CONCLUSION
There are more than 35 million people with the AIDS virus worldwide. Twenty-five million of them live in sub-Saharan Africa. Seventeen million have already died. Seventeen million Africans is proportional percentage-wise to seven million Americans. More importantly, it is seventeen million Africans.
在全球范围内, 有三千五百万人传染上了爱滋病毒。其中，两千五百万人生活在sub-saharah Afraic 。至今，一千七百万人已经被爱滋病毒夺取了生命。一千七百万非洲人从百分比看相当与七百万美国人。但更重要的是，我们应该认识到，这些被爱滋病毒夺取生命 的是一千七百万生活在非洲的受害者。
There is no cure for AIDS, but there are drugs to slow its progression. These antiretroviral therapies are still experimental, but they have already had a dramatic effect. In the United States, AIDS patients who regularly take a cocktail of these drugs increase their life expectancy by ten to twenty years. For some, the drugs make the disease almost invisible.
现在还没有能有效治愈爱滋病的药品，但却有能减缓病毒对感染者身体破坏的药品。这些对抗病毒的治疗（方法）还处在实验阶段，但他们已经有非常明显的 治疗效果。在美国，常规性进行鸡尾酒治疗已经能延长爱滋病感染者的寿命达十到七十年。对于一些人，这种治疗已经几乎彻底抑制了病毒的侵害。
These drugs are expensive. When they were first introduced in the United States, they cost between $10,000 and $15,000 per person per year. Today, some cost $25,000 per year. At these prices, of course, no African nation can afford the drugs for the vast majority of its population: $15,000 is thirty times the per capita gross national product of Zimbabwe. At these prices, the drugs are totally unavailable.1
但是，这种用于鸡尾酒治疗药品是非常昂贵的。在第一次投入市场的时候，一个消费者大约每年要花去一万到一万五千美元购买这些药品。（Today, some cost $25,000 per year还没被翻译）对于这样的价格，没有任何一个非洲国家能够有财力去购买这些药品来用于治疗占总人口基数很大的爱滋病人。理由很简单，一万五千美相当 于津巴布韦人均国民生产总值的三十倍。在这样的价格的支配下，非洲整个大陆完全缺乏治疗爱滋病药品。
These prices are not high because the ingredients of the drugs are expensive. These prices are high because the drugs are protected by patents. The drug companies that produced these life-saving mixes enjoy at least a twenty-year monopoly for their inventions. They use that monopoly power to extract the most they can from the market. That power is in turn used to keep the prices high.
这些药的价格并不算高，因为药品的成分很昂贵。这些成分之所以昂贵，是由于受到了专利的保护。对生产这些挽救生命的混合药剂的公司来说，他们的发明带来了至少二十年的垄断。他们尽垄断之力从市场榨取利益，反过来又用此利益来保持价格的高昂。
There are many who are skeptical of patents, especially drug patents. I am not. Indeed, of all the areas of research that might be supported by patents, drug research is, in my view, the clearest case where patents are needed. The patent gives the drug company some assurance that if it is successful in inventing a new drug to treat a disease, it will be able to earn back its investment and more. This is socially an extremely valuable incentive. I am the last person who would argue that the law should abolish it, at least without other changes.
许 多人对专利持怀疑态度，特别是药品专利。我并不这样认为。实际上，研究的所有领域都可以得到专利的支持，在我看来，药品研究是需要专利保护的最无可非议的 领域。专利给制药公司一些保障，即他们如果成功的研制出一种治疗疾病的新药，就可以赚回投资，并赢得更多收益。这是一个极其重要的激励。我断然不会支持法 律取消药品专利，至少是不经任何其他改动的取消。
But it is one thing to support patents, even drug patents. It is another thing to determine how best to deal with a crisis. And as African leaders began to recognize the devastation that AIDS was bringing, they started looking for ways to import HIV treatments at costs significantly below the market price.
但支持专利，甚至药品专利是一回事，如何处理危机则是另一回事。正当非洲领导人开始意识到艾滋病的带来的灭顶之灾时，他们便开始寻找各种途径，设法以明显低于市场价格进口HIV药品。
In 1997, South Africa tried one tack. It passed a law to allow the importation of patented medicines that had been produced or sold in another nation's market with the consent of the patent owner. For example, if the drug was sold in India, it could be imported into Africa from India. This is called “parallel importation,” and it is generally permitted under international trade law and is specifically permitted within the European Union.2
1997年，南非尝试了一种方法。南非通过一项法律，允许向他国进口在此国家制造或出售的专利药品，前提是得到专利所有者的首肯。举例来说，如果一种药在印度出售，那就可以从印度出口到南非。这被称为“平行进口”，并在国际贸易法下被普遍认可，尤其是在欧盟。2
However, the United States government opposed the bill. Indeed, more than opposed. As the International Intellectual Property Association characterized it, “The U.S. government pressured South Africa . . . not to permit compulsory licensing or parallel imports.”3 Through the Office of the United States Trade Representative, the government asked South Africa to change the law—and to add pressure to that request, in 1998, the USTR listed South Africa for possible trade sanctions. That same year, more than forty pharmaceutical companies began proceedings in the South African courts to challenge the govern-ment's actions. The United States was then joined by other governments from the EU. Their claim, and the claim of the pharmaceutical companies, was that South Africa was violating its obligations under international law by discriminating against a particular kind of patent— pharmaceutical patents. The demand of these governments, with the United States in the lead, was that South Africa respect these patents as it respects any other patent, regardless of any effect on the treatment of AIDS within South Africa.4
然而，美国政府不同意此项法案，实际上是大举反对。正如国际知识产权联盟说的那样“美国政府向南非施加压力…不准批准强制性专利使用权转让或平行进口”3 通过美国贸易代表办公室，美国政府要求南非改变法律——并对此施加压力，1998年，美国贸易代表把南非列为了可能的贸易制裁对象。同年，超过40家 制药公司开始在南非法院提起诉讼来反抗政府的决定。美国得到了其他欧盟国家的支持。这些国家和制药公司的主张就是，南非政府违反了国际法，因为它把某一项 专利——药品的专利和其他专利区别对待。以美国为首的这些国家政府的要求是，南非必须像对其他专利一样尊重这些药品的专利，无论这对南非的艾滋病治疗会产 生什么影响。4
We should place the intervention by the United States in context. No doubt patents are not the most important reason that Africans don't have access to drugs. Poverty and the total absence of an effective health care infrastructure matter more. But whether patents are the most important reason or not, the price of drugs has an effect on their demand, and patents affect price. And so, whether massive or marginal, there was an effect from our government's intervention to stop the flow of medications into Africa.
我 们须把美国的干预放在一定的情境中来看。无疑，专利问题不是非洲人无法获得药品的最重要的原因。贫困，以及基础卫生设施的全面匮乏是更重要的因素。但无论 专利是不是最重要的原因，药品价格会影响需求，而专利影响价格。所以，无论影响的多寡，美国政府干预起到的实际效果就是使输送到非洲的药物减少了。
By stopping the flow of HIV treatment into Africa, the United States government was not saving drugs for United States citizens. This is not like wheat (if they eat it, we can't); instead, the flow that the United States intervened to stop was, in effect, a flow of knowledge: information about how to take chemicals that exist within Africa, and turn those chemicals into drugs that would save 15 to 30 million lives.
尽管减少了输送到非洲的HIV药物，美国政府并未把它们投放给美国公民。这和小麦不同（如果他们吃了，我们就吃不到了）；相反，美国政府的干预制止的不是药物的流动，而是知识的流动：关于如何提取非洲大陆本身拥有的化学物质，然后将它们制造成药品的信息，这足以挽救一千五百万到三千万人的生命。
Nor was the intervention by the United States going to protect the profits of United States drug companies—at least, not substantially. It was not as if these countries were in the position to buy the drugs for the prices the drug companies were charging. Again, the Africans are wildly too poor to afford these drugs at the offered prices. Stopping the parallel import of these drugs would not substantially increase the sales by U.S. companies.
美国的干预也无法保护美国制药企业的利益——至少不是实质性的。事实上并不是这些非洲国家有能力以制药公司希望的价格购买药品，非洲实在是太穷困了，根本无法负担他们开具的高价。制止平行进口这些药品不会让美国公司的销售额有实质性的增长。
Instead, the argument in favor of restricting this flow of information, which was needed to save the lives of millions, was an argument about the sanctity of property.5 It was because “intellectual property” would be violated that these drugs should not flow into Africa. It was a principle about the importance of “intellectual property” that led these government actors to intervene against the South African response to AIDS.
相反，支持限制这种信息流，不管这些信息将挽救百万生命的论点，是关于产权圣洁性的论点。因为一旦这些药品流入非洲，“知识产权”将会被侵犯。正是秉承“知识产权”无比重要的原则，才导致了美国政府对南非艾滋病行动的干预。
Now just step back for a moment. There will be a time thirty years from now when our children look back at us and ask, how could we have let this happen? How could we allow a policy to be pursued whose direct cost would be to speed the death of 15 to 30 million Africans, and whose only real benefit would be to uphold the “sanctity” of an idea? What possible justification could there ever be for a policy that results in so many deaths? What exactly is the insanity that would allow so many to die for such an abstraction?
且后退片刻。三十年后，我们的子孙回顾如 今，定会发问：我们怎么会让这种事发生？我们怎么可以追求一项政策，而不顾它的直接代价是一千五百万到三千万非洲人的生命，而此项政策的实际利益仅仅是某 种思想的“圣洁性”？一项导致如此大规模死亡的政策，其合理性何在？到底是怎样的疯狂，才会容许为某种抽象观念而牺牲如此众多的生命？
Some blame the drug companies. I don't. They are corporations. Their managers are ordered by law to make money for the corporation. They push a certain patent policy not because of ideals, but because it is the policy that makes them the most money. And it only makes them the most money because of a certain corruption within our political system— a corruption the drug companies are certainly not responsible for.
某些人怪罪于制药公司。我并不这么认为。它们是企业。它们的经理受命于法律来为企业谋利。它们推动某项专利政策并非出于理想，而是出于最大利益的考虑。而正是我们政治体系中的一处腐化是它们谋得了最大利益——制药公司完全不应该为这腐化负任何责任。
The corruption is our own politicians' failure of integrity. For the drug companies would love—they say, and I believe them—to sell their drugs as cheaply as they can to countries in Africa and elsewhere. There are issues they'd have to resolve to make sure the drugs didn't get back into the United States, but those are mere problems of technology. They could be overcome.
这腐化是我们的政客们自身不够正直。因为制药公司愿意——它们是这么说的，而我完全相信——以尽可能低廉的价格向非洲和其他国家出售药品。它们需解决一些问题，来保证这些药品不会回流到美国，但这些只是技术问题而已，是完全可以克服的。
A different problem, however, could not be overcome. This is the fear of the grandstanding politician who would call the presidents of the drug companies before a Senate or House hearing, and ask, “How is it you can sell this HIV drug in Africa for only $1 a pill, but the same drug would cost an American $1,500?” Because there is no “sound bite" answer to that question, its effect would be to induce regulation of prices in America. The drug companies thus avoid this spiral by avoiding the first step. They reinforce the idea that property should be sacred. They adopt a rational strategy in an irrational context, with the unintended consequence that perhaps millions die. And that rational strategy thus becomes framed in terms of this ideal—the sanctity of an idea called “intellectual property.”
另外一个问题却无法克服。这就是对冠冕堂皇的政客们的恐惧，这些政客会在参议院或众议院的听证会上传唤制药企业的总裁，质问他们：“为什么你在非洲以每粒一美元的价格出售HIV药品，而同样的药品美国人就要以1500美 元一粒才能买到？”因为对此问题没有一个简短的答案，其结果必然导致美国的价格管制。因此，制药公司为了避免这一系列的麻烦，就不得不避免第一步（廉价向 非洲出售药品）。他们加固了这种看法——产权是圣洁的。在非理性的情境中，他们采取了理性的战略，而无意中导致了百万人的死亡。这种理性战略因此被固化 了，成为这种理想的一部分——“知识产权”的圣洁性。
So when the common sense of your child confronts you, what will you say? When the common sense of a generation finally revolts against what we have done, how will we justify what we have done? What is the argument?
所以当你的孩子用常理来反驳你，你能说什么？当一代人的常理最后站在了我们的努力的反面，我们还能如何为我们的努力辩护？争论的到底是什么？
A sensible patent policy could endorse and strongly support the patent system without having to reach everyone everywhere in exactly the same way. Just as a sensible copyright policy could endorse and strongly support a copyright system without having to regulate the spread of culture perfectly and forever, a sensible patent policy could endorse and strongly support a patent system without having to block the spread of drugs to a country not rich enough to afford market prices in any case. A sensible policy, in other words, could be a balanced policy. For most of our history, both copyright and patent policies were balanced in just this sense.
明 智的专利法应当认可并大力支持专利系统，但对任何人任何地方不可完全同等对待。就像一项明智的版权政策可以认可并大力支持版权系统，但无须事无巨细的管理 文化的传播一样，一项明智的专利政策可以认可和大力支持专利系统，但无须妨碍药品向无法负担市场价格的国家传播。一项明智的政策，用其他话来说，是一项平 衡的政策。在我们历史上的大多数时间，版权和专利政策在这个意义上都是平衡的。
But we as a culture have lost this sense of balance. We have lost the critical eye that helps us see the difference between truth and extremism. A certain property fundamentalism, having no connection to our tradition, now reigns in this culture—bizarrely, and with consequences more grave to the spread of ideas and culture than almost any other single policy decision that we as a democracy will make.
但作为一种文化，我们已经失去了这种平衡的观念。我们已经失去了有助于辨别真理和极端主义的批判性眼光。一种与我们的传统全然无关的产权原教旨主义，正在统治这种文化——这是非常怪诞的，它对意识和文化传播的损害，会比我们这个民主政权作出的任何政策决定都更为严重。
A simple idea blinds us, and under the cover of darkness, much happens that most of us would reject if any of us looked. So uncritically do we accept the idea of property in ideas that we don't even notice how monstrous it is to deny ideas to a people who are dying without them. So uncritically do we accept the idea of property in culture that we don't even question when the control of that property removes our ability, as a people, to develop our culture democratically. Blindness becomes our common sense. And the challenge for anyone who would reclaim the right to cultivate our culture is to find a way to make this common sense open its eyes.
一个简单的想法令 我们盲目，许多事在黑幕之下发生，如果任何一个人看到了都会坚决抵制。我们如此不加批判的接受了产权的想法，以至于没有注意到它如怪兽一般剥夺了人们赖以 生存的信念。我们如此不加批判的接受了文化中的产权概念，以至于当产权的控制消除了我们，作为一个民族，自主的发展自身文化的能力时，我们甚至不加质问。 盲目成为了我们的常理。对于想重新获得培养自身文化的权利的人来说，其挑战在于如何找到一种方法，使这种常理重获光明。
So far, common sense sleeps. There is no revolt. Common sense does not yet see what there could be to revolt about. The extremism that now dominates this debate fits with ideas that seem natural, and that fit is reinforced by the RCAs of our day. They wage a frantic war to fight “piracy,” and devastate a culture for creativity. They defend the idea of “creative property,” while transforming real creators into modern-day sharecroppers. They are insulted by the idea that rights should be balanced, even though each of the major players in this content war was itself a beneficiary of a more balanced ideal. The hypocrisy reeks. Yet in a city like Washington, hypocrisy is not even noticed. Powerful lobbies, complex issues, and MTV attention spans produce the “perfect storm” for free culture.
目前，常理正在沉睡之中。没有任何反抗。常理尚未看到反抗可能从何而生。统治这场论辩的极端主义与看似正常的想法十分符合，而且这种符合更被rca强 化。他们发动了一场狂热的打击“盗版”的战争，把真正的创作者变成了付版税的佃农。对于权利应当平衡的想法，他们感到受辱，尽管在如今的内容大战中的主要 竞争者都会在更平衡的环境成为更大的赢家。伪善弥漫。然而在华盛顿这样的城市，伪善甚至还没有被意识到。强大的说客，复杂的问题，MTV的关注范围都为自由文化制造了一场“完美风暴”。
In August 2003, a fight broke out in the United States about a decision by the World Intellectual Property Organization to cancel a meeting.6 At the request of a wide range of interests, WIPO had decided to hold a meeting to discuss “open and collaborative projects to create public goods.” These are projects that have been successful in producing public goods without relying exclusively upon a proprietary use of intellectual property. Examples include the Internet and the World Wide Web, both of which were developed on the basis of protocols in the public domain. It included an emerging trend to support open academic journals, including the Public Library of Science project that I describe in the Afterword. It included a project to develop single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), which are thought to have great significance in biomedical research. (That nonprofit project comprised a consortium of the Wellcome Trust and pharmaceutical and technological companies, including Amersham Biosciences, AstraZeneca, Aventis, Bayer, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Hoffmann-La Roche, Glaxo-SmithKline, IBM, Motorola, Novartis, Pfizer, and Searle.) It included the Global Positioning System, which Ronald Reagan set free in the early 1980s. And it included “open source and free software.”
2003年8月，由于世界知识产权组织（WIPO）决定取消一场会议，一场斗争在美国爆发了。应一系列的利益集团的请求，WIPO决 定开会讨论“旨在创造公共物品的开放与合作性项目”。这些是生产了公共物品的成功项目，没有完全依靠对知识产权的排他性使用。例子包括因特网和万维网，这 两者都是在位于公众域的协议的基础上而发展起来的。它（公众域）包括一股新兴的潮流，旨在支持开放的学术期刊，其中包括我在后记中提到的公共科学图书馆项 目。它包括一个发展单核苷多态（SNPs）的项目，这被认为会对生物医学研究产生深远影响。（这个非营利性的项目包括一个由wellcome联合企业，制药与技术公司，包括Amersham 生物科技, AstraZeneca, Aventis, Bayer, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Hoffmann-La Roche, Glaxo-SmithKline, IBM, Motorola, Novartis, Pfizer, and Searle.）它包括由罗纳德·里根在1980年早期同意放开的全球定位系统。它还包括“开放源代码和自由软件”。
The aim of the meeting was to consider this wide range of projects from one common perspective: that none of these projects relied upon intellectual property extremism. Instead, in all of them, intellectual property was balanced by agreements to keep access open or to impose limitations on the way in which proprietary claims might be used.
这次会议的目的在于从一个共同的角度去考虑这些涉及各个领域的项目：即没有一个项目依赖了极端主义的知识产权。相反，在所有这些项目中，人们通过达成协议来开放访问或者限制排他性的要求而使知识产权达到平衡。
From the perspective of this book, then, the conference was ideal. 7 The projects within its scope included both commercial and noncommercial work. They primarily involved science, but from many perspectives. And WIPO was an ideal venue for this discussion, since WIPO is the preeminent international body dealing with intellectual property issues.
从本书的观点来看，这次会议是理想化的。这些项目同时包括了商业性和非商业性的作品。它们主要关于科学，但是从许多不同的角度出发的。WIPO更是展开这次讨论的理想场所，因为WIPO是处理知识产权问题最具权威的国际组织。
Indeed, I was once publicly scolded for not recognizing this fact about WIPO. In February 2003, I delivered a keynote address to a preparatory conference for the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS). At a press conference before the address, I was asked what I would say. I responded that I would be talking a little about the importance of balance in intellectual property for the development of an information society. The moderator for the event then promptly interrupted to inform me and the assembled reporters that no question about intellectual property would be discussed by WSIS, since those questions were the exclusive domain of WIPO. In the talk that I had prepared, I had actually made the issue of intellectual property relatively minor. But after this astonishing statement, I made intellectual property the sole focus of my talk. There was no way to talk about an “Information Society” unless one also talked about the range of information and culture that would be free. My talk did not make my immoderate moderator very happy. And she was no doubt correct that the scope of intellectual property protections was ordinarily the stuff of WIPO. But in my view, there couldn't be too much of a conversation about how much intellectual property is needed, since in my view, the very idea of balance in intellectual property had been lost.
实际上，我曾经被公开指责不承认WIPO的声望。在2003年2月，我在信息社会世界峰会（WSIS） 的筹备会上做了一次主题演讲。在演讲前的新闻发布会上，有人问我的演讲内容。我回答说我会讲到一些知识产权的平衡对一个信息社会之发展的重要性问题。在我 所准备的演讲中，知识产权实际上只是一个次要问题，但在新闻发布会上的作出这个惊人回答以后，我就把知识产权作为了自己演讲的唯一主题。除非也把自由信息 和自由文化的范围纳入讨论，否则一个人是无法谈论“信息社会”的。我的演讲没有取悦激进的会议主席。她马上纠正说知识产权保护的问题一般是属于WIPO的管理范围。但在我看来，无法就我们需要多少知识产权这一问题进行对话，因为我认为，知识产权的平衡这一观念已经不复存在。
So whether or not WSIS can discuss balance in intellectual property, I had thought it was taken for granted that WIPO could and should. And thus the meeting about “open and collaborative projects to create public goods” seemed perfectly appropriate within the WIPO agenda.
所以不管WSIS是否可以讨论知识产权的平衡问题，大家已经想当然的认为这是WIPO可以且必须讨论的问题。所以关于“旨在创造公共物品的开放与合作性项目”看上去完全应该提上WIPO的议事日程。
But there is one project within that list that is highly controversial, at least among lobbyists. That project is “open source and free software.” Microsoft in particular is wary of discussion of the subject. From its perspective, a conference to discuss open source and free software would be like a conference to discuss Apple's operating system. Both open source and free software compete with Microsoft's software. And internationally, many governments have begun to explore requirements that they use open source or free software, rather than “proprietary software,” for their own internal uses.
但有一个项目 引起很大争议，至少在说客中。这个项目就是“开放源代码和自由软件”。微软特别严防对此主题的讨论。从它的观点来看，讨论开放源代码和自由软件的会议就像 讨论苹果的操作系统的会议一样。开放源代码和自由软件都和微软的软件竞争。在国际上，许多政府开始要求在内部使用开放源代码或者自由软件，而不是“私有软 件”。
I don't mean to enter that debate here. It is important only to make clear that the distinction is not between commercial and noncommercial software. There are many important companies that depend fundamentally upon open source and free software, IBM being the most prominent. IBM is increasingly shifting its focus to the GNU/Linux operating system, the most famous bit of “free software”—and IBM is emphatically a commercial entity. Thus, to support “open source and free software” is not to oppose commercial entities. It is, instead, to support a mode of software development that is different from Microsoft's.8
我并不想参与这场辩论。我们必须明白，此处的区别不是商业和非商业软件之间的区别。世界上有很多大企业主要依靠开放源代码和自由软件，IBM是个中翘楚。IBM正在逐渐把重心移向GNU/Linux操作系统——自由软件中最著名的一部分，需要强调的是，IBM是一个商业实体。因此，支持“开放源代码和自由软件”并不是反对商业实体，正相反，是支持一种区别于微软的软件模式的发展。
More important for our purposes, to support “open source and free software” is not to oppose copyright. “Open source and free software" is not software in the public domain. Instead, like Microsoft's software, the copyright owners of free and open source software insist quite strongly that the terms of their software license be respected by adopters of free and open source software. The terms of that license are no doubt different from the terms of a proprietary software license. Free software licensed under the General Public License (GPL), for example, requires that the source code for the software be made available by anyone who modifies and redistributes the software. But that requirement is effective only if copyright governs software. If copyright did not govern software, then free software could not impose the same kind of requirements on its adopters. It thus depends upon copyright law just as Microsoft does.
支持“开放源 代码和自由软件”并非是反对版权，这是我们更重要的目的。“开放源代码和自由软件”并不是公众域里的软件。相反，就像微软软件一样，自由软件的版权所有者 坚持要自由和开放源代码软件的使用者尊重其软件的授权条款。当然，此条款与私有软件的授权条款是不同的。自由软件在通用公共许可证（GPL）下授权，举例来说，要求任何修改和重新分发该软件的人都可以获得软件的源代码。但这种要求只对受版权保护的软件生效。如果软件不受版权约束，那么自由软件无法对其使用者有同样的要求。因此，自由软件和微软一样，也依赖版权法。
It is therefore understandable that as a proprietary software developer, Microsoft would oppose this WIPO meeting, and understandable that it would use its lobbyists to get the United States government to oppose it, as well. And indeed, that is just what was reported to have happened. According to Jonathan Krim of the Washington Post, Microsoft's lobbyists succeeded in getting the United States government to veto the meeting.9 And without U.S. backing, the meeting was canceled.
如此就可以理解为什么作为私有软件的开发商的微软会抵制这次WIPO会议，而且会利用其说客来使美国政府也抵制这次会议。实际上，这果真发生了。据华盛顿邮报的Jonathan Krim 报导，微软的说客成功的使美国政府否决了这次会议。没有了美国的支持，本次会议取消了。
I don't blame Microsoft for doing what it can to advance its own interests, consistent with the law. And lobbying governments is plainly consistent with the law. There was nothing surprising about its lobbying here, and nothing terribly surprising about the most powerful software producer in the United States having succeeded in its lobbying efforts.
我不指责微软，它这么做是合法的促进其自身利益。游说政府也是合法的。它进行游说并不奇怪，而且美国上最强大的软件生产商成功的说服对方也毫不令人惊讶。
What was surprising was the United States government's reason for opposing the meeting. Again, as reported by Krim, Lois Boland, acting director of international relations for the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, explained that “open-source software runs counter to the mission of WIPO, which is to promote intellectual-property rights.” She is quoted as saying, “To hold a meeting which has as its purpose to disclaim or waive such rights seems to us to be contrary to the goals of WIPO.”
真正令人惊讶的是美国政府抵制这次会议的原因。还是根据Krim的报导，美国专利与商标办公室的国际关系代理主管Lois Boland解释说“开放源代码软件与WIPO的使命相悖，WIPO的使命是宣传知识产权”。文中引用她的原话“对我们来说，举行一次旨在否定或者放弃这些权利的会议是和WIPO的目标背道而驰的。”
These statements are astonishing on a number of levels.
这些声明在诸多层面上都令人瞠目。
First, they are just flat wrong. As I described, most open source and free software relies fundamentally upon the intellectual property right called “copyright.” Without it, restrictions imposed by those licenses wouldn't work. Thus, to say it “runs counter” to the mission of promoting intellectual property rights reveals an extraordinary gap in under- standing—the sort of mistake that is excusable in a first-year law student, but an embarrassment from a high government official dealing with intellectual property issues.
首先，它们在 字面上就是错误的。正如我所说的，大多数开放源代码和自由软件主要依赖知识产权中的“版权”。如果没有版权，这些许可证下的限制就不起作用。因此，说它和 宣传知识产权的使命是“背道而驰”的就暴露出理解上的一处极大鸿沟——法律系一年级新生犯此错误尚能原谅，而对于一个处理知识产权问题的高级政府官员来 说，就是大出洋相。
Second, who ever said that WIPO's exclusive aim was to “promote" intellectual property maximally? As I had been scolded at the preparatory conference of WSIS, WIPO is to consider not only how best to protect intellectual property, but also what the best balance of intellectual property is. As every economist and lawyer knows, the hard question in intellectual property law is to find that balance. But that there should be limits is, I had thought, uncontested. One wants to ask Ms. Boland, are generic drugs (drugs based on drugs whose patent has expired) contrary to the WIPO mission? Does the public domain weaken intellectual property? Would it have been better if the protocols of the Internet had been patented?
其次，谁说过WIPO的唯一目的就是尽最大努力“宣传”知识产权？正如我在WSIS会议大筹备会上收到的指责一样，WIPO的责任不仅仅是如何最好的保护知识产权，也包括如何才能使知识产权获得最佳平衡。每个经济学家和律师都明白，知识产权法里最困难的问题就是找到平衡点。但我认为肯定存在无争议的边界。我们想问Boland女士，普通药品（基于专利已过期的药品的药品）是否和WIPO的使命相悖？公众域的存在是否削弱了知识产权？如果因特网的协议申请了专利权，是不是更好呢？
Third, even if one believed that the purpose of WIPO was to maximize intellectual property rights, in our tradition, intellectual property rights are held by individuals and corporations. They get to decide what to do with those rights because, again, they are their rights. If they want to “waive” or “disclaim” their rights, that is, within our tradition, totally appropriate. When Bill Gates gives away more than $20 billion to do good in the world, that is not inconsistent with the objectives of the property system. That is, on the contrary, just what a property system is supposed to be about: giving individuals the right to decide what to do with their property.
第三，即使一个人相信WIPO的目的是知识产权最大化，在我们的传统中，知识产权由个人和企业所有。他们可以决定如何处置这些权利，因为这毕竟是他们的权利。如果他们想“放弃”或者“否定”他们的权利，那在我们的传统中，是完全正当的。当比尔·盖茨捐出超过200亿美元来为世界做善事，这与财产权系统的目标并非矛盾。正相反，这正是产权系统应该做的：给个体以决定如何处置他们的财产的权利。
When Ms. Boland says that there is something wrong with a meeting “which has as its purpose to disclaim or waive such rights,” she's saying that WIPO has an interest in interfering with the choices of the individuals who own intellectual property rights. That somehow, WIPO's objective should be to stop an individual from “waiving” or “dis-claiming” an intellectual property right. That the interest of WIPO is not just that intellectual property rights be maximized, but that they also should be exercised in the most extreme and restrictive way possible.
当Boland女士说“旨在否定或者放弃这些权利”是不对的时候，她就是在说WIPO有意干涉知识产权的拥有者们的选择。所以，WIPO的目的就成了制止个人“放弃”或者“否定”知识产权。那么WIPO的兴趣就不仅仅在于知识产权最大化，而包括以尽可能极端和限制性的方式来行使知识产权。
There is a history of just such a property system that is well known in the Anglo-American tradition. It is called “feudalism.” Under feudalism, not only was property held by a relatively small number of individuals and entities. And not only were the rights that ran with that property powerful and extensive. But the feudal system had a strong interest in assuring that property holders within that system not weaken feudalism by liberating people or property within their control to the free market. Feudalism depended upon maximum control and concentration. It fought any freedom that might interfere with that control.
在英美传统 中，有一种类似的产权系统臭名昭著。它叫做“封建制”。封建制下，不仅产权由少数人和实体拥有，不仅产权带来的的权利既强且广，最重要的是，封建制度确保 产权所有者不会通过解放人民或者财产，来削弱封建制度本身，引向自由市场体制。封建制靠的是最大限度的控制和集权。它与任何可能妨碍这种控制的自由势不两 立。
As Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite relate, this is precisely the choice we are now making about intellectual property.10 We will have an information society. That much is certain. Our only choice now is whether that information society will be free or feudal. The trend is toward the feudal.
就像Peter Drahos 和 John Braithwaite叙述的那样，我们现在对于知识产权所作的决策正是如此。10 我们会迎来信息社会。这是毫无疑问的。我们现在唯一的选择是，信息社会该是自由的还是封建的。现在的趋势是走向封建。
When this battle broke, I blogged it. A spirited debate within the comment section ensued. Ms. Boland had a number of supporters who tried to show why her comments made sense. But there was one comment that was particularly depressing for me. An anonymous poster wrote,
当这场战争开始时，我把它写到了网志上。评论栏里掀起了一场热烈的辩论。不少人支持Boland女士，他们想说明为什么她的话有道理。但有一条评论让我特别不安。一个匿名人士写道，
George, you misunderstand Lessig: He's only talking about the world as it should be (“the goal of WIPO, and the goal of any government, should be to promote the right balance of intellectual- property rights, not simply to promote intellectual property rights"), not as it is. If we were talking about the world as it is, then of course Boland didn't say anything wrong. But in the world as Lessig would have it, then of course she did. Always pay attention to the distinction between Lessig's world and ours.
George，你误解了Lessig。他只是在描述世界的应该的面目（WIPO的目标，政府的目标，应该是促进知识产权的平衡，而不仅仅是促进知识产权）而不是描述现实。如果我们谈的仅仅是现实，那么Boland女士没有说错。但在Lessig的理想世界里，她错了。请注意我们的世界和Lessig的世界之间的区别。
I missed the irony the first time I read it. I read it quickly and thought the poster was supporting the idea that seeking balance was what our government should be doing. (Of course, my criticism of Ms. Boland was not about whether she was seeking balance or not; my criticism was that her comments betrayed a first-year law student's mistake. I have no illusion about the extremism of our government, whether Republican or Democrat. My only illusion apparently is about whether our government should speak the truth or not.)
我第一次读的时候没读出其中的反讽。我读的很快，认为这个发贴人支持这个观点，即政府应该寻求平衡。（当然，我对Boland女士的批评并未涉及她是否寻求平衡；我的批评在于她的话犯了法律系一年级新生的错误。我对政府的极端主义不抱任何幻想，不管是共和党还是民主党。我唯一的幻想显然关于政府是否应该说出真话。）
Obviously, however, the poster was not supporting that idea. Instead, the poster was ridiculing the very idea that in the real world, the “goal” of a government should be “to promote the right balance” of intellectual property. That was obviously silly to him. And it obviously betrayed, he believed, my own silly utopianism. “Typical for an academic,” the poster might well have continued.
很明显，发贴人并不支持这一观点。相反，他嘲笑这个观点，即在现实世界中，对于知识产权，政府的“目标”应该是 “促进其正确的平衡”。对他来说这显然很傻。而且他显然相信，上述观点与我的愚蠢的乌托邦主义是背道而驰的。“典型的学究，”这个发贴人很可能这样想。
I understand criticism of academic utopianism. I think utopianism is silly, too, and I'd be the first to poke fun at the absurdly unrealistic ideals of academics throughout history (and not just in our own country's history).
我理解对于学者式乌托邦主义的批评。我也认为乌托邦主义很愚蠢。我会毫不犹豫的取笑历史上不切实际的学者们（而且不仅是我们本国的历史）。
But when it has become silly to suppose that the role of our government should be to “seek balance,” then count me with the silly, for that means that this has become quite serious indeed. If it should be obvious to everyone that the government does not seek balance, that the government is simply the tool of the most powerful lobbyists, that the idea of holding the government to a different standard is absurd, that the idea of demanding of the government that it speak truth and not lies is just naïve, then who have we, the most powerful democracy in the world, become?
但是，当认 为政府的作用是“寻求平衡”，持这一观点被认为是愚蠢的时候，那就让我愚蠢吧，因为事态已经很严重了。如果所有人都认为，政府不需要寻求平衡，政府的只是 强大的政治说客们的工具，而且用除此以外的标准来要求政府显然是荒谬的，要求政府说真话而不是说谎，简直是太天真了，既然如此，我们这个世界上最强大的民 主政体，到底成了什么？
It might be crazy to expect a high government official to speak the truth. It might be crazy to believe that government policy will be something more than the handmaiden of the most powerful interests. It might be crazy to argue that we should preserve a tradition that has been part of our tradition for most of our history—free culture.
If this is crazy, then let there be more crazies. Soon.
期望一个政府高官说实话，也许是愚蠢的。相信政府的决策不仅仅是强大利益集团的仆役，也许是愚蠢的。同样愚蠢的是，证明我们需要继续保持历史悠久的传统——自由文化。
如果这是愚蠢的，那么就让更多的愚蠢出现吧。很快。
There are moments of hope in this struggle. And moments that surprise. When the FCC was considering relaxing ownership rules, which would thereby further increase the concentration in media ownership, an extraordinary bipartisan coalition formed to fight this change. For perhaps the first time in history, interests as diverse as the NRA, the ACLU, Moveon.org, William Safire, Ted Turner, and CodePink Women for Peace organized to oppose this change in FCC policy. An astonishing 700,000 letters were sent to the FCC, demanding more hearings and a different result.
在这场战争中，出现过一些充满希望的时刻。一些令人惊奇的时刻。当FCC考虑放宽所有权的规定，意味着媒体的所有权可能更为集中时，一个异乎寻常的两党联盟建立起来反对此次变动。可能是历史上头一回，如此分散的利益集团如the NRA, the ACLU, Moveon.org, William Safire, Ted Turner, 和 CodePink Women for Peace联合了起来，反对FCC政策的改变。700000封信件寄往FCC，要求开更多的听证会和一个不同的结果。
This activism did not stop the FCC, but soon after, a broad coalition in the Senate voted to reverse the FCC decision. The hostile hearings leading up to that vote revealed just how powerful this movement had become. There was no substantial support for the FCC's decision, and there was broad and sustained support for fighting further concentration in the media.
这些行动没有阻止FCC，但很快，一个广泛的参议院联盟投票反对FCC的决定。针锋相对的听证会导致了这次投票否决，反映出这次运动的强大声势。FCC的决定没有得到任何强有力的支持，反对媒体的进一步集中控制得到了广泛和连续的支持。
But even this movement misses an important piece of the puzzle. Largeness as such is not bad. Freedom is not threatened just because some become very rich, or because there are only a handful of big players. The poor quality of Big Macs or Quarter Pounders does not mean that you can't get a good hamburger from somewhere else.
但甚至是这次运动都没有意识到谜题一个重要的部分。媒体规模大并不一定是坏事。大财阀的存在，或者大媒体数量减少并不一定会威胁到媒体自由。巨无霸或者Quarter Pounders质量很差，也并不意味着你就不能从别处买到优质的汉堡包。
The danger in media concentration comes not from the concentration, but instead from the feudalism that this concentration, tied to the change in copyright, produces. It is not just that there are a few powerful companies that control an ever expanding slice of the media. It is that this concentration can call upon an equally bloated range of rights—property rights of a historically extreme form—that makes their bigness bad.
媒体集中的威胁，不在于集中，而在于媒体集中和版权改变两厢联合所产生的封建制度。并不是说，仅有的几个大公司逐渐控制了几乎所有的媒体。媒体集中可以引出同样膨胀的权利——极端形式（封建制）的知识产权，这才是威胁的真正来源。
It is therefore significant that so many would rally to demand competition and increased diversity. Still, if the rally is understood as being about bigness alone, it is not terribly surprising. We Americans have a long history of fighting “big,” wisely or not. That we could be motivated to fight “big” again is not something new.
因此许多人集会抗议，要求更多竞争和多样性。如果把集会理解成仅仅在反对“庞大”，那么依然是司空见惯的。不论明智与否，我们美国人早就有反对“庞大”的漫长历史。动员我们去反对“庞大”并不是什么新鲜事。
It would be something new, and something very important, if an equal number could be rallied to fight the increasing extremism built within the idea of “intellectual property.” Not because balance is alien to our tradition; indeed, as I've argued, balance is our tradition. But because the muscle to think critically about the scope of anything called “property” is not well exercised within this tradition anymore.
If we were Achilles, this would be our heel. This would be the place of our tragedy.
这可以成为新鲜事，并且是非常重要的事，如果有同等数目的民众可以集会抗议由“知识产权”带来的极端主义。并非因为平衡与我们的传统相悖，实际上，正如我所论证的，平衡是我们的传统。但对“财产权”边界的理性思考已经逐渐在我们的传统中消失了。
如果我们是阿咯琉斯，这就是我们致命的脚跟。这很可能成为我们悲剧的发源地。
As I write these final words, the news is filled with stories about the RIAA lawsuits against almost three hundred individuals. 11 Eminem has just been sued for “sampling” someone else's music. 12 The story about Bob Dylan “stealing” from a Japanese author has just finished making the rounds.13 An insider from Hollywood—who insists he must remain anonymous—reports “an amazing conversation with these studio guys. They've got extraordinary [old] content that they'd love to use but can't because they can't begin to clear the rights. They've got scores of kids who could do amazing things with the content, but it would take scores of lawyers to clean it first.” Congressmen are talking about deputizing computer viruses to bring down computers thought to violate the law. Universities are threatening expulsion for kids who use a computer to share content.
就在我写下最后这些话的时候，新闻正连篇累牍的报道RIAA对近300个人起诉的事件。Eminem因为对某人的音乐“取样实验”而被起诉。关于Bob Dylan“偷窃”某日本作者的风波刚刚平息。一位坚持不肯透露姓名的好莱坞位内部人士报导了“与几位制作人的一场了不起的谈话。他们想使用有一些非常不错的[旧]的内容，但由于没有授权而无法使用。他们有好几十个孩子，原本可以使用这些内容做出非常棒的东西来，但现在首先需要几十个律师来搞到授权才行。”国会议员们在谈论着批准一些计算机病毒来攻击被认为是侵权的计算机。众大学威胁要开除用计算机共享文件的学生。
Yet on the other side of the Atlantic, the BBC has just announced that it will build a “Creative Archive,” from which British citizens can download BBC content, and rip, mix, and burn it.14 And in Brazil, the culture minister, Gilberto Gil, himself a folk hero of Brazilian music, has joined with Creative Commons to release content and free licenses in that Latin American country.15
而在大西洋的另一边，BBC刚刚宣布它要建立一个“创作文档”，英国公民可以从这里下载BBC的内容，并且能够分开和混合这些内容，以及刻录光盘。在巴西，文化部长Gilberto Gil,一个巴西音乐的民间英雄，已经参加了创作共用协议，在拉丁美洲国家发布内容和自由许可证。
I've told a dark story. The truth is more mixed. A technology has given us a new freedom. Slowly, some begin to understand that this freedom need not mean anarchy. We can carry a free culture into the twenty-first century, without artists losing and without the potential of digital technology being destroyed. It will take some thought, and more importantly, it will take some will to transform the RCAs of our day into the Causbys.
Common sense must revolt. It must act to free culture. Soon, if this potential is ever to be realized.
我讲了一个黑暗的故事。真理更加难分难辨。技术给我们新的自由。一些人渐渐开始明白，这种自由并不意味着混乱。我们可以把自由文化带入二十一世纪，同时报障艺术家的权益不受损失，数字电子技术的潜力不受破坏。这需要一些思考，更需要我们把今日的RCA转变成Causbys的决心。
常理必须反抗。常理必须支持自由文化。如果潜力得以发挥，为时不会太久。

后记---(1)
AFTERWORD
At least some who have read this far will agree with me that something must be done to change where we are heading. The balance of this book maps what might be done.

I divide this map into two parts: that which anyone can do now, and that which requires the help of lawmakers. If there is one lesson that we can draw from the history of remaking common sense, it is that it requires remaking how many people think about the very same issue.

That means this movement must begin in the streets. It must recruit a significant number of parents, teachers, librarians, creators, authors, musicians, filmmakers, scientists—all to tell this story in their own words, and to tell their neighbors why this battle is so important.
Once this movement has its effect in the streets, it has some hope of having an effect in Washington. We are still a democracy. What people think matters. Not as much as it should, at least when an RCA stands opposed, but still, it matters. And thus, in the second part below, I sketch changes that Congress could make to better secure a free culture.
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至少，读到这里，一些人将赞同我的看法，必须采取某种行动来改变我们前进的方向。这本书的后面部分反映了那些可以采取的行动。
我把这种反映分为两部分：现在任何人都可以做的，以及那些需要在立法者的帮助下做的。如果我们可以从对常识进行注意的历史中吸取教训，那就是需要注意有多少人在考虑同样的问题。
这意味着这场运动必须在街头巷尾开始。必须征集大量的父母亲，教师，图书管理员，创作人，作家，音乐家，制片人，科学家－－所有的人，用他们的语言给他们讲这个故事，并告诉他们的邻居为什么这场仗这么重要。
一旦这场运动在街头有了影响，才有希望对华盛顿有一些影响。我们还是一个民主国家。人民的想法还是有用。虽然没有到它应有的程度，至少当RCA站在反对的立场时，但它仍然重要。因此，在下面的第二部分，我勾勒了一些国会应该作出的变化，来更好地保护一种自由文化。
US, NOW

Common sense is with the copyright warriors because the debate so far has been framed at the extremes—as a grand either/or: either property or anarchy, either total control or artists won’t be paid. If that really is the choice, then the warriors should win.

The mistake here is the error of the excluded middle. There are extremes in this debate, but the extremes are not all that there is. There are those who believe in maximal copyright—“All Rights Reserved”—and those who reject copyright—“No Rights Reserved.” The “All Rights Reserved” sorts believe that you should ask permission before you “use” a copyrighted work in any way. The “No Rights Reserved” sorts believe you should be able to do with content as you wish, regardless of whether you have permission or not.

When the Internet was first born, its initial architecture effectively tilted in the “no rights reserved” direction. Content could be copied perfectly and cheaply; rights could not easily be controlled. Thus, regardless of anyone’s desire, the effective regime of copyright under the
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original design of the Internet was “no rights reserved.” Content was “taken” regardless of the rights. Any rights were effectively unprotected.

This initial character produced a reaction (opposite, but not quite equal) by copyright owners. That reaction has been the topic of this book. Through legislation, litigation, and changes to the network’s design, copyright holders have been able to change the essential character of the environment of the original Internet. If the original architecture made the effective default “no rights reserved,” the future architecture will make the effective default “all rights reserved.” The architecture and law that surround the Internet’s design will increasingly produce an environment where all use of content requires permission. The “cut and paste” world that defines the Internet today will become a “get permission to cut and paste” world that is a creator’s nightmare.

What’s needed is a way to say something in the middle—neither “all rights reserved” nor “no rights reserved” but “some rights reserved”— and thus a way to respect copyrights but enable creators to free content as they see fit. In other words, we need a way to restore a set of freedoms that we could just take for granted before.

我们，现在
版权一方有着常识，因为到此为止，辩论已经框定在极端情况－－主要的不是/就是：不是所有权就是无政府主义，不是全盘控制就是艺术家们得不到报酬。如果真是这样的选择，那么他们该赢。
这 里的问题是把中间地带排除在外了。在这场辩论中是有极端情况，但极端情况不代表一切。是有一些人信仰最大程度上的版权――“保留所有权利”，也有一些人抵 制版权――“不保留任何权利”。“保留所有权利”的那一类人相信，在以任何方式“使用”受版权保护的作品时都需要申请许可；而“不保留任何权利”的这一类 人相信，应该能以你希望的方式来处理那些内容，不管你是不是拥有许可。

当Internet刚刚诞生的时候，它的初始架构有力地标志着“不保留任何权利”的方向。内容可以完美而便宜地复制，权利不容易得到控制。因此，不管人们的意愿如何，在最初Internet的设计下，实际的版权制度就是“不保留任何权利”。可以“拿走”内容，不管权利。任何权利都是无保护的。

版权拥有者对这种最初的特点有了反应（反对，也不完全是反对）。反应就是这本书的主题，通过立法，诉讼，和网络设计的改变，版权拥有者已经可以改变原来Internet环境的基本特点了。如果说原始架构导致了默认的“不保留任何权利”，将来的架构将导致默认的“保留所有权利”。 架构和围绕Internet设计法律将逐渐产生一种对内容的所有使用都需要许可的环境。定义了今天这个Internet的“拷贝粘贴”世界将变成一个“许可后拷贝粘贴”世界，那将是创作者的恶梦。

需要一种方式来谈谈中间地带的某种情况――既不是“保留所有权利”，也不是“不保留任何权利”，而是“保留某些权利”――因此这是一种尊重版权，而又可以让创作者使用合适的免费内容的方式。换句话说，我们需要一种方式来归还一些以前认为是想当然的自由。
Rebuilding Freedoms Previously
Presumed: Examples
If you step back from the battle I’ve been describing here, you will recognize this problem from other contexts. Think about privacy. Before the Internet, most of us didn’t have to worry much about data about our lives that we broadcast to the world. If you walked into a bookstore and browsed through some of the works of Karl Marx, you didn’t need to worry about explaining your browsing habits to your neighbors or boss. The “privacy” of your browsing habits was assured.

What made it assured?

AFTERWORD 277

Well, if we think in terms of the modalities I described in chapter 10, your privacy was assured because of an inefficient architecture for gathering data and hence a market constraint (cost) on anyone who wanted to gather that data. If you were a suspected spy for North Korea, working for the CIA, no doubt your privacy would not be assured. But that’s because the CIA would (we hope) find it valuable enough to spend the thousands required to track you. But for most of us (again, we can hope), spying doesn’t pay. The highly inefficient architecture of real space means we all enjoy a fairly robust amount of privacy. That privacy is guaranteed to us by friction. Not by law (there is no law protecting “privacy” in public places), and in many places, not by norms (snooping and gossip are just fun), but instead, by the costs that friction imposes on anyone who would want to spy.

Enter the Internet, where the cost of tracking browsing in particular has become quite tiny. If you’re a customer at Amazon, then as you browse the pages, Amazon collects the data about what you’ve looked at. You know this because at the side of the page, there’s a list of “recently viewed” pages. Now, because of the architecture of the Net and the function of cookies on the Net, it is easier to collect the data than not. The friction has disappeared, and hence any “privacy” protected by the friction disappears, too.

Amazon, of course, is not the problem. But we might begin to worry about libraries. If you’re one of those crazy lefties who thinks that people should have the “right” to browse in a library without the government knowing which books you look at (I’m one of those lefties, too), then this change in the technology of monitoring might concern you. If it becomes simple to gather and sort who does what in electronic spaces, then the friction-induced privacy of yesterday disappears.

It is this reality that explains the push of many to define “privacy” on the Internet. It is the recognition that technology can remove what friction before gave us that leads many to push for laws to do what friction did.1 And whether you’re in favor of those laws or not, it is the pattern that is important here.We must take affirmative steps to secure a
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kind of freedom that was passively provided before. A change in technology now forces those who believe in privacy to affirmatively act where, before, privacy was given by default.

A similar story could be told about the birth of the free software movement. When computers with software were first made available commercially, the software—both the source code and the binaries— was free. You couldn’t run a program written for a Data General machine on an IBM machine, so Data General and IBM didn’t care much about controlling their software.

That was the world Richard Stallman was born into, and while he was a researcher at MIT, he grew to love the community that developed when one was free to explore and tinker with the software that ran on machines. Being a smart sort himself, and a talented programmer, Stallman grew to depend upon the freedom to add to or modify other people’s work.

In an academic setting, at least, that’s not a terribly radical idea. In a math department, anyone would be free to tinker with a proof that someone offered. If you thought you had a better way to prove a theorem, you could take what someone else did and change it. In a classics department, if you believed a colleague’s translation of a recently discovered text was flawed, you were free to improve it. Thus, to Stallman, it seemed obvious that you should be free to tinker with and improve the code that ran a machine. This, too, was knowledge.Why shouldn’t it be open for criticism like anything else?

No one answered that question. Instead, the architecture of revenue for computing changed. As it became possible to import programs from one system to another, it became economically attractive (at least in the view of some) to hide the code of your program. So, too, as companies started selling peripherals for mainframe systems. If I could just take your printer driver and copy it, then that would make it easier for me to sell a printer to the market than it was for you.

Thus, the practice of proprietary code began to spread, and by the early 1980s, Stallman found himself surrounded by proprietary code.

AFTERWORD 279

The world of free software had been erased by a change in the economics of computing. And as he believed, if he did nothing about it, then the freedom to change and share software would be fundamentally weakened.

Therefore, in 1984, Stallman began a project to build a free operating system, so that at least a strain of free software would survive. That was the birth of the GNU project, into which Linus Torvalds’s “Linux” kernel was added to produce the GNU/Linux operating system.

Stallman’s technique was to use copyright law to build a world of software that must be kept free. Software licensed under the Free Software Foundation’s GPL cannot be modified and distributed unless the source code for that software is made available as well. Thus, anyone building upon GPL’d software would have to make their buildings free as well. This would assure, Stallman believed, that an ecology of code would develop that remained free for others to build upon. His fundamental goal was freedom; innovative creative code was a byproduct.

Stallman was thus doing for software what privacy advocates now do for privacy. He was seeking a way to rebuild a kind of freedom that was taken for granted before. Through the affirmative use of licenses that bind copyrighted code, Stallman was affirmatively reclaiming a space where free software would survive. He was actively protecting what before had been passively guaranteed.

Finally, consider a very recent example that more directly resonates with the story of this book. This is the shift in the way academic and scientific journals are produced.

As digital technologies develop, it is becoming obvious to many that printing thousands of copies of journals every month and sending them to libraries is perhaps not the most efficient way to distribute knowledge. Instead, journals are increasingly becoming electronic, and libraries and their users are given access to these electronic journals through password-protected sites. Something similar to this has been happening in law for almost thirty years: Lexis and Westlaw have had electronic versions of case reports available to subscribers to their ser-
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vice. Although a Supreme Court opinion is not copyrighted, and anyone is free to go to a library and read it, Lexis and Westlaw are also free to charge users for the privilege of gaining access to that Supreme Court opinion through their respective services.

There’s nothing wrong in general with this, and indeed, the ability to charge for access to even public domain materials is a good incentive for people to develop new and innovative ways to spread knowledge. The law has agreed, which is why Lexis and Westlaw have been allowed to flourish. And if there’s nothing wrong with selling the public domain, then there could be nothing wrong, in principle, with selling access to material that is not in the public domain.

But what if the only way to get access to social and scientific data was through proprietary services? What if no one had the ability to browse this data except by paying for a subscription?

As many are beginning to notice, this is increasingly the reality with scientific journals. When these journals were distributed in paper form, libraries could make the journals available to anyone who had access to the library. Thus, patients with cancer could become cancer experts because the library gave them access. Or patients trying to understand the risks of a certain treatment could research those risks by reading all available articles about that treatment. This freedom was therefore a function of the institution of libraries (norms) and the technology of paper journals (architecture)—namely, that it was very hard to control access to a paper journal.

As journals become electronic, however, the publishers are demanding that libraries not give the general public access to the journals. This means that the freedoms provided by print journals in public libraries begin to disappear. Thus, as with privacy and with software, a changing technology and market shrink a freedom taken for granted before.

This shrinking freedom has led many to take affirmative steps to restore the freedom that has been lost. The Public Library of Science (PLoS), for example, is a nonprofit corporation dedicated to making scientific research available to anyone with a Web connection. Authors

of scientific work submit that work to the Public Library of Science. That work is then subject to peer review. If accepted, the work is then deposited in a public, electronic archive and made permanently available for free. PLoS also sells a print version of its work, but the copyright for the print journal does not inhibit the right of anyone to redistribute the work for free.

This is one of many such efforts to restore a freedom taken for granted before, but now threatened by changing technology and markets. There’s no doubt that this alternative competes with the traditional publishers and their efforts to make money from the exclusive distribution of content. But competition in our tradition is presumptively a good—especially when it helps spread knowledge and science.

重建以往的自由
假设：例子
如果回退到我在这里已经提到过的战斗，你将从其他上下文中把这个问题辨别出来。想想隐私，在Internet之前，我们大部分人都不必担心自己散布的生活数据。如果走到某个书店，翻了翻卡尔·马克思的一些著作，你不必担心要如何向你的老板或邻居解释你的浏览习惯。你的浏览习惯的“隐私”可以放心。

是什么保护了它呢？

好，如果考虑一下我在第十章描述的形式方面，隐私得到保护是因为收集数据的架构效率太低，因此对任何想要收集数据的人来说存在市场约束（或代价）。如果怀疑你是一名北朝鲜的间谍，对CIA工作而言，无疑你的隐私无法得到保证。但那是因为，CIA（我 们希望）认为花上成千上万的人跟踪你非常值得。但对我们大多数人来说（同样我们也希望），秘密侦察毫无意义。真实世界里，效率非常低下的架构意味着我们大 家享受着相对比较宽松的隐私。这种隐私得到保障是因为冲突，不是因为法律（没有法律在公共场所保护“隐私”），而且在许多场所，不是因为规范（四处窥探和 搬弄是非仅仅是好玩而已）；但是相反，是因为每个想要秘密监视的人要付出代价的冲突

进入Internet，跟踪特定浏览习惯的代价大大减少了。如果你是Amazon的顾客，当你浏览网页时，Amazon收集了你访问何处的数据，你知道它在收集，因为页面的一边有一个“最近看过”的页面。现在，因为网络的架构，以及网络上的Cookies功能，数据收集比不收集还要容易。冲突消失了，因此任何受这个冲突保护的“隐私”也消失了。

Amazon， 当然，不是问题。但我们可能开始担心图书馆。如果你是疯狂的左翼分子之一，认为人民应该有权浏览图书馆而不让政府知道你正在看哪类书（我也是这种左翼分子 之一），那么你会关心这种监视技术的变化。如果收集和分类人们在电子世界的所作所为变得简单，那么以往冲突引起的隐私消失了。

就是这样的现实解释了为什么许多人在推动Internet上 隐私的定义。就是认识到技术可以消除冲突带给我们的隐私，导致大家推动法律来做冲突以前所做的一切。而且不管你是否喜欢这些法律，它就是这里的重要模式， 我们必须采取积极的措施来保护以前被动提供的自由。技术上的变革现在迫使那些信仰隐私的人积极地在那些以往默认获得隐私的地方行动起来。
自由软件运动也是一个类似的故事。当附带软件的计算机刚刚开始商业性提供时，软件――包括源代码和二进制代码――都是免费的。你不可能在一台IBM机器上运行为Data General机器编写的程序，所以Data General和IBM不关心对它们软件的控制。

对Richard Stallman来说，那是一个生来如此的世界，而当他成为MIT的研究员时，他慢慢爱上了那种由人们自由探索和修补机器上的软件而发展起来的团体。由于他非常聪明，是一个有天分的程序员，Stallman开始依赖那种增加或修改别人作品的自由。

在学术性的环境里，至少，这并不是一个非常激进的想法。在数学系，任何人都可以自由修补其他人给出的证明。如果自认为有一个更好的定理证明方法，你可以采用别人的方法并作一些改动。在古典文学系，如果相信某个同事对最近发现的文字翻译有问题，你可以自由地改善它。因此，对Stallman来说，好像显然你应该能自由修补和改进机器上运行的软件。这，也是一种知识，为什么它不能象其他东西一样对批评开放？

没 有人回答那个问题。相反，计算处理的收入架构变了。当程序可能从一个系统引入到另一个系统时，隐藏自己程序的代码变得在经济上富有吸引力（至少在某些人看 来）。同样，也由于公司们开始出售主机系统的外围设备。如果我只是拿到你的打印机驱动程序并复制一下，那么在市场上我将比你更容易销售打印机。

这样，代码所有权开始传开了，到80年代早期为止，Stallman发现他周围满是拥有所有权的代码。

由于计算经济的改变，自由软件的世界坍塌了。他相信，如果不做点什么，对软件改变和共享的自由将完全被削弱。

因此，在1984年，Stallman开始了一个自由操作系统的项目，那么至少一种自由软件的分支将存留下来。那就是GNU项目的产生，加入到Linus Torvalds的Linux内核之后，产生了GNU/Linux操作系统。

Stallman的方法是想用版权法来建立一种必须保持自由的软件世界。在自由软件组织（Free Software Foundation）的GPL许可下的软件只有在源代码也可用时才能修改和分发。于是，任何人在GPL之上开发的软件将不得不让他们的产出物同样自由。这样将保证，Stallman相信，将形成一种代码的平衡，来保持其他人在其上开发的自由。他最初的目的是自由，创造性的代码只是额外的收获。

于是Stallman为软件做了现在隐私鼓吹着要做的事。他在寻找一种方法重建某种以前理所当然的自由。通过积极使用附带版权代码的许可，Stallman富有成效地开垦了一片自由软件可以存活的空间。他在主动保护着过去被动得到的保障。

最后，来看一个最近的例子，这个例子和本书的故事更加直接共鸣。这是学术和科学杂志产生方式的转变。

随着数字技术的发展，对许多人来说，每月印制数千册杂志，并把它们送到图书馆显然不是一种分发知识的有效方式，反过来，杂志越来越电子化，图书馆和用户也通过密码保护的网站来访问这些电子杂志。在法律上，30年以来有一些类似的事情发生：Lexis和Westlaw都对订阅服务者提供个案分析的电子版本。尽管最高法院的意见并没有版权，任何人都可以去图书馆阅读，Lexis和Westlaw还是可以通过它们各自的服务来对得到授权访问最高法院意见的用户收费。

总的来说没什么问题，事实上，能对公共领域资料访问进行收费对那些开发新方式传播知识的人来说是一种很好的激励。法律已经承认，那就是为什么允许Lexis和Westlaw繁盛的原因。而且，如果出售公共领域没什么问题，那么，原则上，出售非公共领域资料的访问权也不会有什么问题。

但如果访问社会和科学数据的唯一方式就是通过专有服务，那又怎么样呢？

就 象很多人开始意识到的那样，越来越多的科学杂志就是如此。当这些杂志用纸的形式分发时，图书馆可以让任何来到图书馆的人借阅它。因此，癌症病人可能成为癌 症专家，因为图书馆允许他们借阅。或者试图理解某种治疗方式风险的病人可以通过阅读所有跟该治疗有关的文章来研究那些风险。因此这种自由是图书馆研究（标 准），和纸张杂志技术（架构）的功能――也就是说，很难控制对纸张杂志的访问。

然而，当杂志慢慢电子化，出版社希望图书馆不要让一般的公众访问这些杂志。这意味着由公共图书馆中印刷杂志提供的自由开始消失了。因此，因为私有，因为软件，一项变革技术，和市场，缩减了以往理所当然的自由。

这种缩减让许多人采取坚定的措施，来恢复那些失去了的自由。例如，Public Library of Science（PLoS，科学公共图书馆）是一个非赢利的组织，致力于可以让任何人通过网络获取科学研究成果。科学工作的作者们把工作提交到PLoS，该项工作将受到同行评审。如果被接纳，该项工作将存放到一个公共的电子档案中，并且可以永久自由访问。PLoS也出售该工作的印刷版本，但该印刷版本的版权并不约束任何人对该工作进行再分发的权利。

这是重建以往自由的努力之一，但现在受到了变革的技术和市场的威胁。无疑这种替代方式正在和传统出版商以及他们从对内容的独占分发中获利进行竞争，但在我们的传统中可以推测，竞争是好的――尤其是当它有助于传播知识和科学时。
重建自由文化：一个想法

同样的策略可以用在文化上，来回应那些通过法律和技术生效的，日益增多的控制。

加入Creative Commons（创作共用）。创作共用是在马萨诸塞州成立的一个非赢利组织，不过它的地点在斯坦福大学。它的目标是在现在盛行的极端制度之上建立一个合理的版权层次。通过让人们更容易在别人的作品上工作，通过简化创作者表达别人获取和在自己作品上再创作的自由来达到这一点。简单的标签，绑定到对人可读的描述，以及防攻击的许可，让它成为可能。

简单――意味着没有中间人，或者说，没有律师。通过发展一个自由的许可集合，让人们附带在他们的内容上，创作共用的目标是为内容标志一个范围，让它可以容易地，并且可靠地从中再创作。 这些标签链接到可机读的许可版本，让计算机能自动识别那些易于共享的内容。这三种表达方式一起――一个合法的许可，一个可人读的描述，和可机读的标签―― 组成一个创作共用的许可。创作共用的许可对任何接触到该许可的人建立了一种授权自由，而且更重要的是，完美地表达了，那个和许可相关联的人，相信在“所 有”和“没有”的极端之间有某种不同的东西存在。内容用CC的标志来做记号，并不意味着版权的放弃，而是说授予了一定的自由。

这 种自由超越了合法使用承诺的自由。他们精度的范围视创作者的选择而定。创作者可以选择一种允许任何使用的许可，只要授予了权限；可以选择一种只允许非商业 使用的许可；也可以选择一种许可，在（使用者）给予其他人和原作品同样的许可的情况下，就可以任意使用（“共享和共享一致”）。或任意使用，但不可派生。 或其他任何在开发领域的使用，或任何抽样使用，只要不全部复制。还有最后，任何教育性的使用。

从 而，这些选择在默认的版权法之上建立了一个自由的范围。他们也使得自由超越了传统的合法使用。最重要的是，他们用一种后来者也可以使用和依赖，不用聘请律 师，的方式表达了这些自由。创作共用因而旨在建立一个内容层次，由一个合理版权法层次来管理，其他人可以在此之上构建。个人和创作者们的自愿选择将使该内 容可用，该内容也回过头来让我们可用重建一个公共领域。

这只是创作共用的多个项目之一，当然，创作共用并不是唯一追求这种自由的组织。但是把创作共用和其他许多组织区分开来的关键是，我们并不是只对讨论公共领域或设法得到立法者的帮助来建立公共领域感兴趣，我们的目标是建立一种内容消费者和生产者（Mia Garlick律师称为内容受益者）的运动，他们帮助建立这个公共领域，并且通过他们的作品，来证明公共领域对其他创作的重要性。

这个目标不是要与“保留所有权利”对抗，而是对它们进行补充。问题是我们的法律，作为一种文化，是几个世纪以前的法律产生的结果，那些法律已经老化了，却应用于一种可能只有杰弗逊才想象过的技术。那些规则也许对那时候的技术背景有过意义，但它们不适用于数字技术背景。需要新的规则――有着不同的自由，用人们没有律师也能使用的方式来表达――了。创作共用提供了一种方法让人们可以有效地开始建立那些规则。

为什么创作者们可以参与放弃所有的控制？一些人是为了更好地传播他们的内容。例如，Cory Doctorow（科里·多克特罗），他是一位科幻小说作者。他的第一部小说Down and Out in the Magic Kingdom（神秘王国潦倒记），就是在书店发售的同一天，在创作共用的许可下在线免费发行。

为什么出版商会同意这样做？我猜想可能出于这样的理由：（1）有一些人不管科里的书是否在Internet上都会购买他的书，（2）一些人，如果不是从网上免费得到，可能从来没听说过科里的书。（1）里面的一部分人将下载科里的书，不去购买，称为不良的（1）读者；而（2）里面一部分人下载了科里的书，喜欢它，然后决定去买一本，这是良好的（2）读者。如果良好的（2）读者比不良的（1）读者多，那么在线免费发行科里小说的策略将增加该书的销售量。

的确，该书出版商的经验明确支持这个结论。第一次印刷的书在出版商所期望的几个月之前就售罄了。科幻小说作者的第一部小说完全成功了。

免费的内容可能增加非免费内容的价值，这种想法也由另一位作者的经验证实了。Peter Wayner（彼得‧威纳），写了一本关于自由软件运动的书，叫做Free for All（开放原始码），
在他的书卖完以后，在创作共用的许可下，在线免费提供了一个电子版本。然后他注意了一下该书的旧书书店价格，正如他所预言的那样，随着下载量的增加，这本书的旧书价格也同样攀升了。

这 些都是使用创作共用来更好地传播专有内容的例子。我相信，那是创作共用美妙而又普遍的使用。还有一些人因为其他理由使用创作共用许可，很多人使用“抽样许 可”，因为除此之外显得很虚伪，抽样许可的意思是，其他人可以自由使用许可作品的抽样内容，不管是商业还是非商业目的，他们只是不能自由制作完全拷贝。这 跟他们自己的艺术是一致的――他们，也从其他作品那里取样。因为“合法”的取样代价那么高（Walter Leaphart，生来就从别人的音乐里取样的rap组合Public Enemy人民公敌，的经理，说他不“允许” Public Enemy再作任何取样了，因为法律成本太高2），这些艺术家发行到创作环境的内容，让别人可以在他们的基础上使用，然后他们创作的形式也形成了。

最 后，还有很多人把他们的内容标志成创作共用许可，只是因为他们想要对其他人表达在这场辩论中平衡的重要性。如果只是随波逐流，你可能很肯定地说你信仰“保 留所有权利”的模式。对你来说不错，但是对很多人来说不是这样。很多人相信，不管好莱坞和影迷们的规则如何适用，它并不是大多数创作者看待和他们内容相关 的权利的合适描述。创作共用许可表达了这种“保留某些权利”的观点，并且给了大家对其他人表达的机会。

在创作共用最初6个月的实验中，超过一百万件作品得到了自由文化的许可。下一步将是与中间件内容提供者们合作，帮助他们把用户用创作共用自由标志内容的这种简单方式构建到他们的技术中去。接着下一步就是，注视和祝贺那些在自由内容的基础上建立了内容的创作者们。

这些是重建一个公共领域的基础步骤。不只是争论，而是行动。建立一个公共领域是第一步，告诉人们这个领域对创作和革新来说有多重要。创作共用依靠自愿的行为来达成重建，他们将通向一个世界，在这个世界里，可以让超越自愿的行为成为可能。

创作共用只是一个例子，个人和创作者自愿的努力可以改变现在统治创作领域的权利混合状况。这个项目并不和版权竞争，而是作为它的补充，它的目标不是打败作者的权利，而是让作者和创作者更容易行使他们的权利，更灵活，更便宜。我们相信，这种区别将使得创作更容易传播。

Conclusion: (结语(简体), Tranlsator: Haochen; Piggie )

Afterword: (后记(简体),Tranlsator: WindyJ; proofreader: vanvan)