已确立了地位的的内容产业（content industry）。因此，Internet 于二十世纪生产和传播内容的产业，就如同当年调 频广播之对于调幅广播，或者如同十九世纪的卡车之对于铁路：（是它们）没落 的开始，或至少意味着实质性的转变。数字技术与Internet结合在一起，能够产 生一个更具竞争力和活力的生产和发展文化的市场；这个市场可以包涵更广泛和 更多样的创作者；这些创作者可以产生和传播更具活力的创造力领域；基于少许 重要因素，平均来说这些创作者能够从这个系统得到比他们现在更多的报酬—— 只要我们今天的RCA们不使用法律对抗竞争。
Yet, as I argue in the pages that follow, that is precisely what is happening in our culture today. These modern-day equivalents of the early twentieth-century radio or nineteenth-century railroads are using their power to get the law to protect them against this new, more efficient, more vibrant technology for building culture. They are succeeding in their plan to remake the Internet before the Internet remakes them.
但如我在随后的文字里论证的，这正是在我们国家里发生着的情况。这些当代的 二十世纪早期的广播公司，或十九世纪铁路公司的等价物正在利用他们的势力让 法律来保护它们，对抗新兴的，更有效率的，更有活力的建设文化的技术。他们 的计划是在Internet改造他们之前去改造Internet，这计划正走向成功。
It doesn't seem this way to many. The battles over copyright and the Internet seem remote to most. To the few who follow them, they seem mainly about a much simpler brace of questions--whether "piracy" will be permitted, and whether "property" will be protected. The "war" that has been waged against the technologies of the Internet--what Mo- tion Picture Association of America (MPAA) president Jack Valenti calls his "own terrorist war"10--has been framed as a battle about the rule of law and respect for property. To know which side to take in this war, most think that we need only decide whether we're for property or against it.
很多人并非不这么看。对大多数人来说版权法和Internet之间的战斗似乎很遥远。 对很少的一些关注它们的人，这些战斗主要是关于一对简单的多的问题————“盗版” 是否该被允许，和“产权”是否该被保护。对Internet技术发动的“战争”—— 被美国电影协会(MPAA) 主席Jack Valenti称为他“自己的反恐战争”[10]——被 定格为个关于法律准则和尊重财产的战斗。要知道自己站在这场交战中的哪一 方，大多数人认为我们仅需决定我们是否支持财产（权）还是反对它。
If those really were the choices, then I would be with Jack Valenti and the content industry. I, too, am a believer in property, and espe- cially in the importance of what Mr. Valenti nicely calls "creative prop- erty." I believe that "piracy" is wrong, and that the law, properly tuned, should punish "piracy," whether on or off the Internet.
如果那些真是我们要做的选择，那么我会站在Jack Valenti和内容产业一边。我， 如他们一样，信仰财产（权），尤其是Valenti先生所称的“创作的财产”的重要 性。我认为“盗版”是不对的，而且法律，恰当地设制，应该惩罚“盗版”，不 论是否在Internet上。
But those simple beliefs mask a much more fundamental question and a much more dramatic change. My fear is that unless we come to see this change, the war to rid the world of Internet "pirates" will also rid our culture of values that have been integral to our tradition from the start.
但那些简单的信念掩饰了一个更加根本的问题和一个更戏剧性的变化。我担心的 是，除非我们认识到这个变化，这场消灭Internet世界的“盗版者”的战争，也 将消灭那些从一开始就是我们传统一部分的价值观（rid our culture of values ？）。
These values built a tradition that, for at least the first 180 years of our Republic, guaranteed creators the right to build freely upon their past, and protected creators and innovators from either state or private control. The First Amendment protected creators against state control. And as Professor Neil Netanel powerfully argues,11 copyright law, properly balanced, protected creators against private control. Our tradition was thus neither Soviet nor the tradition of patrons. It instead carved out a wide berth within which creators could cultivate and extend our culture.
这些价值观建立了一个传统，至少在我们共和国(美国)的前180年中，保证了创作 者在过去的基础上自由建设（build upon）的权力，保护了创作者和发明者不受 国家（state）和个人（private）的控制。第一修正案保护创作者们不受国家控 制。并且如Neil Netanel有力的论证的，[11] 版权法，如能适当的权衡，保护了创作 者们不受个人控制。因此，我们的传统既不是苏维埃式的也不是赞助人的传统 （tradition of patrons)。它开创了一个开阔港湾让创作者们能够抚育和扩展我 们的文化。
Yet the law 's response to the Internet, when tied to changes in the technology of the Internet itself, has massively increased the effective regulation of creativity in America. To build upon or critique the culture around us one must ask, Oliver Twistlike, for permission first. Permission is, of course, often granted--but it is not often granted to the critical or the independent. We have built a kind of cultural nobility; those within the noble class live easily; those outside it don't. But it is nobility of any form that is alien to our tradition.
法律对Internet的回应，但当与Internet本身的技术联系在一起时（tie to）， 确是大大地加强了对美国创造力管制的效力。要批评或用我们身边的文化建立新 的文化（buil upon），人们必须如Oliver Twisst[狄更斯《雾都孤儿》主人公] 般的先征求许可。请求当然常常是被准予的——但很少准予那些有批判性的和独 立意识的。我们建立了一种文化贵族；那些在贵族阶层之内的人们过的很安逸， 外人就行了。但我们的传统与任何形式的贵族结成都是格格不入的。
The story that follows is about this war. Is it not about the "centrality of technology" to ordinary life. I don't believe in gods, digital or other wise. Nor is it an effort to demonize any individual or group, for neither do I believe in a devil, corporate or other wise. It is not a morality tale. Nor is it a call to jihad against an industry.
接下来的故事是关于这场战争的。不是对于普通生活的科技中心论(centrality of technology)。我不相信那些上帝，不论它们是不是数字化的。这也不是要妖 魔化某些个体或团体，因为我不相信有妖魔，不论它是不是企业化的。 这不是道 德上的说教。这也不是对抗一个产业的圣战号召。
It is instead an effort to understand a hopelessly destructive war inspired by the technologies of the Internet but reaching far beyond its code. And by understanding this battle, it is an effort to map peace. There is no good reason for the current struggle around Internet technologies to continue. There will be great harm to our tradition and culture if it is allowed to continue unchecked. We must come to un- derstand the source of this war. We must resolve it soon.
这里是要去理解一场绝望的毁灭性的战争，它因Interent技术引起的，但远远超 出了Internet的法则(code)。通过理解这场战争去寻找和平。目前没什么理由继 续围绕着Internet技术的争斗，如果允许它不经制约地发展，我们的传统和文化 将受到损害。我们必须去理解这战争的根源。我们必须马上解决它。
Like the Causbys' battle, this war is, in part, about "property." The property of this war is not as tangible as the Causbys', and no innocent chicken has yet to lose its life. Yet the ideas surrounding this "property" are as obvious to most as the Causbys' claim about the sacredness of their farm was to them. We are the Causbys. Most of us take for granted the extraordinarily powerful claims that the owners of "intellectual property" now assert. Most of us, like the Causbys, treat these claims as obvious. And hence we, like the Causbys, object when a new technology interferes with this property. It is as plain to us as it was to them that the new technologies of the Internet are "trespassing" upon legitimate claims of "property." It is as plain to us as it was to them that the law should intervene to stop this trespass.
同考斯比们的战争一样，这场战争部分是关于“财产”的。这场战争的财产不像 考斯比们的那么看得见摸的着，到现在为止还没有无辜的鸡只丧命。围绕着这个 “财产”的观念对大部分人来说是显而易见的，就如农场是不可侵犯的观念对考 斯比们一样的显而易见。我们就是考斯比们。现在，当“知识产权”拥有者宣称 他们过乎强有力的要求时，我们中的大多数人认为那是理所当然的。我们中的大 多数认为这些要求是很显然的。因此我们跟考斯比们一样，当新的技术干涉了产 权的时候会反对。我们很清楚，就如他们当时一样，Internet的新技术在“非法 侵入”合法的“财产”。 我们很清楚，就如他们当时一样，法律应该介入并阻止 这样的“非法侵入”。
And thus, when geeks and technologists defend their Armstrong or Wright brothers technology, most of us are simply unsympathetic. Common sense does not revolt. Unlike in the case of the unlucky Causbys, common sense is on the side of the property owners in this war. Unlike the lucky Wright brothers, the Internet has not inspired a revolution on its side.
因此，当技术怪人（geek）和技术专家们为他们中的阿姆斯壮或者莱特兄弟辩护 时，我们中的大多数根本不予以同情。常理并没有反抗。与不走运的考斯比们情 况不同，这场战争里，常理站在了产权拥有者那边。与幸运的莱特兄弟不同， Internet并没有鼓动其自己一方的革命。
My hope is to push this common sense along. I have become increasingly amazed by the power of this idea of intellectual property and, more importantly, its power to disable critical thought by policy makers and citizens. There has never been a time in our history when more of our "culture" was as "owned" as it is now. And yet there has never been a time when the concentration of power to control the uses of culture has been as unquestioningly accepted as it is now.
我希望推进这个常理（push this common sense along ？）。我越来越对知识产 权这概念的力量感到惊奇。更重要的是，对它阻止政策制定者和人民的批判思维 （critical thinking ？）的力量感到惊奇。我们的历史上从来没有像今天这样 有这么多“文化”是“私有”的。同时前所未有的是像此刻这样不问是非地接受 那些控制文化“使用”的权力的集中。
The puzzle is, Why?
令人困惑的是，为什么？
Is it because we have come to understand a truth about the value and importance of absolute property over ideas and culture? Is it because we have discovered that our tradition of rejecting such an absolute claim was wrong?
是因为我们已经认识到绝对财产权（abolute property）的价值和重要性居于观 念和文化之上的真理吗？是因为我们发现我们的传统拒绝如此的绝对的要求 （absolute claim）错的吗？
Or is it because the idea of absolute property over ideas and culture benefits the RCAs of our time and fits our own unreflective intuitions?
还是因为绝对财产权居于观念和文化之上的观念对我们时代的RCA们有利，而且 与我们未经反思的直觉相符？
Is the radical shift away from our tradition of free culture an instance of America correcting a mistake from its past, as we did after a bloody war with slavery, and as we are slowly doing with inequality? Or is the radical shift away from our tradition of free culture yet another example of a political system captured by a few powerful special interests?
这远离自由文化传统的巨大的改变，是美国改正对以往过失的例子吗：如我们在 一场血腥的战争后对待黑奴制，如我们缓慢地对待不平等？还是又一个政治制度 被一些强有力的利益集团所俘获的例子？
Does common sense lead to the extremes on this question because common sense actually believes in these extremes? Or does common sense stand silent in the face of these extremes because, as with Armstrong versus RCA, the more powerful side has ensured that it has the more powerful view?
常理在这个问题上走入极端是因为常理确实相信这些极端（extrems）？还是常理 在面对这些极端时保持沉，因为如同阿姆斯壮对RCA一案，更强大的一方确保了它 有更强大观点（powerfu view）？
I don't mean to be mysterious. My own views are resolved. I believe it was right for common sense to revolt against the extremism of the Causbys. I believe it would be right for common sense to revolt against the extreme claims made today on behalf of "intellectual property." What the law demands today is increasingly as silly as a sheriff arresting an airplane for trespass. But the consequences of this silliness will be much more profound.
我不想故作玄虚，我自己的看法已经确定了。我相信常理对抗考斯比们的极端主 义是正确的。我相信常理对抗今天以“知识产权”为名的极端的占有要求也将是 正确的。今天的法律的所要求越来越愚蠢，就像一个警长要以非法入侵而逮捕飞 机一样愚蠢。但这种愚蠢的影响确更为深远.
The struggle that rages just now centers on two ideas: "piracy" and "property." My aim in this book's next two parts is to explore these two ideas.
刚刚爆发的抗争集中在两个观念：“盗版”和“财产”。本书下两个部分中的目 的就是去探究它们。
My method is not the usual method of an academic. I don't want to plunge you into a complex argument, buttressed with references to obscure French theorists--however natural that is for the weird sort we academics have become. Instead I begin in each part with a collection of stories that set a context within which these apparently simple ideas can be more fully understood.
我用的方法不是学术届通常用的。我不想让你一头扎入一个引证了晦涩的法国理 论家来支持的论点——不管如今这种做法对我们这些怪怪的学院派是多么自然的 事儿。我会在每一部分的开始，用我收集的故事来提供讨论的背景，使我们能更 全面理解这些显然是简单的观念。
The two sections set up the core claim of this book: that while the Internet has indeed produced something fantastic and new, our government, pushed by big media to respond to this "something new," is destroying something very old. Rather than understanding the changes the Internet might permit, and rather than taking time to let "common sense" resolve how best to respond, we are allowing those most threatened by the changes to use their power to change the law--and more importantly, to use their power to change something fundamental about who we have always been.
本书核心主张有两个部分：Internet的确带来了美好和崭新的事物；我们的政府， 在大媒体集团的驱使下，对“新事物”的回应正在摧毁一些很古老的东西。我们 没有去理解因Internet而成为可能的变化。我们没有让“常理”花时间去解决如 何最好地去回应，却允许那些受变化威胁最大的力量（those most threatened by）用它们的势力去改变法律——更重要的是，用它们的势力去改变我们一直保 持的本色（who we have always been）。
We allow this, I believe, not because it is right, and not because most of us really believe in these changes. We allow it because the interests most threatened are among the most powerful players in our depressingly compromised process of making law. This book is the story of one more consequence of this form of corruption--a consequence to which most of us remain oblivious.
我认为，我们容许它，不是因为这样对的，也不是因为我们中的大多数人真的相 信这些变化。我们容许它是因为那些利益受到最大威胁的力量正在我们令人沮丧 的、被妥协了的立法过程中最有势力的参与者当中。这本书讲的就这种形式的腐 败导致的又一个结果，一个我们大多数没有意识到的结果。
1. St. George Tucker, Blackstone's Commentaries 3 (South Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints, 1969), 18.
2. United States v. Causby, U.S. 328 (1946): 256, 261. The Court did find that there could be a "taking" if the government 's use of its land effectively de- stroyed the value of the Causbys' land. This example was suggested to me by Keith Aoki's wonderful piece, "(Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of Authorship," Stanford Law Re- view 48 (1996): 1293, 1333. See also Paul Goldstein, Real Property (Mi- neola, N.Y.: Foundation Press, 1984), 111213.
3. Lawrence Lessing, Man of High Fidelity: Edwin Howard Armstrong (Philadelphia: J. B. Lipincott Company, 1956), 209.
4. See "Saints: The Heroes and Geniuses of the Electronic Era," First Elec- tronic Church of America, at www.webstationone.com/fecha, available at link #1.
5. Lessing, 226.
6. Lessing, 256.
7. Amanda Lenhart, " The Ever-Shifting Internet Population: A New Look at Internet Access and the Digital Divide," Pew Internet and American Life Project, 15 April 2003: 6, available at link #2.
8. This is not the only purpose of copyright, though it is the over whelmingly primary purpose of the copyright established in the federal constitution. State copyright law historically protected not just the commercial interest in publication, but also a privacy interest. By granting authors the exclusive right to first publication, state copyright law gave authors the power to control the spread of facts about them. See Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, " The Right to Privacy," Har vard Law Review 4 (1890): 193, 198200.
9. See Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (New York: Prometheus Books, 2001), ch. 13.
10. Amy Harmon, "Black Hawk Download: Moving Beyond Music, Pirates Use New Tools to Turn the Net into an Illicit Video Club," New York Times, 17 Januar y 2002.
11.Neil W. Netanel, "Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society," Yale Law Journal 106 (1996): 283.

Introduction: (简介(简体), Tranlsator: Yining，Proofreader: bxy)